Hansaria, C.J.
1. Article 227 of the Constitution has given the power of superintendence to the High Courts. What is the ambit and nature of this power? Whether in a proceeding under this article, it is open to the High Court to take note of facts which were not on the record of the Court or tribunal over which the High Court exercises the power of superintendence? These are the important questions brought to the fore in this case.
2. Article 227 was not written on a clean state. The ancestors of this article in the direct line are Section 15 of the Indian High Courts Act, 1861; Section 167 of the Government of India Act, 1915; and Section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935. We may not ourselves try to find out what these sections purported to lay down, because in a very detailed decision it has been so done by a two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Umaji v. Radhikabai, AIR 1986 SC 1272, the sum and substance of which is that the power is not only confined to administrative superintendence but also to judicial superintendence, as had been noted by a Constitution Bench in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215, which was quoted in paragraph 102 in Umaji's case. It was then stated that the power of judicial superintendence has also to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases to keep the subordinate Courts and tribunals within the bonds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. In a way, the power of judicial superintendence under Article 227 is akin to the power under Article 226. There is no dispute so far and for the present case we need not advert to the other aspects of Article 227 so far as the ambit of the power is concerned.
3. The important question is the nature of the power under Article 227. A reference to Umaji's case makes it clear beyond doubt that a proceeding under Article 227 is not an original proceeding as is proceeding under Article 226 (see paragraph 102). The power under Article 227 rather is in the nature of 'revisional jurisdiction' as would appear from what finds place in paragraph 99. It is because of this that Umaji Bench held that an appeal against an order passed by a single Judge of the Bombay High Court in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is available under Clause 15 of Letters Patent, as against an order passed in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. This would appear clear from what has been stated in paragraphs 87, 91 and 99. Umaji's case, therefore, leaves no manner of doubt that while exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court exercises power which is akin to its revisional jurisdiction.
4. The aforesaid nature of the power has been required to be highlighted, because the question is whether some new facts which find place in the present petition, which is under Article 227, can be taken note of, though the same had not been brought on record either before the original Court or, for that matter, the appellate Court. This question has arisen, because the petitioners, who are tenants, seek to challenge the order of eviction passed in appeal by the Chief Judicial Magistrate on the ground of bona fide need, which would be belied if some facts which find place in the present petition are taken note of, as these show that the landlord had rented out the premises which had fallen vacant subsequent to the initiation of the present proceeding by letting out the same to other persons on higher rent, which makes it clear that he did not need those premises for his own use and occupation, otherwise he would not have let out the same. The submission on these facts is that the eviction proceeding is a ruse for letting out the same on higher rent after evicting the petitioners.
5. Shri Pal appearing for opposite party No. 1, the landlord, has taken great pains to submit that the aforesaid, which has been averred for the first time in the proceeding before this Court, cannot be taken note of. In his written note filed on 5-8-1993, he has referred to certain decisions in which the High Court itself took note of subsequent events while seized with eviction proceedings, but those were the cases where the High Court was in seisin of the matter either in its revisional jurisdiction, as was in P. Ven-kateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409; M/s. Veriety Emporium v. V.R.M. Mohd. Ibrahim, AIR 1985 SC 207 and Amrjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain, AIR 1987 SC 741; or wheere it examined the same as an appellate Court, as in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, AIR 1981 SC 1711.
6. The only case where subsequent events in an eviction case had been taken note of by the High Court in a writ proceeding was Gulab Bai v. Malin Narsi Vohra, AIR 1991 SC 1760 : (1991 AIR SCW 1971) as per the written note of Shri Pal. As to this, the learned counsel submits that the additional materials, though used by the High Court, had been brought on record of the appellate Court by invoking its power under Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C. It is, therefore, contended that -the observations made in this case in paragraph 20 that a High Court in a petition under Article 227 can take note of subsequent facts and evidences must not be understood to mean that such subsequent facts may be those which had been brought to the file of the High Court for the first time. So, the learned counsel has submitted in his written note, which was also his oral submission, that after the proceeding has attained finality under the statute, no fresh materials can be taken note of by the High Court when seized with the self same matter under Article 227.
