A.K. Parichha, J.
1. All the misc cases were heard analogously and are disposed of by this common order as the common question of fact and law are involved.
2. Basing on the allegations that the petitioners (Inder Chand Jain is the common petitioner in all the three misc cases and petitioner Kailash Chandra Mohanty is the co-petitioner of Inder Chand Jain in Criminal Misc. Case No. 4725 of 2000) and their co-accused persons committed criminal misconduct and cheating in the matter of purchase of paddy seeds for the Orissa Seeds Corporation and supply thereof, Vigilance Cases were registered, investigated and on conclusion of investigation charge sheets were submitted under Section 5(1)(c) & 5(1)(d) of the P.C. Act read with Sections 420 and 120-B, IPC. After cognizance those cases were registered as T.R. Case Nos. 71, 72 & 73 of 1983 in the Court of Special Judge (Vigilance), Bhubaneswar. The petitioners, as accused entered appearance and contested the said cases. In the year 1999 they filed petitions requesting the trial Court to drop those proceedings and acquit them on the ground of inordinate delay in disposal of the cases citing the ratio of the case of Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar 7998 Cri.L.J. 4596. Since the said prayer was rejected by the trial Court the petitioners have filed the present petitions under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings of the T.R. Cases on the same ground viz. inordinate delay in disposal of the cases.
3. Mr. D.P. Das, learned Counsel for the petitioners states that charge sheets in the T.R. Cases against the petitioners were submitted in the year 1983 for an alleged incident of the year 1982, but even after lapse of more than 20 years and death of one of the co-accused the cases have not yet been disposed of causing harassment and prejudice to the petitioners, who are now extremely old. He submitted that charges were framed in the cases against the petitioners more than 7 years after submission of the charge sheets and out of more than 100 witnesses named in the charge sheet only one witness has been examined, cross-examined and discharged so far and no real effort has been made by the prosecution to procure the attendance of the rest witnesses. According to him, when the petitioners are regular in their attendance and have not contributed to the delay in disposal of the cases in any manner and when the delay has occasioned due to the inaction of the prosecution and the Court, proceeding of the above noted T.R. cases should be dropped. In support of his pontention Mr. Das relied on the cases of A.R. Antulay etc. etc v. R.S. Nayak and Anr. etc. etc. : 1992CriLJ2717 ; Santosh De v. Archna Guha and Ors. : 1994CriLJ1975 ; Rajkishore Mohanty v. State of Orissa 79 (1995) CLT 88; Ghanashyam Mohanty and Ors. v. State of Orissa (1993) 6 OCR 66; P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka : 2002CriLJ2547 .
4. Mr. D.K. Mohapatra, learned Standing Counsel (Vigilance) on the other hand argued that when law does not prescribe any time limit for trial and disposal of a criminal proceeding, the criminal proceedings involving heinous or antisocial offences cannot be quashed simply on the ground of delay in disposal of the case. He also submitted that inordinate delay by itself does not form good ground for quashing a criminal proceeding as such delay may be due to various factors including dilatory tactics by the accused, stay orders by superior Courts etc. Defending the action of the prosecution in the above noted T.R. Cases, Mr. Mohapatra argued that the prosecution cannot be blamed as it abided by the orders of the Court all along and never acted with malice or negligence. To support his contention learned Standing Counsel relied on the cases of P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (supra); CBI v. Dr. Narayan Waman Nerukar and Anr. 2002 Cri. L.J. 4099; Ram Ekbak Missir v. Ram Niswash Pandey @ Sri Niwash Pandey and Ors. 2002 Cri.L.J. 4719.
5. Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees speedy trial to an accused. What is the scope of that proposition and what right an accused deserves from the same was the main subject matter of debate in the case of A.R. Antulay (supra). There a specific question was raised as to whether a time limit for criminal proceeding can be drawn and whether the criminal proceeding must be quashed when that time limit expires. The Constitution Bench after examining the pros and cons on the issue made the following observations.
