Judgment:
A. Pasayat, J.
1. In this appeal from Jail, Rathia alias Dandha Munda (hereinafter referred to as 'accused') calls in question legality of order of conviction recorded under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') for having allegedly committed murder by intentionally causing the death of a Forest Guard, Abhiram Behera (hereinafter referred to as 'deceased') and also under Section 201, IPC, for causing the evidence of murder to disappear by throwing the dead body with the intention of screening himself from legal punishment, on 27th April, 1991 at about 11 A.M.
2. Prosecution version as unfolded during trial is as follows :
Deceased was working as a Forest Guard on 27.4.1991 in Kinabaga beat within the Forest Range of Garposh in the district of Sambalpur. As usual, on that day he had been to the forest Kinabaga beat to perform his duty and in course of his visit he found that accused Ratia Munda had engaged labourers who had already cut Sal trees inside Chimka forest and after cutting the trees those labourers were sawing the log. When the deceased found that accused had committed offence punishable under the Forest laws, he booked a case against him, seized the sawn wood and kept the same in zima of one Singh Toppo (P.W.1) of village Dangajor and directed him to keep the same in his custody until further order. Thereafter, the deceased came to the house of P.W. 1 and started preparing seizure-list and other documents. When the deceased was thus engaged, accused requested him not to book a case, but the deceased did not agree. Suddenly, the accused picked up the forest seized hammer, which is usually used by every forest guard to put amark on the log and tree after seizure and dealt three blows on the head of the deceased. When P.W. 1 protested and came to the rescue of the deceased, accused rushed towards him to assault. On account of fear, P.W. 1, fled away from his house to the house of Singha Majhi who is his immediate neighbour. P.W.1 narrated the incident before Singha Majhi. Both of them went towards the place of occurrence, and found accused carrying the deceased on his shoulder towards the forest. Both Singha Majhi and P.W. 1 followed the accused and found that the accused threw the dead body of the deceased inside Birngapatra forest under a Kendu tree. P.W. 1 immediately went to the neighbouring hamlet and informed this incident to the villagers who came and found the dead-body lying under a kendu tree. Thereafter, P.W. 1 and others went to Garposh Outpost and reported the matter to one constable who was in charge of that day. Investigation was undertaken and on completion thereof, charge-sheet was submitted.
3. Accused pleaded innocence stating that he was falsely implicated. He further stated in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code') that P.W. 1 was the real author of the crime.
4. In order to establish the accusations, eleven witnesses were examined. Out of them, P.W. 1 was stated to be eye-witness, and PW. 9 to be a witness before whom the accused made an extra-judicial confession that he was the author of the crime. Placing reliance on the evidence of P.Ws 1 and 9, learned trial Judge found the accused guilty and convicted as aforesaid and sentenced him to imprisonment for life for offence punishable under Section 302, IPC and imprisonment for two years for the other offence and both the sentences were directed to run concurrently.
5. In support of the appeal, Mr. G.S. Pani, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the prosecution has filed to establish its case. According to him, learned trial Judge should not have convicted on the basis of evidence of a single witness. Mr. R.K. Patnaik, learned counsel for the State supported the order.
6. The well known maxim that 'Evidence has to be weighed and not counted' has been given statutory placement in Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short 'Evidence Act') which provides as under :
'134. No particular number of witness shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact'.
7. This section makes a departure from the English Law where a number of statutes still prohibit convictions for certain categories of offences on the testimony of a single witness. This difference was noticed by the Privy Council in Mohamad Gugal Esa Mamasan Ger Alalan v. The King, AIR 1946 P.C. 3 wherein it was laid down as under :
'It was also submitted on behalf of the appellant that assuming the unsworned evidence was admissible the Court could not act upon it unless it was corroborated. In England, where provision has been made for the reception of unsworned evidence from a child, it has always been provided that the evidence must be corroborated in some material particularly, implicating the accused. But in the Indian Act there is no such provision and the evidence is made admissible whether corroborated or not. Once there is admissible evidence a Court can act upon it, corroboration unless required by statute goes only to the weight and value of the evidence.
It is a sound rule in practice not to act on the uncorroborated evidence of a child whether sworn or unsworned but this is a rule of prudence and not of law.'
8. The Privy Council decision was considered by the Apex Court in Vadivelu Thevar v. The State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614, in which it was observed as under :
'On a consideration of the relevant authorities and the provisions of the Evidence Act, the following propositions may be safely stated as firmly established;
(1) As a general rule, a Court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated. One credible witness outweighs the testimony of a number of other witnesses of indifferent characters.
(2) Unless corroboration is insisted upon by statute, Courts should not insist on corroboration except in cases where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself requires as a rule of prudence, that corroboration should be insisted upon for example, in the case of a child witness, or of a witness whose evidence is that of an accomplice or of an analogous character.
