Pasayat, J.
1. Determination of area to be surplus and in excess of the retainable limit, by the competent authority and the affirmation thereof by the appellate authority under the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (in short 'the Act') is the subject-matter of challenge in the present writ application.
2. The factual backdrop is rather simple. The cursory manner of disposal of the return filed by the petitioner indicating his status to be an individual, has unnecessarily complicated the matter. The conduct of the petitioner is also not without blemish. Properties which he claims to have been parted with much prior to the relevant date under the Act were included in the details of 'land held' and the details of land which ought to have been legally included were not so done. The petitioner came to hold lands from two sources, i.e., by way of gift evidenced by deed dated 31-5-1955, from his father and by partition of ancestral properties on 5-8-1970. Some amount of dispute was raised as to the nature of the property received by way of gift. It was faintly submitted that the same acquired the characteristic of ancestral property. This submission need not detain us in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Arunachala Mudaliar v. Muruganatha reported in AIR 1953 SC 495 : (1954 All LJ 25) which laid down that the recitals in the gift deed would be determinative of the nature and character of the properties in the hands of the recipient. A bare perusal of the gift deed in the instant case leaves no scope for any doubt that it was intended to be the absolute property of the petitioner.
3. The other aspect that needs to be highlighted here is the manner of disposal of the return submitted by the petitioner. The petitioner at the time of submission of the return was married and had minor children. Under Section 2(i) of the Act, 'Persons' has been defined to include an individual, a family, a firm, a company, or an association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. 'Family' has been defined in Sub-section (f) of the said section, in relation to a person to mean the indiviuals, the wife or husband, as the case may be of such individual, and their unmarried minor children. While computing the area held by a person to adjudicate whether there was any surplus to be surrendered to the State, certain procedures have been laid down. Section 4(7) provides for a notional partition to find out the extent of land which would have fallen to the share of a member of a Hindu Undivided Family, had there been a partition of the vacant land and of any other land on which there is a building with a dwelling unit therein. The ultimate purpose is to find out in respect of a family as defined under the Act, total extent of land held by an individual, his wife or husband, as the case may be and their minor children. As fairly submitted by Mr. S.S. Mohanty, learned counsel for the petitioner, in the instant case the wife and minor children of the petitioner held land in their respective names on the appointed day, and those lands were available to be aggregated with that of the petitioner. This was not done. He, therefore, submitted that the computation has not been properly done and even though it may work out against the petitioner in the ultimate analysis, yet as a responsible citizen with good conscience the petitioner wants to file all the relevant details for a proper adjudication. It was also submitted that lands which were no longer under the ownership of the petitioner were by mistake and due to tack of proper guidance included in the details of land submitted along with the statement filed by the petitioner. Given an opportunity he would explain the desirability for their exclusion. Mr. P.K. Mohanty, learned Addl. Government Advocate, appearing for the State could not bring to our notice any plausible reason for depriving the petitioner of such an opportunity. It was submitted at the Bar that the competent authority shall issue a notice under Section 6(2) of the Act to the petitioner to regularise the proceedings and to proceed on the basis of the statement to be filed by him incorporating all the necessary details including the details of land held by his wife, and/ or their minor children.
4. In course of hearing an interesting point was raised for our consideration. We propose to deal with the same, though it is not strictly necessary for disposal of the case. It was stated that the power of determination by the competent authority derives its source from a statement filed either under Section 6(1) or in response to a notice under Section 6(2). Elaborating, it was stated that if no such statement is filed, there cannot be a determination by the competent authority and the only available course is to initiate a proceeding for prosecution under Section 38 of the Act. Support in respect of this stand is sought to be derived from certain observations made by an author Shri Rameswar Dial in his commentary titled 'A Commentary on the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (Act XXXIII of 1976), First Edition, November, 1976'. The learned author has expressed an opinion that the rigours of prosecution as provided in Section 38 are of such nature that it would be sufficient to persuade a recalcitrant notice to file a return. It was also submitted that the language used in Section 8 was very clear and it left no scope for doubt that the power of determination was based on the statement to be submitted, and in a case where no statement was filed any adjudication was impermissible.
Much was sought to be made out from the expression used in Section 8 that 'on the basis of the statement filed under Section 6, and after such inquiry as the competent authority may deem fit to make, the competent authority shall prepare a draft statement in respect of the person who has filed the statement under Section 6. In our view, such an interpretation if allowed to be accepted would defeat the purpose of the Act. True it is that where plain and unambiguous expression is used in a statute, it is not for the Court to put words to the mouth of the legislature or to seek the legislative intent. There is, however, one exception to this fundamental rule of interpretation. The primary and foremost task of a Court in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature, actual or imputed. Having ascertained the intention, the Court must then strive to so interpret the statute as to promote and advance the object and purpose of the enactment. For this purpose, where necessary the Court may even depart from the rule that plain words should be interpreted according to their plain meaning. This was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Girdhari Lal & Sons v. Balbir Nath Mathur, reported in AIR 1986 SC 1499. Elaborating further, the Court held as follows:
'........There need not be no meek and mute submission to the plainness of the language. To avoid patent injustice, anomaly or absurdity or to avoid invalidation of a law, the Court would be well justified in departing from the so-called golden rule of construction so as to give effect to the object and purpose of the enactment by supplementing, the written word if necessary.'
Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction can be put upon it which modifies, clarifies the meaning, intent, implication of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. (See AIR 1955 SC 830 : Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh and others). The doctrine of grammatical construction has been, as aforestated, made exceptionable in certain circumstances. The position has been succinctly stated by the Supreme Court in the following words.
'..........In the past, the Judges and lawyers spoke of a 'golden rule' by which statutes were to be interpreted according to grammatical and ordinary sense of the word. They took the grammatical or literal meaning unmindful of the consequences. Even if such a meaning gave rise to unjust results which legislature never intended, the grammatical meaning alone was kept to prevail. They said that it would be for the legislature to amend the Act and not for the Court to intervene by its innovation.
During the last several years, the 'golden rule' has been given a go-by. We now look for the 'intention' of the legislature or the 'purpose' of the statute. First, we examine the words of the statute. If the words are precise and cover the situation in hand, we do not go further. We expound those words in the natural and ordinary sense of the words. But, if the words are ambiguous, uncertain or any doubt arises as to the terms employed, we deem it as our paramount duty to put upon the language of the legislature rational meaning. We then examine every word, every section and every provision. We examine the Act as a whole. We examine the necessity which gave rise to the Act. We look at the mischiefs which the legislature intended to redress. We look at the whole situation and not just one-to-relation. We will not consider any provision out of the framework of the statute. We will not view the provisions as abstract principles separated from the motive force behind. We will consider the provisions in the circumstances to which they owe their origin. We will consider the provisions to ensure coherence and consistency within the law as a whole and to avoid undesirable consequences.
Let me here add a word of caution. This adventure, no doubt, enlarges our discretion as to interpretation. But it does not imply power to us to substitute our own notions of legislative intention. It implies only a power of choice where differing constructions are possible and different meanings are available.'
(See AIR 1988 SC 1883 at p. 1945 of AIR): Kehar Singh and others v. The State (Delhi Admn.)).
5. As appears from the Preamble of the Act, the object of the statute in question is to provide for imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomeration, tor the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve the common good. The object is to take the surplus land and utilise the same for socially useful purposes. If the interpretation as suggested is accepted, then the State may enrich in terms of money, but the avowed object would not be achieved. Prosecution as provided in Section 38 may not be always a persuasive factor for submission of a statement. There may be large number of cases where the landowners may find it profitable to avoid filing of statement and prefer payment of fine which may be negligible considering the value of the property involved in those particular cases. On payment of fine they shall continue to hold the land in the absence of any provision for deprivation thereof under the statute. This is contrary to the very object of the statute as aforestated.
6. The true intention of Section 8 appears to be to determine the computable area, and find out surplus area, if any. In our view, Section 8(1) should, therefore, be conveniently read as follows:
'8. Preparation of draft statement as regards vacant land held in excess of ceiling limit.
(1) On the basis of the statement filed under Section 6, and after such inquiry as the competent authority may deem fit to make, the competent authorin shall prepare a draft statement in respect of the person who has filed (or was required to file) the statement under Section 6.'
The words in bracket have been supplied by us to make the Section more workable and to be in line and in consonance with the legislative intent. We, therefore, find no substance in the argument raised that it is impermissible to prepare a draft statement in the absence of a statement required to be filed under Section 6.
7. Mr. S.S. Mohanty, learned counsel for the petitioner, has undertaken that the petitioner shall file a statement containing all requisite particulars on or before 7-3-1990; irrespective of the fact as to whether he receives a notice under Section 6(2) from the competent authority or not. He also undertakes to file a memorandum stating that in view of his own submission that requisite particulars were not submitted in correct status, the statement filed by him shall be deemed to be a statement required to be filed under Section 6(2) and shall not insist on a formal notice in that regard. However, to regularise the matter the competent authority would do well to issue a notice under Section 6(2). The orders contained in Annexures 4 and 5 are quashed and the matter is remitted back to the competent authority. Since the matter has been delayed and the object of the Act was an expeditious vesting of surplus land in the State the competent authority would do well to proceed in the matter with dispatch, and after conducting such inquiry as contemplated and appropriate, finalise the proceeding by the end of May, 1990.
The writ application is accordingly disposed of; but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.
D.P. Mohapatra, J.
8. I agree.