A. Pasayat, J.
1. This appeal has been preferred by the Steel Authority of India Ltd., Rourkela Steel Plant (hereinafter referred to as the 'employer') under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (in short, the 'Act') challenging the order passed by the Asst. Labour Commissioner and Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Rourkela (in short, the 'Commissioner') in W.C. Case No. 5 of 1991.
2. Background facts as portrayed for parties sans unnecessary details are as follows :
One, Basu Charan Mohanty (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') was an employee of the employer, when he lost his life in an accident on April 21, 1990. The accident took place near Fertilizer English Medium School. The deceased was taken to the Fertilizer Hospital at about 8 a.m.. He was given first aid treatment in the said hospital, and later on was removed to the Ispat General Hospital where he breathed his last at 2.50 p.m.. The deceased had been allotted a quarter in Sector-8, bearing No. D/45 and on the date of accident had gone to attend duty in 'C' shift. He was constructing a house at Balijodi and was on his way to the said house, after duty hours. A memorandum of settlement (hereinafter referred to as the 'settlement') between the employer and its workmen represented through a recognised Union, inter alia, provides that workmen's compensation benefits extend to injury cases causing death or permanent/temporary disablement arising during journey from residence to place of work and back if the accident takes place on the normal route of journey to the place of work. His widow lodged a claim for compensation of Rs. 65,000/- on the ground that the death occurred due to accident which arose out of and in course of his employment under the employer. The dispute is whether it was so. According to claimant, the accident took place around 6.15 a.m., while the deceased was taking his normal route to his residence. Employer's stand on the contrary is that the accident did not arise out of and in course of his employment. Since the deceased was allotted company's quarter bearing No. D/45 in Sector-8 and his duty was over at 6 a.m. he should have returned to the said quarter. Instead he was found unconscious on the road in front of Fertilizer English Medium School and was taken to the Fertilizer Hospital at about 8 a.m.. The provisions of Clause 8.10.2 of the settlement refer to normal route between the plant and residence of the deceased, and it does not cover Fertilizer Township which is in the opposite direction and was far away from the place of residence. The Commissioner held that the accident arose out of and in course of employment, and that claimant was entitled to Rs. 63.920/-
3. In support of the appeal, learned Counsel for the employer has stated that the Commissioner has misinterpreted the relevant provisions of memorandum of settlement and his conclusion is not supportable by materials on record. It is stated that claimant, has accepted that place of residence of the deceased was the allotted quarter and therefore, Commissioner's conclusions that the accident is covered by Clause 8.10.2 of the settlement are erroneous. Learned Counsel for claimant, however, submitted that considering the limited scope of appeal under Section 30 of the Act, there is no scope for any interference. It is further submitted that expression 'normal route' used in the settlement does not necessarily mean the shortest route, and in any event, it refers to a residence. A residential house was being constructed by the deceased at Balijodi, where the deceased was staying and therefore the Commissioner was justified in his conclusion. Reference is made to the report of official enquiry, which according to him establishes that the deceased was not staying in the quarter allotted to him and the same was in occupation of another person.
4. There can be no dispute to the general proposition advanced by learned Counsel for claimant that the scope of interference in an appeal under Section 38 of the Act is extremely limited. Section 30 lays down that no appeal against the order specified therein shall lie unless it involves a substantial question of law. When there is no evidence, or finding of fact is contrary to evidence, or where the evidence is so meagre that no reasonable man would on the basis of such evidence come to a positive rinding, it is substantially a mixed question of fact and law. Non-consideration of material circumstances gives rise to a substantial question of law, entitling High Court to go into merits of the dispute. Additionally, where a provision in a settlement or scheme comes up for interpretation, the same obviously involves question of law. In the instant case, it has to be seen whether conclusions of the Commissioner are in conformity with the prescriptions in the settlement, and whether there are materials on record to support the conclusions. The fate of dispute depends upon the meaning to be given to the expression 'residence' and 'normal route' appearing in Clause 8.10.2 of the settlement, which reads as follows ;
'8.10.2- Workmen's Compensation benefits will continue to be extended to injury cases causing death or permanent/temporary disablement arising during journey from residence to place of work and back within one hour of the start or and of his duty hours provided that the accident takes place on the, normal route of journey to the place of work.'
