J.P. Mishra, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner on applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the Contempt Proceeding.
It is the case of the petitioner that the learned Central Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the 'C.A.T.) directed the present opposite parties to reinstate him into service within ten days from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment and within 30 days therefrom to pay all his emoluments with effect from the date on which the petitioner was put off from duty till the day prior to his reinstatement into service. The said order was passed on 6.5.1994. Due to non-compliance of the opp.parties the petitioner filed O.J.C. No. 14751 of 1998 before this Court as the learned C.A.T. expressed his helplessness to implement his own order. In the writ (O.J.C. No. 14751 of 1998), this Court passed the order on 29.11.2000 directing the opp.parties for complying the order of learned Tribunal forthwith and allow the petitioner to joining his former post. Due to non-compliance of order of this Court dt.29.11.2000 the petitioner has filed the present Contempt Proceeding (CONTC No. 98 of 2003) on 3.10.2002 i.e. after a period for about one year & eleven months with an application to condone the delay with a medical certificate showing his illness from 1.9.2001 to 30.9.2002 vide Annexure-A to the Misc.petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits to condone the delay by applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act as he could not approach this Court for his illness 'amounting to sufficient cause' for non-filing within a period of one year from the date of violation of the order of this Court.
2. The present position of law governing the field of application of Section 5 is enumerated in the following decisions of the Apex Court.
In 1996 (5) SCC 342 : The State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Kartick Chandra Das and Ors.
7. In consequence, by operation of Section 29(2) read with Section 3 of the Limitation Act, limitation stands prescribed as especially law under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act and limitation in filing Letters Patent Appeal stands attracted. In consequence, Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act stands attracted to Letters Patent Appeal in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded either by special or local law. Since the rules made on the appellate side, either or entertaining the appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent or appeals arising under the contempt of Courts, had not expressly excluded, Section 5 of the Limitation Act becomes applicable. We hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to the appeals filed against the order of the learned single Judge for the enforcement by way of a contempt. The High Court therefore, was not right in holding that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply. The delay stands condoned. Since the High Court had not dealt with the matter on merits, we decline to express any opinion on merits. The case stands remitted to the division bench for decision on merits.'
In (2000) 3 Supreme Court Cases 171 : Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal and Anr..
'15. In the cases contemplated by (i) or (ii) above, it cannot be said that any proceedings for contempt have been initiated. Filing of an application or petition for initiating proceedings for contempt or a mere receipt of such reference by the Court does not amount to initiation of the proceedings by Court. On receiving any such document it is usual with the Courts to commence some proceedings by employing an expression such as 'admit', 'rule', 'issue notice' or 'issue notice to show cause why proceedings for contempt be not initiated.' In all such cases the notice is issued either in routine or because the Court has not yet felt satisfied that a case for initiating any proceedings for contempt has been made out and therefore the Court calls upon the opposite party to admit or deny the allegations made or to collect more facts so as to satisfy itself if a case for initiating proceedings for contempt was made out. Such a notice is certainly anterior to initiation. The tenor of the notice is itself suggestive of the fact that in spite of having applied its mind to the allegations and the material placed before it the Court was not satisfied of the need for initiating proceedings for contempt; it was still desirous of ascertaining facts or collecting further material whereon to formulate such opinion. It is only when the Court has formed an opinion that a prima facie case for initiating proceedings for contempt is made out and that the respondents or the alleged contemners should be called upon to show cause why they should not be punished; then the Court can be said to have initiated proceedings for contempt. It is the result of a conscious application of the mind of the Court to the facts and the material before it. Such initiation of proceedings for contempt based on application of mind by the Court to the facts of the case and the material before it must take place within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed failing which the jurisdiction to initiate any proceedings for contempt is lost. The heading of Section 20 is 'limitation for actions for contempt'. Strictly speaking, this section does not provide limitation in the sense in which the term is understood in the Limitation Act, Section 5 of the Limitation Act also does not, therefore, apply. Section 20 strikes at the jurisdiction of the Court to initiate any proceedings for contempt.'
In (2001) 7 SCC 549 : Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors.
'44. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice, in the other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.'
In the case of Kartik Chandra Das the Apex Court held applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals under Section 19 arising out of an order of punishment, but not otherwise. In the case of Om Prakash Jaiswal in clear term the Apex Court ruled out the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the Contempt Proceedings. In the said case the initiation of Contempt Proceeding was held to be the date of issuing of notice. In other words the date of application of mind of the Court which was not approved by a larger Bench in the case of Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Ors. (supra), it was concluded therein the date of initiation of Contempt Proceeding to be the date of application before the Court in case of Civil contempt by a private person. In the opinion of the Apex Court the Contempt proceeding has to be initiated by filing of an application or by issuing notice suo moto within a period of one year from the date of alleged violation.
3. Similar question of applicability of limitation prescribed under Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 to the powers of this Court under Article 215 was raised in the case of Khemchand Agarwal v. Commissioner, Irrigation, 2004 (Supp.) OLR 151 before a Division Bench of this Court : 97 (2004) CLT 237. In that case argument was advanced that the Constitutional Power prescribed in Article 215 of the Constitution cannot be controlled or regulated by any ordinary legislation and therefore. Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act cannot arrest the power of this Court conferred on it under Article 215 of the Constitution. In the said case, the view of Calcutta High Court and Karnatak High Court (AIR 1980 Calcutta 375 and ILR 1990 Karnatak 3455) was not accepted keeping in mind the provision under Article 225 of the Constitution read with provision of Chapter I of Part II thereof and entry 14 of the concurrent list of the 7th Schedule. Further, the following decisions of the Apex Court in Barada Kanta Mishra v. Gatikrusha Mishra : AIR 1974 SC 2255, Pallav Seth's case and D.K. Mittal's case (supra), this Court came to the conclusion that even the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution is also restricted by Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and this Court cannot punish a person for contempt beyond the period of limitation i.e. after one year from the date of cause of action. The Division Bench of this Court further opined that Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no manner of application to the proceeding under Contempt of Courts Act.
4. In the present case, this Court directed the opp.parties to appoint the petitioner forthwith on 29.11.2000. Construing the same date to be the violation of the order the Contempt application should have been filed within one year i.e. 28.11.2001. But the same has been filed on 3.10.2002 with an application to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
5. The above pronouncements of the apex Court clearly indicate that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is. only applicable to the appeals and it does not apply to the Contempt Proceedings which is required to be filed within one year from the date of alleged violation as per Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Therefore, we are not inclined to entertain the application for condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
6. In the result, we dismiss the Misc.Case so as also the Contempt application being barred by limitation.