7. We have not felt inclined to accept the broad submission of Shri Pal. First, because, as already stated, Article 227 power is in the nature of revisional jurisdiction, and so, if while exercising revisional power under Section 115, C.P.C. subsequent events brought to the notice of the Court for the first time can be, indeed must be, albeit cautiously, taken note of, as had been done in the cases of Venkateswarlu, Variety Emporium, and Amarjit Singh, there is no reason as to why under Article 227 the same could not be done. Secondly, the finality given to an order by a statute, as has been done by Section 14 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1967 to the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, cannot take away the constitutional power conferred on this Court either by Article 226 or Article 227, and so, what has been stated by Section 14 at hand has to be subject to the order to be passed in a Article 227 proceeding in those cases where Article 227 power is available. It would be too much to contend (to be fair to Shri Pal let it be said, he did not so contend) that the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate would remain final as required by Section 14 despite it having been varied, modified or reversed by this Court in a proceeding under Article 227 where such variance etc. is permissible.
8. In view of the above, we are of the firm opinion that law does not prohibit the High Court to take note of the relevant additional materials brought to its notice for the first time while examining an eviction order in a proceeding under Article 227.
9. Let us now see what these additional materials are and how do they affect the case of the landlord regarding the premises being needed bona fide on which ground the eviction order has been finally upheld by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. The following averment finding place in paragraph 18 of the petition needs to be noted in this connection:--
'18. That the oblique motive of the opposite party No. 1 is evidenced by his conduct in letting out premises to fresh tenants on an increased rent after eviction of one Niranjan Khandelwal and another Dinesh Khandelwal arising out of Execution Cases Nos. 23/83 and 22/83 respectively, filed before Munsif, Balasore.'
The aforesaid averment has been met in the last sub-paragraph of paragraphs in the counter-affidavit filed by opposite party No. 1 by stating as below :--
'That (as to) the grounds taken in paras 18 and 19, it is submitted that Niranjan Khandelwal and Dinesh Khandelwal were evicted from their rented house on the ground of wilful defaulter and their writ applications were dismissed as they failed to deposit the arrear amount as directed by this Hon'ble Court.'
This shows that the fact of letting out the, premises which had fallen vacant after evicting Niranjan and Dinesh to fresh tenants on: increased rent has not been denied. We may refer here to full particulars of the case relating to Niranjan and Dinesh as given in the affidavit filed by petitioner No. 3 on 19-3-1991 -- the affidavit of opposite party No. 1 having been filed on 5-4-1991.
10. The entire emphasis of Shri Pal is that possession of the premises under occupation of Niranjan and Dinesh had been prayed for, not on the ground that the landlord needed the same bona fide, but that they were wilful defaulters. This fact has no relevance in so far as the point under consideration is concerned inasmuch as it is not in dispute that those premises did become available to the landlord in 1983 as the Execution Cases relating to Niranjan and Dinesh in the Court of Munsif, Balasore are Nos. 22 and 23 of 1983. So, in 1983 two premises became available to the landlord and if he was in bona fide need of some premises for his own use and occupation, he could have definitely used the same if those were otherwise suitable for his purpose. It is not the case of opposite party No. 1 that the premises vacated by Niranjan and Dinesh would not have served the purpose for which the present eviction proceeding was initiated in 1979.
11. This being the position, nothing also is required to satisfy our mind that the plea of bona fide requirement was a ruse for getting the premises evicted to be let out subsequently on higher rent. A landlord cannot be allowed to do the same. This would throw to the winds the protection made available by a statute like, the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1967.
12. In view of the above, being satisfied that the additional material brought on record for the first time in this proceeding can be looked into and that the additional material made available to. us does knock down the case of the landlord that the premises were required bona fide for his own use and occupation, we set aside the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate by allowing this petition.
13. The petition stands allowed by quashing Annexure 3, which is the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate after the matter had been remanded to him by this Court in OJ.C. No. 2562 of 1983.
R.K. Patra, J.
14. I agree.