Judgment:
A. Pasayat, J.
1. In this appeal Under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act 1940 (in short, the 'Act') challenge is to the judgment dated 23-7-1993 passed by learned Subordinate Judge. Bhubaneswar making an award made by the Arbitrator, rule of the Court.
2. The controversy has the following background:
A dispute was raised relating to fixation of rent in respect of a house taken by National Water Development Agency (in short. oNWDA') on rent from Arun Kumar Pattanaik (hereinafter referred to as the 'landlord') Misc. Case No. 17 of 1991 was filed by the landlord Under Section 8(2) of the Act for appointment of an Arbitrator and accordingly, on 30 3-1992 an Arbitrator was appointed. On 19-12-1992 award was passed by the Arbitrator and intimation was given to the parties. On receipt of the same. Original Suit No. 323 of 1993 was registered in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Bhubaneswar. The same was admitted on 19-1-1993. Notice in the suit was issued to both parties by the Court, fixing 10-5-1992 for the purpose of service report. On 21-1-1993 landlord entered appearance through Advocate. Direction was given by the Court to put up the matter on the date fixed. On 19-1-1993 the memo of appearance for the NWDA and two other officials was filed. Prayer was made for grant of a month's time to file objection. Court directed to put up the matter on the date fixed. On 10-5-1993 NWDA and two officials filed objection which was registered as Misc. Case No. 188 of 1993. In the suit an application was filed by the landlord to make the award rule of the Court. Objection was raised by him relating to maintainability of the Misc. Case filed on the ground that the same was filed beyond permissible thirty days. Though the learned Subordinate Judge held that the Court can condone the delay, yet refused to do it in the instant case on the ground that there was no petition Under Section 6 of the Indian Limitation Act. 1963 (in short, the Limitation Act'). Accordingly, the award was made the rule of the Court.
3. In support of the appeal, the learned counsel urged that there was no notice in terms of Section 14(2) of the Act and therefore, the objection filed on 10-6-1993 was within time. Reference was made to Section 14(2) concontend that notice has to be given to the parties regarding fiding of the award. In any event it is contended that in the petition dated 29-1-1993 filed by the A.G.P. a month's time was prayed for to file objection. The Court directed the matter to be put up on the date fixed. Obviously the prayer for time was not rejected and when objection was filed on 10-5-1993, in the peculiar circumstances the Court should not have rejected it on the ground that it was filed belatedly. According to him, absence of petition Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not relevant. The learned counsel for landlord on the other hand submitted that the period of Limitation runs from the date of knowledge of filing of the award, and merely because time petition was filed that was not sufficient to extend the period of limitation to file objection. Addition- ally, it is submitted that objection purportedly filed Under Sections 30 and 33 of the Act has no basis, and no Interference is called for.
4. Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act requires the Arbitrator or the Umpire to give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing of the award. Sub-section (2) of the said section requires the Court after filing of the award to give notice to the parties of the filing of the award. The difference in language in the two sub-sections with regard to giving of notice is significant and clearly indicates that the notice which the Court is to give to the parties of the filing of the award need not be a notice in writing. It can be given orally. No question of the service of the notice in the formal way of delivering the notice or tendering it to the party can arise in the case of a notice given orally. There is sufficient compliance with the requirements of Sub-section (2) of Section 14 with respect to giving of notice to parties if there is communication of the information that an award has been filed. Notice does not necessarily mean communication in writing. It means 'intimation' 'intelligence', warning' and has this meaning in expressions like 'give notice, have notice', and it also means 'formal intimation of something, or instructions to do something'. As observed by the apex Court in Nilakantha Shidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath Somanna Ningashetti : AIR 1962 SC 666, the expression 'give notice' in Sub-section (2) of Section 14 simply means giving intimation of the filing of the award. Notice to pleader is notice to the party in view of Rule 5 of Order 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which provides that any process served on the pleader of any party shall be presumed to be duly communicated and made known to the party whom the pleader represents and, unless the Court otherwise directs, shall be as effectual for all purposes as if the same had been given to or served on the party in person. Similar view was also expressed by the apex Court in Indian Revon Corporation Ltd. v. Raunag and Company Pvt. Ltd.: AIR 1988 SC 2054; and Food Corporation of India and Ors. v. E. Kuttapoan : AIR 1993 SC 2629.
5. In the case at hand as the fact situation indicated above shows, the award was filed on 19-12-1992 before the Court, and the same was registered as 0.3. No. 323 of 1992. Notice was directed to be issued to the parties by order dated 19-1-1993 fixing the date of appearance to 10 5-1993. Bui much prior to that date, i. e., on 21-1-1993 the landlord filed vakalatnama and the matter was directed to be put on the date fixed. Similar is the case with the present appellants. They entered appearance on 29-1-1993, and prayed for time. It is, thus obvious that at least from 29-1-1993 the period of limitation started running so far as the appellants are concerned in the absence of any material to show as to when they came to know about filing of award, and from what source. The question is whether the direction given by the Court on 29-1-1993 to place the matter on 10,5-1993 meant acceptance of the prayer for time. The prayer was neither accepted nor rejected, but the simple direction was to place it on the date fixed. It can certainly provide a foundation to the appellants to believe that they could file the objection on or before the date fixed. In fact objection has been tiled on 10-5-1993. It is not in dispute that the Court has power 1o extend time by condoning the delay in filing of an objection beyond 30 days. This position has also been succinctly stated by this Court in Executive Engineer, Rural Engineering Division, Puri v. M/s Construction India; Vol.52' (1981) CLT 458 : and Union of India v. M/s. Builders Union : AIR 1981 Orissa 188. The Court could, therefore accept the objection filed on 10-5-1993. But, it refused to 'do so on the ground that there was no petition filed Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
6. A reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act makes it clear that a petition is not strictly necessary because if the appellant or the applicant satisfied the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the prescribed period, the Court may admit it after the prescribed period. The satisfaction is that of the Court. The language of Section 5 does not expressly or by necessary implication require filing of a written application to obtain a relief under this section. Power is given to a Court to admit an appeal or application beyond the prescribed time if the appellant or the applicant satisfied it that he had reasonable ground for not preferring the appeal or application within the prescribed time. It is for the Court to exercise its judicial discretion soundly in the interest of justice while dealing with such matters. Hence no formal application or written application is necessary. The discretion Under Section 5 of the limitation Act is to be judicial discretion and not arbitrary one. If under explainable circumstances an appeal or application is filed but without a formal application or written application indicating the reasons for delay in presentation of the same, the appellate Court should circumvent technicality and afford reasonable opportunity to the opposite party to mend matters. Otherwise it would lead to miscarriage of justice. However, the well accepted practice of requiring a written application is because of desirability of affording the opponent an opportunity to point out fallacies, if any, in the reasons indicated for delayed presentation.
7. In the case at hand, the basic features were before the Court. There is not much of factual dispute about the background in which the objection was filed beyond thirty days. In that view of the matter, the refusal to take note of the objection filed is indefensible. The judgment is set aside. The learned Subordinate Judge shall consider the objection on its own merits. To avoid unnecessary delay the parties are directed to appear before the learned Subordinate Judge on 6th September, 1994, so that a date for hearing the objection can be fixed. It is, however, made clear that I have expressed no opinion about merits of the case and tenability of the objection raised by the present appellants.
The miscellaneous appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs.