B.P. Das, J.
1. This Civil Revision is directed against the order dated 10.11.2000 passed by the Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Berhampur in E.P. No. 1 of 1995.
2. The facts leading to this application, in short, are that present opposite parties 1 to 3 were owners in possession of Ac.1.70 and Ac.0.95 decimals of land appertaining to Survey Nos. 616/1 and 616/2 in Mouza Lanjipalli. By the notification issued under Sections 4(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, which was published in the Extraordinary Gazette No. 1450 dated 3.11.1977, the aforesaid land was acquired by the Land Acquisition Officer, Ganjam for the purpose of construction of 'Food Grains Godown' on the requisition of the Superintendent, Central Ware Housing Corporation of India and treating the acquired land to be cultivable land, the Land Acquisition Officer by an order dated 2.2.1978 determined the compensation at the rate of Rs. 30,000/- per acre and awarded a sum of Rs. 93,299.20 as compensation including 15% solatium and 6% interest from the date of dispossession till the date of award. Not being satisfied with the aforesaid quantum of compensation, the present opposite parties filed objection before the Land Acquisition Officer and the Land Acquisition Officer referred the matter to the Civil Court in terms of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Learned Sub-Judge, Berhampur, after hearing the parties, by order dated 20.2.1987 fixed the market value of the acquired land at Rs. 1,22,880/- per acre and awarded an additional amount of 12% per annum on the market value fixed by him and further awarded 30% solatium on the market value so fixed and adding to the above also awarded interest at the rate of 9% per annum for the first year from the date of dispossession and 15% per annum thereafter till payment of the balance amount. Against the aforesaid order of the Sub-Judge, the Land Acquisition Officer, Ganjam, preferred First Appeal No. 131 of 1987 before this Court and this Court by judgment dated 6.2.1990 allowed the appeal in part and fixed the market value of the acquired land at Rs. 1,20,000/- per acre and directed that the claimants would be entitled to permissible statutory benefits under the Land Acquisition Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984. After the disposal of the said First Appeal, the opposite party-decree-holders filed proceeding for execution of the decree passed by the Sub-Judge in L.A. M.J.C. Nd.57 of 1980 and by this Court in F.A. No. 131 of 1987. After receiving the summons from the Executing Court, the Land Acquisition Officer filed his objection which was rejected by the Executing Court by order dated 2.8.1996. Against the aforesaid order, the present petitioner, namely, Central Ware Housing Corporation, Bhubaneswar, preferred Civil Revision No. 244 of 1997 before this Court. This Court disposed of the said Civil Revision on 27.7.2000 allowing the same and setting aside the order of the Civil Judge (Sr. Division) dated 2.8.1996 and directing the Civil Judge to reconsider the objection filed before him with regard to entitlement of the land owners under the Amending Act, 1984. Thereafter, in terms of the order passed in Civil Revision No. 244 of 1997, the present petitioner through its Manager appeared before the Civil Judge and filed his, objection to the execution petition. The Civil Judge (Sr. Division) by order dated 10.11.2000 partly allowed the objection raised by the judgment debtor, i.e., the present petitioner by holding that:. the D. Hr-claimants are not entitled to the additional amount of 12% on the principal amount as claimed by them. The D. Hr-claimants are only entitled to the value of the land at the market rate fixed by the Hon'ble Court in F.A. 131/87 and are further entitled to the benefits of 30% solatium, 9% interest per annum for the first year from the date of dispossession and 15% interest thereafter till final payment is made. The D. Hr-claimants are directed to file fresh calculation sheet as per the observation made in this order and the calculation sheet filed by the D. Hr-claimants on 4.1.95 along with their E.P. petition is hereby held to be not correct and the D. Hr-claimants are entitled to the said amount as it includes additional amount of 12% on Rs. 3,18,000/- from 3.11.77 to 28.1,78 amounting to Rs. 9,220/- to which they are not legally entitled to....
3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the judgment debtor, i.e., the Central Ware Housing Corporation has filed this revision petition raising several grounds. One of such grounds is that the benefits of the Amending Act would apply only to those claimants, whose awards were pending before the Land Acquisition Officers and not to others. In the instant case, as the proceeding was not pending before the Land Acquisition Officer when the Amending Act came into force, the provisions of the Amending Act are not applicable even if the matter was pending in appeal on the relevant date. Alternatively, it was argued that the claimants are not entitled to the interest on solatium but interest will be payable only on the awarded amount.
