Judgment:
C.R. Pal, J.
1. In this application under Section 482, Cr. P.C. the petitioner who is serving the sentences awarded against him in seven cases instituted by Special Police Establishment has prayed for issuance of a direction that the sentences awarded against him in S.P.E. Case Nos. 12 and 17 of 1990 and 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of 1991 shall run concurrently.
2.The facts which gave rise to this petition are as follows : The petitioner who was working as the Post Master in the Extra Departmental Post Office at Bharauja in the district of Bolangir faced his trial for a charge under Section 409, I.P.C. in the aforementioned seven cases. After trial, the petitioner was sentenced by the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhubaneswar on 31.5.1993 for the offence under Section 409, I.P.C. in S.P.E. Cases No. 12 of 1990 to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five months and to pay fine of Rs. 2000/- and in default, to further R.I. for two months, in S.P.E. Case No. 17 of 1990 to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay fine of Rs. 300/- and in default, to further R.I. for 15 days, in S.P.E. Case No. 8 of 1991 to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months and to pay fine of Rs. 300/- and in default to further R.I. for 15 days. On 16.8.1993 the petitioner was convicted and sentenced for the offence under Section 409, I.P.C. in S.P.E. Case No. 11 of 1991 and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 2 1/2 years and to pay fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default, to further R.I. for two months. On 28.8.1993 the petitioner was convicted and sentenced in S.P.E. Case No. 9 of 1991 to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay fine of Rs. 500/- and in default, to suffer R.I. for one month and in S.P.E. Case No 10 of 1991 to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default, to undergo R.I. for two months. Further on 17.9.1993 the petitioner was convicted for the offence under Section 409, I.P.G. in S.P.E. Case No. 12 of 1991 and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default, to suffer R.I. for two months. The petitioner now has come up with this petition seeking a direction for concurrent running of the sentences.
3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that taking into consideration the nature of the offence alleged along with the fact that the petitioner is undergoing the sentence since 31.5.1993 and by now has already suffered incarceration for more than 3 1/2 years out of the total period of 7 years and 5 months of imprisonment awarded against the petitioner in the aforementioned seven cases his prayer be considered. It is also submitted that the question of running the sentence concurrently was never considered. The petitioner, therefore, seeks for such a direction in his petition. The learned counsel appearing for the opposite party objected to the prayer of the petitioner contending that when the trial Court while passing the sentences has not given any direction for running the sentences concurrently no order can be passed at this stage granting that relief. In the above context it may be stated here that a sentence of imprisonment shall not run concurrently with the sentence undergoing unless the Court passing the subsequent sentence so directs. For proper appreciation, relevant provisions of Section 427, Cr.P.C. is quoted herein which runs as follows :
'427. Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence.
(1) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence :
Provided that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment by an order under Section 122 in default of furnishing security, is whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of such order, the latter sentence shall commence immediately. (2) xx xx xx
Relying on the above provision, the learned counsel for the opposite party contended that the Court passing the subsequent sentence is the competent Court to give a direction for running the subsequent sentence concurrently with the previous one. Section 427(1) is very clear on this point and there is no doubt that such a direction can be given by the Court while passing the subsequent sentence and not thereafter as the Court after passing the sentence becomes functus officio. But the matter is now before this Court and Section 427(1) does not in any way restrict this Court from issuing any direction for running the sentences concurrently when such a sentence is imposed while the accused is undergoing another sentence and such a direction is necessary for ends of justice. Such a view has also been taken in Basudev Pradhan v. State of Orissa reported in Vol. 55 (1983) C.L.T. 73 wherein it has been held as follows :
'......... The inherent power vested in the Court is obviously intended for superintending the administration of criminal justice within the jurisdiction of the Court with a view to ensuring that ultimate justice is done. If the superior Court is not given this power there may be cases where the same accused would suffer the conviction in different Courts and where Judgment would be delivered by the separate Courts on the same day or near about, it may not be possible for the original Court dealing with the case after there have been previous convictions to take note of the sentences awarded in the other cases and modulate its own sentence accordingly......................'
In Jadu alias Jadua Bhoi v. State of Orissa reported in Vol. 72 (1991) C.L.T. 247 a single Bench of this Court held that the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction may direct the sentence to run concurrently. In B. Durga Rao v. State of Orissa reported in (1990) 3 O.C.R. 246 another single Bench of this Court also held that inherent power is exercisable in such cases for doing ultimate justice. It is clear that the consistent view of the High Court on the point under consideration is that in the administration of criminal justice the power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. is exercisable for rendering ultimate justice and as such, the contention of the learned counsel of the opposite party to the contrary is unsustainable.
4. The next question which requires consideration is whether the petitioner who is undergoing sentences awarded against him in the aforementioned cases for the offence under Section 409, I.P.C. should be granted the relief prayed for. In this context, it is noticed that the petitioner is in custody since 31.8.1993. The period of imprisonment awarded in the aforementioned seven cases taken together is seven years five months. By now the petitioner has already suffered incarceration for more than 3 1/2 years. The longest period of sentence imposed in a single case is 2 1/2 years imposed in S.P.E. Case No. 11 of 1991 on 16.8.1993. In the above circumstances, taking into consideration the nature of the offence, the total period of the imprisonment awarded and the total period already undergone, it is felt that the relief sought for if granted will serve the ends of justice. Hence, it is directed that the substantive sentences imposed on the petitioner in the aforementioned seven cases shall run concurrently.
The Criminal Misc. Case is accordingly disposed of.