(3) Whether corroboration of the testimony of a single witness is or is not necessary, must depend upon facts and circumstances of each case and no general rule can be laid down in a matter like this much depends upon the judicial discretion of the Judge before whom the case comes'.
In view of these considerations, the Court should not insist upon plurality of witnesses. Section 134 of the Evidence Act, has categorically laid it down that no particular number of witnesses shall, in any case, be required for the proof of any fact. The Legislature determined, as long ago as 1872 presumably after due consideration of the pros and cons that it shall not be necessary for proof of disproof of a fact, to call any particular number of witnesses.
9. It is not seldom that a crime has been committed in the presence of only one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of uncommon occurrence where determination of guilt depends entirely on circumstantial evidence. If the Legislature were to insist upon plurality of witnesses, cases where the testimony of a single witness only could be available in proof of the crime, would go unpunished. It is here that the discretion of the presiding Judge comes into play. The matter thus must depend upon the circumstances of each case and the quality of the evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be either accepted or rejected. If such a testimony is found by the Court to be entirely reliable, there is no legal impediment to the conviction of the accused person on such proof. Guilt of an accused person may be established on the testimony of single witness, even though a considerable number of witnesses may be forthcoming to testify to the truth of the case for the prosecution. Hence, it is a sound and well-established rule of law that the Court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for proving or disproving a fact. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely:
(1) Wholly reliable;
(2) Wholly unreliable;
(3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.-
In the first category of proof, the Court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way--it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above approach or tainted with interestedness and the like. In the second category, the Court equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the Court has to be circumspect and to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. There is another danger in insisting on plurality of the oral evidence of a single witness, if Courts were to insist on plurality of witnesses, in proof of any fact. They will be indirectly encouraging tampering with evidence. Situations may arise and do arise where only a single person is available to give evidence in support of a disputed fact. The Court naturally has to weigh carefully such a testimony and if it is satisfied that the evidence is reliable and free from all taints which tend to render oral testimony open to the suspicion, it becomes its duty to act upon such testimony.
10. The decision in Vadivelu's case (supra) has since been followed in Ramratan and Ors. v. The State of Rajasthan AIR 1962 SC 424, Guli Chand and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1974 SC 276, Bari v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1976 SC 560, Vanula Bhushan and Vanula Krishnan v. State of Tamilnadu, AIR 1989 SC 236; and in Jagdish Prasad v. State of M.P. AIR 1994 SC 1251.
11. Some other cases of Apex Court in which the question of sole witness constituting the basis of conviction or otherwise has been considered are State of Haryana v. Manoj Kumar (JT) 1993 (6) SC 297, Brij Basi Lal v. State of M.P. 1991 Suppl. (1) SCC 200, Jai Prakash v. State (Delhi Administration), 1991 (2) SCC 371, Peodireddi Subbareddi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1991 SC 1366, Jaya Ram Shiva Tagore v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1991 SC 1735, Anil Pukhan v. State of Assam, AIR 1993 SC 1462 and Ram Kumar v. State of U.P. AIR 1992 SC 1602.
12. On a conspectus of these decisions referred to above, it clearly comes out that there has been no departure from the principles laid down that on the basis of the statement of a single eye-witness, whose credibility is not shaken by any adverse circumstance appearing on the record against him can form the basis of conviction. The Court has to, at the same time, be convicted that the witness is a faithful one. There shall be no requirement for corroboration by any other eye-witness. If the Court finds the witness to be credible and truthful one, his evidence can form basis of conviction. The incident might have occurred when there was no possibility of any other witness being present. Indeed the Court has to see the quality and not the quantity of evidence. That being the background, we found no infirmity on the learned trial Judge accepting the evidence of P.W. 1. Evidence of this witness has been analysed carefully and after careful analysis, learned, trial Judge has found him to be a truthful witness and therefore, has rightly placed reliance on his version. Additionally, P.W. 9 has deposed that on 27.4.1991, Saturday, in the evening at about 8 to 9 P.M. while he was going to take Khajuri Rasa, at that time on the way he met the accused and made conversation with him. Accused confessed before him that he had assaulted the deceased with seized hammer and a tangia (axe). This witness is an independent witness and nothing has been elicited from his cross-examination to even lay foundation for plea of false implication. There is no reason as to why he would falsely implicate the accused. Additionally he being the friend of the accused, confidence could have been reposed for the purpose of making a confession. In that view of the matter, the conviction under Section 302, IPC is well founded. Evidence of P.W. 1 regarding accused carrying the dead body to the jungle, and throwing the dead body is quite elaborate and detailed. Provisions of Section 201, IPC have been rightly applied. We find nothing improper in the conviction and it does not warrant interference. The appeal fails.
S.C. Datta, J.
13. I agree.