51...It is not possible in the very nature of things and present day circumstances to draw a time limit beyond which a criminal proceeding will not be allowed to go. Even in the U.S.A., the Supreme Court has refused to draw such a line. Except for the Patna Full Bench decision under appeal, neither decision of any High Court in this Country taking such a view has been brought to our notice, nor to our knowledge, in United Kingdom. Wherever a complaint of infringement of right to speedy trial is made the Court has to consider all the circumstances of the case including those mentioned above and arrive at a decision whether in fact the proceedings have been pending for an unjustifiably long period. In many cases, the accused may himself have been responsible for the delay. In such cases, he cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. In some cases, delays may occur for which neither the prosecution nor the accused can be blamed but the system itself. Such delays too cannot be treated as unjustifiable-broadly speaking. Of course, if it is a minor offence not being an economic offence and the delay is too long, not caused by the accused, different considerations may arise. Each a case must be left to be decided on its own facts having regard to the principles enunciated hereinafter. For all the above reasons, we are of the opinion that it is neither advisable nor feasible to draw or prescribe an outer time limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. It is not necessary to do so for effectuating the right to speed trial. We are also not satisfied that without such an outer limit, the right becomes illusory.
52. We may next deal with, what is called the 'demand' rule. The contention is that an accused who does not demand a speed trial, who stands by an acquiesces in the delays cannot suddenly turn round after a lapse of period of complain to infringement of his right to speedy trial. It is not possible to accede to this contention either. An accused does not prosecute himself. The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is, thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant, as the case may be, to proceed with the case with reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this country, where the large majority of accused come from and poorer weaker sections of the society, not versed in the ways of law, where they don't often get competent legal advice, the application of the said rule is wholly inadvisable. Of course, in a given case, if an accused demands speedy trial and yet he is not given one, may be a relevant factor in his favour. But we cannot disentitle an accused from complaining of infringement of his right to speedy trial on the ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a speedy trial.
53. Another question seriously canvassed before us related to the consequence flowing from an infringement of right to speedy trial. Counsel for accused argued on the basis of the observations in Sheela Barse : [1986]3SCR562 and Strunk 1973 (37) Law Ed 2d 56, that the only consequence is quashing of charges and/or conviction, as the case may be. Normally, it may be so. But we do not think that is the only order open to Court. In a given case, the facts-including the nature of offence-may be such that quashing of charges may not be in the interest of justice. After all, every offence-more so economic offences, those relating to public officials and food adulterations- is an offence against society. It is really the society- the State - that prosecutes the offender. We may in this connection recall the observations of this Court in Campalal Punjaji Shah : 1981CriLJ1273 . In case, where quashing of charges/convictions may not be in the interest of justice, it shall be open to the Court to pass such appropriate orders as may be deemed just in the circumstances of the case. Such orders may, for example, take the shape of order for expedition of trial and its conclusion within a particular prescribed period, reduction of sentence where the matter comes up after conclusion of trial and conviction, and so on.
The apex Court also laid a guideline to be undertaken by the trial Courts while considering as to whether the criminal proceeding deserves to be dropped on account of abnormal delay. It will appear from the observation and the direction noted in the case that the trial Court must examine the cause of the inordinate delay and whether the accused has any contribution to the said delay and whether further continuance of the proceeding would entail in prejudice and injustice to the accused. In Raj Deo Sharma's case (supra) the apex Court issued a direction to close the criminal proceedings which were pending before the trial Courts beyond a particular length of period. In P. Ramachandra Rao's case (supra) a Larger Bench overruled the ratio laid down in the case of Raj Deo Sharma (supra) and reaffirmed the propositions and guidelines given in A.R. Antulay's case (supra) making the following observations-
Therefore, the dictum in A.R. Antulay's case : 1992CriLJ2717 is correct and still holds the field. The proportions emerging from Article 21 of the Constitution and expounding the right to speedy trial laid down as guidelines in A.R. Antulays' case, adequately take care of right to speedy trial. Court upholds and re-affirm the said propositions. The guidelines laid down in A.R. Antulay's case are not exhaustive but only illustrative. They are not intended to operate as hard and fast rules or to be applied like a strait-jacket formula. Their applicability would depend on the fact-situation of each case. It is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalization can be made. It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The time-limits or bars of limitation prescribed in the several directions made in Common Cause (I) 1996 AIR SCW 2279; AIR 1996 SC 1619: 1996 Cri LJ 2380, Raj Deo Sharma (I) : 1998CriLJ4596 and Raj Deo Sharma (II) 1999 Cri LJ 4541 could not have been so prescribed or drawn. The Criminal Courts are not obliged to terminate trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as prescribed by the directions made in the Common Cause Case (I), Raj Deo Sharma case (I) and (II). At the most the periods of time prescribed in those decision can be taken by the Courts seized of the trial or proceedings to act as reminders when they may be persuaded to apply their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case before them and determine by taking into consideration the several relevant factors as pointed out in A.R. Antulay's case : 1992CriLJ2717 and decide whether the trial or proceedings have become so inordinate delayed as to be called oppressive and unwarranted. Such time-limits cannot and will not by themselves be treated by any Court as a bar to further continuance of the trial or proceedings and as mandatorily obliging the Court to terminate the same and acquit or discharge the accused. The Criminal Courts should exercise their available powers, such as those under Sections 309, 311 and 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to effectuate the right to speedy trial. A watchful and diligent trial Judge can prove to be better protector of such right than any guidelines. In appropriate cases jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and Arts. 226 and 227 of Constitution can be invoked seeking appropriate relief or suitable directions. This is an appropriate occasion to remind the Union of India and the State Governments of their constitutional obligation to strengthen the judiciary-quantitatively and qualitatively-by providing requisite funds, manpower and infrastructure.
