ORDER
L. Rath, J.
1. In this revision, the defendant assails an order passed by the Munsif overruling his objection regarding the valuation of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction and the court-fee paid by the plaintiffs in the suit for a declaration that the deed of gift executed by plaintiff No. 2 on 6-3-1984 was void inasmuch as the defendant, her husband's younger brother, practised fraud upon her to get the gift deed executed in his favour in the garb of execution of a power-of-attorney by her. His submission is that since in essence and substance, the relief claimed by the plaintiffs is for cancellation of the deed and depriving the defendant of his title in the property conveyed under the gift deed, the suit has to be valued on the valuation of the property and ad valorem court-fee has to be paid as required under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act (shortly stated 'the Act'). It is further submitted that the valuation of the property being more than Rs. 50,000/ -, the Munsif, in whose court the suit was filed, did not have the pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit andthat the suit should have been filed before the Subordinate Judge.
2. Mr. M.M. Das, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-opposite parties, has contended that the suit is essentially one for a declaration that the deed was null and void as having been obtained by fraud and hence payment of a declaratory court-fee and consequent filing of the suit in the court of the Munsif who had jurisdiction to try the suit are not illegal.
3. A reference to the plaint shows that the plaintiffs have valued the suit at Rs. 2,000/-and pleaded that since the suit was being filed for cancellation of the deed of gift and only a declaration was sought for, a fixed court-fee of Rs.22.50/- was being affixed. In paragraph 15 of the plaint, plaintiff No. 2 enumerated the reliefs sought for by her, the first one being for a declaration that the deed of gift was void.
4. It is well settled that the court-fee payable on a suit is not merely dependent upon the way of drafting the plaint or the reliefs claimed but that the substance of the plaint has to be looked into to determine the real reliefs claimed in the suit. Dealing with the question I held in Jhapa Meher v. Jibardhan, (1988) 65 Cut LT 387, as follows :
'The principle for determination of valuation of the suit and the court-fee payable is to ascertain the real relief necessary to be claimed in the suit. For the purpose, the substance of the pleadings is to be looked into and the mere form in which it is couched is not to be taken as the determinative factor .........'
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while contending that the court-fee is to be paid under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act, has placed reliance on the decisions in Sadananda Sahu v. State of Orissa, AIR 1962 Orissa 102, Jhara Padhamuni v. Bhagirathi Padhan, ILR (1976) Cut 707, and Mt. Rupia v. Bhatu Mahton, AIR 1944 Patna 17, which is a Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court, as also (1988) 65 Cut LT 387 (supra).
6. In Sadananda Sahu's case (supra) though it was a partition suit, but essentially it was a suit to set aside the alternations of thejoint family properties made by the defendant and that being the real nature and substance of the plaint, the court held that the relief sought for in the suit was to undo the effect of the alienations and to get back possession of the lands and recover mesne profits and hence the suit was valued under Section 7(iv)(c).
7. In Jhara Padhamuni's case (supra), the Court held that where a suit is for declaration of title and for permanent injunction, it is a suit for declaration of title with consequential reliefs and hence has to be valued under Section 7(iv)(c) and ordinarily the plaintiff could put his own valuation in the suit, but, however, such valuation cannot be put arbitrarily and should have some nexus with the real market value of the property.
8. There is no dispute that the deed of gift itself recited the valuation of the property conveyed to be Rs. 2,000/-. It is, however, the submission of Mr. Deo that since the present market value of the property is Rs. 50,000/-, the valuation of the suit has to be made accordingly and court-fee paid thereon.
9. Since the opposite parties came before the court with the pleadings that fraud was practised upon plaintiff No. 2 in execution of the power of attorney and the deed of gift is one which apparently has been executed and registered and such a deed of gift is to be declared void through the suit, learned counsel for the petitioner is correct in his submission that, in essence, the releif sought for by the opposite parties is one for cancellation of the deed and not for a mere declaration of fraud having been practised upon plaintiff No. 2. As a matter of fact, a mere declaration of fraud having been practised upon her would not have the effect of avoiding the deed unless the declaration is to the effect that due to such fraud, the deed is vitiated which, in effect, is the other way of saying that the deed is ineffective and therefore cancelled. In the context the cancellation of the deed arises as a necessary consequence of the declaration and hence while the relief of declaration is the substantive relief claimed, cancellation thereof is the necessary consequential relief arising therefrom since without getting a declaration that the deed is vitiated by fraud, the cancellation cannot be sought forindependently. I would thus hold the suit to be one for relief of declaration with consequential relief and is to be governed by Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act.
10. Next is the question as to what valuation is to be put by the plaintiffs on the plaint for the purpose of court-fee and jurisdiction, inasmuch as the suit is one to which Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act applies and the valuation is the same for the purpose of jurisdiction and court-fee as provided under Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887.