As a rule, the employment of a workman does not commence until he has reached the, place of employment and does not continue when he has left the place of employment, the journey to and from the place of employment being excluded. However, by agreement, this may be made subject to theory of notional extension of the employer's premises so as to include an area which the workman passes and repasses in going to and leaving the actual place of work. There may be reasonable extension in both time and place/See Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. v. Bal Voiuraja and Ors.,)(1958-II-LLJ-249). Clause 8.10.2 of the settlement provides for such notional extension.
5. 'Residence signifies a man's abode or continuance in a place'(Cowel Resiance). What is the meaning of the word 'resides' Where there is nothing to show that it is used in a more extensive sense, denotes the place where an individual eats, drinks and sleeps, or where his family or his servants eat, drink and sleep, (per Bayley, J.N. v. North Curry, 4 B & C. 959). 'A man's residence is where he habitually sleeps' (per Blackburn, J.Oldham, 1 O'M & M 158, citing R. v. Norwood, L.R.2 Q.B. 457). The words 'residence' and 'place of abode' are flexible, and must be construed according to the object and intent of the particular legislation where they may be found. Primarily, they mean the dwelling and home where a man is supposed usually to live and sleep; they may also include a man's business abode, the place where he is to be found daily. (per Gibson J. R. v. Fermanach Justices, (1897) 2 L.R. 563, approved by Holmes L.J. in R. v. Tyrone Justices (1901)2 L.R. 510). In Re Bowis, ex p. Breul1(l6 Ch. D. 484), James L.J. held that a man resides where he is to be found daily. Casual stay at a place without continuity at that place cannot make it residence of a person.
In its ordinary sense the word 'reside' carries with it the idea of performance, that is for any length of time, as well as continuity. The word may be defined thus; 'A person resides in a place if he through choice makes it his abode. Permanently or even temporarily; whether a person has chosen to make a particular place his abode depends upon the facts of each case.' It means to dwell permanently or for considerable time; to have one's settled or usual abode; to live in or at a particular place. The mere fact that a person visited a place occasionally or casually would not amount to residence. To constitute residence, there must be animus manondi i.e. an intention to stay for an indefinite period. 'Residence' connotes as something more than 'stay'; it implies some intention to remain at a place, and not merely to pay it a casual visit. Therefore, it has to be seen whether the deceased was returning to his 'residence'. Evidence of claimant is very significant. Her statement is as follows:
'We have been allotted a quarter in Sector-8 i.e. D/45 and we were staying in that quarter. After demise of my late husband I surrendered the quarter. We were staying in that quarter from September 5, 1985 and vacated the quarter on October 9, 1990. We have got our own residence at Balijodi which was constructed after obtaining house building advance. On April 20, 1990 my late husband went to duty in 'C' shift. After duty hours he was going to see the house at Balijodi.'
Evidence of major son of claimant is also relevant. He has stated as follows :-
'My father has taken a house from Rourkela Steel Plant on rent basis in Sector-8, Qr.No. D/45 where whole family was staying in it. .......My father took me from Sector-8 residence to leave me at new house and thereafter went to join C shift duty. The house at Balijodi was under construction.'
The application dated June 19, 1990 filed by claimant marked as Ext. A contains following statement:
'After 6 a.m. on April 21, 1990 he came out from duty and was going to Balijodi to see progress of the newly constructed house there which was under construction.'
Besides this, there are certain other documents like photo copy of coke coupon etc, which clearly indicate that the deceased was a resident of quarter No. D/45 in Sector-8.
6. Further question therefore is, whether he was following 'normal route' for journey from place of work to his residence. According to Mr. Misra for claimant, normal route need not necessarily be the shortest route, it can be any convenient route. A route appears to an abstract conception of a line of travel between one terminus and another. Normal route may not necessarily be the shortest route, but it has to be the most convenient route. Travelling a far distance in the opposite direction and taking a circuitous route cannot be said to be a normal route. It is not in dispute that the place where the accident took place was in a direction opposite to where Quarter No. D/45 is situated and far off it. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that the accident took place while the deceased was on his way back from the place of work to his residence, by a normal route. Therefore, claimant was not entitled to the notional extension provided under Clause 8.10.2 of the settlement.
7. The case at hand is one where interference is called for because the Commissioner did not consider the relevant provisions in right perspective, made a perfunctory analysis of materials on record, and his conclusions are contrary to material on record.
8. The Misc. Appeal is allowed, but in the circumstances of the case, without any cost.