In the case of CBI v. Dr. Narayan Waman Nerukar and Anr. (supra) also the apex Court reiterated the same view.
6. The legal position is, therefore, finally settled. No time limit can be fixed for disposal of a criminal proceeding and such proceeding is not to be quashed simply because delay has occurred in disposal of the same. However, if the inordinate delay is not due to the fault of the accused and such delay has resulted in utter prejudice to the accused and if further continuance of the proceeding would be abuse of process of the Court, then the proceeding can be closed or quashed.
7. In the present case admittedly the incident relates to the year 1982. The charge sheets in the T.R. Cases were submitted on 30th July, 1983 and charges were framed on 24.10.1990. P.W.1 was examined in chief on 2.11.1991 and his cross-examination was completed on 16.9.1993. Examination of P.W.2 began on 28.4.1994 and the same has not yet been completed. The order sheets of the case records show that the accused persons were regularly attending either personally or through their counsel and virtually did not contribute to the delay in the trial of the case. It appears that the orders were passed by the trial Court mechanically for issue of summonses to the witnesses, but hardly any witness turned up. No special effort was undertaken by the Court or prosecution to procure the attendance of the charge sheeted witnesses or to complete the trial expeditiously although the petitioners filed petitions to expedite the trial or to close the prosecution case. In the above noted situation, the ratios of the cases of Santosh De (supra), Ghanashyam Mohanty (supra) and Rajkishore Mohanty (supra) squarely apply. In Santosh De's case the accused public servant was alleged to have possessed disproportionate assets to the tune of Rs. 2 lakhs. Charge sheet in that case was framed after lapse of about 8 years from the date of committal of the case to the Court of Sessions and the delay was on account of default by prosecution. The apex Court, therefore, held that in view of the inordinate delay in commencing the trial and non-explanation of delay by the prosecution right of the accused to speedy trial was infringed and so the quashing of the proceeding was justified. In the case of Rajkishore Mohanty (supra) charge sheet was placed in 1981, trial commenced in 1990 and no progress was made till filing of the petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. in 1995. Considering the inordinate delay and inaction on the part of the prosecution, learned Single Judge of this Court observed that further continuance of the case would be abuse of process of the Court and quashed the proceeding. In Ghanashyam Mohanty's case (supra) there was delay of about 20 years and yet trial had not been concluded. So this Court following the ratio of the A.R. Antulay's case (supra) inferred that prejudice to the accused can be presumed and quashed the proceeding on the same ground. The present case stands virtually on the same footing as the above noted cases. Here charge sheet was placed in 1983, charge was framed in 1990, trial began in 1992 and out of more than 100 witnesses cited in the charge sheet examination of only one witness has been completed although the proceeding has become more than 20 years old. As has been indicated earlier, the delay did not occur due to any lapse on the part of the petitioners; rather the same occurred due to want of suitable action of the prosecution and the Court. It is worthwhile to note that in the meantime one of the accused has died and the present petitioners have become old persons above 70 years of age. In such situation, there cannot be any doubt that utter prejudice has been caused to the petitioners and continuance of the proceedings would be simply abuse of process of the Court. So, in my considered opinion, for the sake of justice, equity and for the violation of the constitutional right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, the Criminal Proceedings in T.R. Case Nos. 71, 72 & 73 of 1983 against the petitioners should be dropped.
8. In the result, therefore, CRMC are allowed and the Proceedings in T.R. Case Nos. 71, 72 & 73 of 1983 against the petitioners are dropped.