4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner drawing my attention to the decision rendered by this Court in Land Acquisition Officer, Pallahara Zone Angul v. Abala Biswal and Ors. 2000 (II) OLR 467, argued that as the matter was pending before the Civil judge when the amendment came into force, the claimants would be entitled to solatium at the rate of 30 per cent. In the said decision, it was further held that the claimant shall not be entitled to the benefits under Section 23(1-A) of the L.A. Act and the benefit of higher interest as contemplated in the amendment Act.
Learned Counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the decision of this Court, in Arjun Sethi v. Land Acquisition Collector Cuttack and Ors. AIR 1998 Orissa 34, wherein it was observed as hereunder:
Since such question is cropping up very often specially before the executing Court, it is better to summarize the principles relating to applicability of the benefits under the amended Act, as culled out from the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in , : and , in the following manner:
(i) If the award of the Collector is after 13.4.1982, the claimant is entitled to all the benefits of the amended Act;
(ii) If the award of the Collector is before 13.4.1982, but the award of the Civil Court in reference under Section 18 of the Act is after 13.4.1982, the claimant is entitled to the benefits under Section 23(2) and Section 28, as amended by the Amending Act, but is not entitled to the benefit under Section 23(1-A) of the Act;
(iii) If the award of the Collector as well as that of the Civil Court under Section 10 of the Act is prior to 13.4.1982, the claimant is not entitled to the benefits of the amended Act in the appeals against such awards, and
(iv) If there is specific direction by the Civil Court in reference under Section 18, or in appeal regarding payment of any benefits under the amended Act and such direction had not been reversed or modified by any competent appellate forum, the executing Court is bound to give effect to such direction notwithstanding the fact that the claimant was not entitled to such benefits.
The learned Counsel for the petitioner then drew my attention to the law laid down by the apex Court in K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala and Ors. , which is quoted herein below:
This Court thereby clearly held that even in the pending reference made before April, 30, 1982, if the civil Court makes an award between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984, Section 30(2) gets attracted and thereby the enhanced solatium was available to the claimants. Since Section 30(2) deals with both the amendment under Section 23(2) and the amendment to Sec.28 of the principal Act by Section 15(b) and Sec.18 respectively by parity of the reasoning the same ratio applies to the awards made by the Civil Court between those dates. The conflict of decisions as to whether Section 23(2) as amended by Section 15(b) of the Amendment Act through Section 30(2) of the transitory provisions would be applicable to the pending appeals in the High Court and the Supreme Court was resolved in the Raghuvir Singh's case by the Constitution Bench holding that the award of the Collector or the Court made between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984 would alone get attracted to Section 30(2) of the transitory provision. The restricted interpretation would not be understood to mean that Section 23(2) would not apply to the awarded decree of the Civil Court pending at the time when the Act has come into force or thereafter. In this case, admittedly the award of the Civil Court was after the Act has come into force, namely, February 28, 1985.
Therefore, if the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as compensation, is in excess of the sum which the Collector did award as compensation, the Court shall direct to pay interest on such excess at the rate of 9% per annumttom the date on which the Collector took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into the Court. By operation of the proviso, if such excess or any part thereof is paid into the Court after the date of expiry of a period of one year from the date on which compensation is taken, interest at the rate of 15% per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of such excess or part thereof which has not been paid into the Court before the date of such expiry. Accordingly, the appellant is entitled to the enhanced interest @ 9% from the date of taking possession, namely, January 15,1981 and March 11,1981 respectively for one year @ 9% and thereafter @ 15% till the date of the deposit made by the Collector. Admittedly, the deposit of the enhanced compensation was made on October 20, 1986 and December 3, 1986, therefore, the interest shall be calculated at the enhanced rates for the aforesaid record.
5. Learned Counsel for parties, on the other hand, submitted that the claimants would be entitled to the statutory solatium at the rate of 30% as held by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Union of India and Anr. v. Raghubir Singh (dead) by LRs. etc. AIR 1989 SC 1933.
6. Before examining the correctness of the arguments advanced by the opposite parties relying upon the decision of Raghubir Singh (supra), it would be profitable to have a look at the other decisions relied upon by them. The opposite parties placed reliance on the decision of the apex Court in Khanna Improvement Trust v. Land Acquisition Tribunal and Ors. (1995) 2 Supreme Court Cases 557, wherein it was held that since the award of the arbitrator was passed on 28.3.1 985, i.e., after the Amendment Act came into force, the claimants were entitled to the payment of solatium @ 30% and also interest for one year @ 9%. The opposite parties further relied upon the decision of the apex Court in Kashiben Bhikabai and Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Anr. 2002 (1) Supreme 524, wherein it was held that the claimants would be entitled to statutory solatium @ 30% as held by the Constitution Bench in Raghubir Singh's case (supra), as award of the reference Court was made after coming into force the amendment introduced by the Amending Act, 1984.
