P.C. Misra, J.
1. Having been directed to be evicted from a shop house by the appellate authority under the House Rent Control Act, the tenant has filed the writ application praying to quash the order of the said authority.
2. Admittedly, late Raja Sahib, Dharakot was the owner of several shop rooms including the one in which the petitioner was a tenant. These shop rooms are situated in the town of Berhampur in the district of Ganjam. The petitioner is alleged to have been inducted as tenant some time in the year 1972. The late Raja Sahib, who had inducted the petitioner as a tenant died in the month of May, 1974 leaving behind several heirs. Opposite party 1 is his wife and opposite parties 2 to 4 are his daughters. On 10-6-1976 the present opposite parties 1 to 3 filed an application under Section 7 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') praying for eviction of the petitioner mainly on two grounds namely; (i) wilful default in payment of rent and (ii) bona fide requirement of the landlords. The present petitioner though admitted that there was default in payment of rent, offered an explanation for the purpose of showing that the default was not wilful He also contended that the plea of bona fide requirement on the part of the landlords is colourable and in fact they had no necessity to use the premises in question for their own purpose. The House Rent Controller on a consideration of evidence adduced by both parties held that the default in payment of rent was not wilful and also held that the landlords have failed to prove that they required the premises for their own use and occupation. Consequently, the application of the landlords was dismissed on merits.
3. The landlords thereafter carried up the matter in appeal (H.R.C. Appeal No. 13/83) which was decided by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Ganjam as the appellate authority under the House Rent Control Act. The said appellate authority reversed both the findings and allowed the application under Section 7 of the Act.
4. The petitioner in this writ application challenges the order of eviction passed by the appellate authority mainly on the ground that the findings recorded by him are based on no evidence and that the appellate authority has failed to apply the standard of proof which is required under law to prove that the present petitioner was a wilful defaulter and/or that the landlords' requirement was bona fide.
5. As regards the bona fide requirement, the only averment made in the application under Section 7 of the Act by the landlords was that they need the disputed shop room for their personal use as they want to start a business in the shop room for their maintenance. No further particulars were given in the application as to what sort of business they intend to start and what steps have been taken by them in that behalf. Admittedly none of the landlords was examined in the case. They examined two witnesses of whom the first witness P.W. 1 was their clerk and P.W. 2 was their Manager. Their evidence does not disclose any material on the basis of which the Court can judge as to whether their requirement is bona fide. They merely relied upon the proposition that the landlord is the best Judge of his own choice and since they have expressed the desire to use it for themselves, it would not be within the powers of the Court to insist upon further scrutiny.
6. Under Section 7(4) of the Act, the landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put him in possession of the house, if he requires the house in good faith for the occupation or use of himself, any member of his family or of any person or persons for whose benefit the house is held by him. The expression 'requires the house in good faith' occurring in the said Section connotes something more than a mere desire though it may not amount to absolute necessity. Requirement in good faith obviously implies honest intention on the part of the landlord. Thus the burden lies on the landlord to place materials before the Court for consideration as to whether his requirement was honest and bona fide. The mere desire of the landlord that he wants the premises for opening a shop without giving any further particulars amounts to a vague assertion on the basis of which the Court cannot come to a conclusion as to whether the requirement in such a case is honest and bona fide. As already stated the petitioners did not plead and place materials sufficient for a conclusion that their requirement was bona fide and consequently the finding recorded by the appellate authority is based on no evidence. It must, therefore, be held that the landlords have failed to prove that they require the house for their use and bona fide requirement.
7. As regards the plea of wilful default, it is the admitted case of both parties that the rent was paid by the petitioner up to July 1974. The rent for the months of June and July, 1974 was paid on 15-1-1975 under Ext. 2/G and thereafter the petitioner did not pay any rent. The plea of the petitioner was that the rent was being collected by the agent of Raja Sahib and it is for that reason that there was delayed collection of rent for the months of June and July, 1974. The further plea of the petitioner was that because there was an attachment of the disputed house by the Income-tax Department, he was in a fix as to whom the rent would be payable. This plea of the present petitioner is not acceptable as the present petitioner had admittedly paid rent for the months of June and July, 1974 to present opposite party 1 after which there was no reasonable justification for withholding payment of rent It has been found by the learned courts below that the present petitioner did not pay the rent for the month of August, 1974 and onwards. A further plea was also taken that there was a suit by the Raj Mata (Brajeswari Debi) against the present opposite parties 1 to 4 claiming partition for which reason non-payment of rent to the present opposite parties 1 to 4 cannot be considered as a wilful default. The expression 'landlord' has been defined in the Act to include any person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a house on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others. Whether the present opposite parties who had filed the application for eviction were the absolute owners of the properties in question or there were other co-sharers was irrelevant so far as the present petitioner is concerned. He had paid rent for the months of June and July, 1974 to the present opposite party No. 1 in the month of June, 1975. Therefore, at least opposite party 1, if not others, satisfied the requirements of the definition of 'landlord' and payment of rent to her would have been a valid discharge of the liability of the petitioner. Thus, the plea taken by the petitioner in justification of non-payment of rent was mere a pretence. The conduct of the present petitioner shows that non-payment of rent was deliberate. The absolute callousness or indifference on the part of the tenant in payment of rent amounts to wilful default and in he becomes evictable on that ground alone.
8. In the circumstances, as discussed above, the conclusion is irresistible that the petitioner was guilty of wilful default in payment of the rent and eviction on that ground was justified. Even though I have held that there was no bona fide requirement of the house by the landlords, still the petitioner would be evictable on the ground of wilful default and, therefore, this case does not call for any interference.
9. The writ application is accordingly dismissed, but there would be no order as to costs.
Agrawal, C.J.
10. I agree.