11. So far as a suit to which Section 7(iv)(c) applies, the plaintiff has the option to state the amount at which he values the relief. The provision is different from that of Section 7(v) which applies to suits for possession of lands, houses and gardens where valuation is to be made in accordance with the subject-matter with specific provision as to how the value of the subject-matter is to be determined. Inasmuch as the legislature has made a distinction between the suits coming under Sections 7 (iv) and 7(v) giving an option to the plaintiff in the forms to make his own valuation of the relief claimed and in the later directing the valuation to be made in accordance with the subject-matter, it is an indication to show that the valuation to be made by the plaintiff under Section 7(iv)(c) is not on the basis of valuation of the subject-matter, and an objection cannot be raised that the suit must fail if the plaintiff does not value the relief on the basis of the market value of the land. Analysing the provision of Section 7(iv), the Supreme Court held in AIR 1958 SC 245 (S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar) that considering the scheme in the Act for computation of fees payable in suits covered by different Sub-sections of Section 7, it would be clear that in respect of suits falling under subsection (iv), a departure has been made and liberty has been given to the plaintiff to value his claim for the purposes of court-fees and that the theoretical basis of this provision appears to be that in cases in which the plaintiff is given the option to value his claim, it is really difficult to value the claim with any precision or definiteness.
12. While the plaintiffs are free to puttheir own valuation on the relief claimed by them, yet it is the consensus of law that the valuation cannot be arbitrary so as to bring it within the jurisdiction of any particular court but that the valuation has to be reasonable and based upon some nexus or criteria though it need not necessarily be the market value. In ILR (1976) Cut 707 (supra) the very conclusion was reached that the valuation made is to have some nexus with the market value of the property, but however ordinarily the valuation put by the plaintiff in respect of the relief claimed would be accepted. In AIR 1976 Patna 106 (K.P. Roy v. S. Roy) the Court held that though the court has the power to revise the valuation of the plaint in appropriate cases, yet it does not mean that merely because the value could be higher than that put by the plaintiff, the valuation must necessarily be revised and that if there is some rationale indicating the reasonableness of the value stated by the plaintiff, which cannot be said to be capricious or arbitrary, the court will refuse to revise, and rather, it cannot revise the same. Similar view was also expressed by the Patna High Court in 1968 Patna LJR 578.
13. The foregoing discussions would show that in suits as the present one, the plaintiff has the right to put his own valuation on the relief claimed and that such valuation is to be accepted unless it is wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and without any rational basis. But however merely because the relief is not valued at the market value, it does not become arbitrary or unreasonable and if the plaintiff can support the valuation on any rational basis, the same has to be accepted.
14. In Mt. Rupia's case (AIR 1944 Patna 17) (FB) (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, a similar question as that in the present one arose. The plaintiff in that case had come with an allegation before the court that the defendants 'had fraudulently got some sale deeds executed without consideration and had prayed for a declaration that the sale deeds were got-up and fraudulent and that the defendants had acquired no title by virtue of the same. It was held that the plaintiff in essence asked forcancellation of the deeds and though he did not in term ask for such relief yet the prayer was implicit in the reliefs sought for. Coming to such conclusion, the court held that the court-fee payable was under Section 7(iv)(c) and not under Schedule-I, Article 1, the distinction being that while under Section 7(iv)(c) the plaintiff has to put his own valuation on the plaint which the provision itself requires the plaintiff to state, that is, at what amount he valued the reliefs sought so far as Schedule-I, Article I is concerned, the court-fee payable is ad valorem depending on the amount or value of the subject-matter in dispute. The Full Bench held that the reliefs sought for by the plaintiff warranted payment of court-fee under Section 7(iv)(c) but since the plaintiff had not valued his plaint accordingly, he was called upon to make the valuation both on the suit and on the memorandum of appeal. As in that case, in the present case also the plaintiffs have come with the averment of continuing in possession of land but only seeking a declaration that the deed of gift was vitiated by fraud and as has been noticed earlier, the substantive relief claimed by them was that of declaration with cancellation of the deed as the consequential relief. Thus, the essential subject-matter of the suit is not the property purported to be conveyed, but challenging the action of the petitioner in getting the deed executed by practising fraud. That being so, the suit has to be valued accordingly.
15. The plaintiffs having not valued the suit under Section 7(iv)(c) and having merely valued it as a declaratory one it is necessary that an opportunity should be given to them to value of the suit under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act.
16. In that view of the matter, I would dispose of this revision with a direction that opportunity be given to the plaintiffs to make the valuation accordingly and comply with the requirements of law. There would be no order as to costs.