7. In Raghubir Singh's case, it was held as follows:. There can be no doubt that the benefit of the enhanced solatium is intended by Section 30(2) in respect of an award made by the Collector between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984. Likewise the benefit of the enhanced solatium is extended by Section 30(2) to the case of an award made by the Court between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984, even though it be upon reference from an award made before 30 April, 1982.
It was further held therein that:. In other words Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act extends the benefits of the enhanced solatium to cases where the award by the Collector or by the Court is made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984 or to appeals against such awards decided by the High Court and the Supreme Court whether the decisions of the High Court or the Supreme Court are rendered before 24 September, 1984 or after that date. All that is material is that the award by the Collector or by the Court should have been made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984.
Referring to the Raghubir Singh's case, it has been held by this Court in Arjun Sethi's case as follows:. As already indicated, in the decision reported in , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had held that the benefit of the amended provision under Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, as amended by Act 68 of 1984, was not available in pending appeals against the decisions which had been rendered prior to 13.4.1982, i.e., the date of introduction of the Bill in the Parliament. Following the aforesaid decision, it has been held by a three Judge Bench in the decision reported in K.S. Paripoornan (II) v. State of Kerala that the benefit of the amended Act was not applicable to cases where the Civil Court had decided the reference priorto 13.4.1982. The aforesaid two decisions were again followed in the decision reported in State of Punjab v. Avtar Singh. Since the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court rendered by a Bench consisting of two Judges has not referred to any of the aforesaid three earlier decisions, the first two of which reported in and were of larger Benches of the Supreme Court, the latter decision cannot be followed in preference to the earlier decisions of larger Bench or co-ordinate Bench.
8. In the case at hand, the award was passed by the Collector on 2.2.1978 and the payment was made by the Land Acquisition Officer on 3.7.1978, which is much prior to the coming into force the Amended Act, i.e., on 30.4.1984. As stated earlier, while disposing of the First Appeal, this Court only modified the market value of the land. The other benefits given by the Reference Court were kept intact with an observation that the decree holder-claimants were entitled to permissible statutory benefits under the Amended Act of 1984. Basing upon the said observation, counsel for opposite parties submitted that since in the instant case, there was a specific direction in the reference under Section 18 and appeal regarding payment of benefits under the Amended Act, the executing Court is bound to give effect to such direction as the executing Court cannot go beyond the award, which has the effect of a decree.
9. Having regard to the rival contentions of the parties and the judicial pronouncements as cited above, in my considered opinion, neither in the Constitutional Bench decision in Raghubir Singh (supra) nor in any other decision cited by the opposite parties, it has been held that the benefit of amended Section 23 may be extended to awards/orders passed by the Collector/Civil Judge after 30.4.1982. Rather, the law laid down is that benefit has retrospective effect with regard to award/order passed on or before 30.4.1982.
10. The stand of the opposite parties is based on the decision of this Court in Arjun Sethi's case (supra) to the effect that the benefit of the amended provision may also be extended by the High Court to any other awards/orders and the order passed in Civil Revision No. 244 of 1997 that the opposite parties are entitled to the benefits 'permissible' under the amended provision.
11. The stand is based on a misconstruction of the expression 'permissible....' The stand could have been accepted, rather would have been required to be accepted, if the word 'permissible' would not have been used. In that case, the executing Court would have, in accordance with the decision in Arjun Sethi's case (supra), no option but to grant the benefit. But by using the word 'permissible', the benefit intended to be given to the opposite parties was restricted to the benefit as per the statutory provision as laid down by the judicial pronouncements. In view of the unambiguous and settled legal principle that under the amended provision, the benefit is permissible in respect of post-30.4.1982 awards/orders only, there is no scope for the Executing Court to accept the stand of the opposite parties as the award and order in the present case were passed on 2.2.1978 and 20.2.1987 respectively.
12. The Civil Revision is accordingly allowed. The impugned order dated 10.11.2000 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Berhampur in E.P. No. 1 of 1995 is set aside. There shall be no order as to cost.