P.K. Balasubramanyan, C.J.
1. The Bokaro Steel Plant, a Unit of Steel Authority of India Limited is a Government Company within the meaning of Section 617 of the Indian Companies Act, 1956. The Steel Authority of India Limited (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) is also a Government Company incorporated with the main object of manufacturing, prospecting, buying, selling, importing, exporting, or otherwise dealing in iron and steel of all qualities, types and kinds and in any other steel and iron related products. The Bokaro Steel Plant is claimed to be a pioneer steel Plant of the country and one of the largest of its kind, having a total production capacity of 2 million tonnes per year. The steel Plant is covered by a network of gas pipelines, water network and steam pipelines. It is claimed that the whole system of network of pipelines is integrated and a very high standard of safety is required to maintain the minimum level of pressure in the pipelines. The pressure in the pipeline is directly proportional to the production level in the Plant and the entire steel Plant is maintained at the functional level, so that there is not even an hour of shut down in the plant. It is claimed that the Bokaro Steel Plant has never been shut down from its very inception. The Plant is of such a nature that if it is compelled to shut down, it may pose environmental hazards and there is an apprehension even of human catastrophe. The Plant itself may be very seriously affected if it is shut down without following the procedures and it requires at least seven days preparation. Even that would be at the risk of 4,000 tonnes of molten steal in the blast furnaces solidifying and the blast furnaces being destroyed for ever, leading to the necessity of erecting another at the cost of more than rupees ten thousand crores, practically compelling the setting up of a new plant. The gas pipeline network may be damaged leading to escape of lethal gas, carbon monoxide, which, if it escapes, might lead to a tragedy, loss of human lives like the one in Bhopal. The same would be the position by the damage being caused to the steam pipelines leading to another catastrophe that may result in loss of lives.
2. The iron and steel industry has been recognized to be the backbone of the country. It has been notified as a public utility service within the meaning of Section 2(n) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is also included in the First Schedule to that Act, containing the industries which may be declared to be the public utility services in terms of Clause (vi) of Clause (n) of Section 2 of the Act. Item 7 of the Schedule is 'Iron and Steel'. Section 22 of the Act places restriction on those who are employed in a public utility service, from resorting to strike without complying with the conditions prescribed therein. The last of the notifications issued under Section 2(n)(vi) of the Act was by the State of Jharkhand on 16.9.2003.
3. According to the Bokaro Steel Plant, certain demands were made by the non-recognised Unions. Respondent 6, the recognized Union did not put forward any demand. Considering the importance of the steel industry and its role in the economy of the nation, a National Joint Committee for the Steel Industry (for short, NJCS) was constituted in October, 1969. The committee arrived at a settlement and drew up on 27.10.1970 a memorandum of agreement on revision of wages and other benefits in steel industries. In February 1971, the scope of the Committee was enlarged. It was given power to decide its own terms of reference from day to day and it covered negotiations for wage agreement and its implementation, review of welfare amenities and facilities, steps to be taken for increase in production, matters on which it was necessary to draw the attention of the Government and any issue pertaining to the steel industry and its employees, as may be agreed to in the NJCS from time to time. Thus, the NJCS practically covered all aspects of the industry, including labour relationship therein and any problem arising out of it. According to the Bokaro Steel Plant, without resorting to the machinery of NJCS the non-recognised unions gave them notices of strike along with charters of demand on 10.10.2003. The steel industry immediately forwarded the said notice to the conciliation officer on 11.10.2003, thus, the conciliation machinery under the Act was set in motion. But the workers had threatened to go on strike on and from 25.10.2003 in support of their demands. The Bokaro Steel Limited in that situation approached this Court with the present writ petition essentially seeking a direction to respondents 7 to 13, the non recognized Unions, to desist from the strike proposed to be held on 25.10.2003, putting forward the contention that the strike would be disastrous for the Plant, the environment, human life and also, raising the legal contention that the strike was illegal, since a conciliation proceeding was pending and no such strike could be resorted to when the conciliation proceedings are pending in view of the notification issued under Section 2(n) of the Act. It was also contended that the grievance of the workers, if any, should be taken up through the NJCS. The strike could result in loss of production leading to national loss. It will also seriously damage the Plant leading to huge expenditures to put the Plant back on its feet. Though the Court was closed for Deepawali holidays, the matter was taken up in view of the disaster highlighted by the Plant and an interim direction was issued on 24.10.2003 restraining the Unions from giving effect to the proposed strike called for 25.10.2003. The strike was averted, but it is seen that some of the Unions have issued another notice of their workmen to go ahead with the strike by 11.11.2003. On the Union appearing and requesting that the matter be heard urgently, the said prayer was acceded to and the writ petition itself was taken up for hearing as agreed to by both sides, on 13.11.2003.
4. On behalf of the writ petitioner, Sri Deepankar Gupta, Senior Advocate, submitted that the proposed strike was clearly illegal, since it was barred by Section 22 of the Act in view of the fact that the industry was a public utility service and during the pendency of a conciliation proceeding before the conciliation officer, no person employed therein, has a right to go on strike. Counsel also contended that the strike was uncalled for, since the forum available to the union was NJCS, which could deal with all the problems, including the alleged failure of the Management to implement some of the decisions already taken and in that situation, the Unions, if they had grievances, could have approached NJCS for resolution. He further contended that the Unions had no fundamental right to strike. They neither had a statutory right to strike in the circumstances nor the moral right to strike. Counsel highlighted the disastrous consequences that may follow an abrupt shut down of the plant if the strike went on and the possible human tragedy of great magnitude that may visit people of the area. Counsel also highlighted the colossal loss that will be suffered by the Plant by an abrupt shut down as pleaded in the writ petition. These submissions of the learned Senior Counsel were met by the learned Senior Counsel for respondent No. 8, who submitted that the writ petitioner was trying to raise demons without any foundation, for inducing the Court to interfere at this premature stage and the disastrous consequences projected by the Steel Plant were more imaginary than real. Of course, Senior Counsel and the other counsel who appeared for various other Unions, could not positively assert that such consequence as foreseen or projected by the Plant would not occur. Essentially, the plea was that the Management was exaggerating the possible consequences. There had been strikes earlier and nothing like the scenario as painted by the Management had presented itself. Counsel fairly submitted that since this was a public utility service, a strike could not be resorted to in terms of Section 22 of the Act, during the pendency of the conciliation proceedings. But counsel tried to argue that the Management was shying away from the conciliation proceedings by trying to raise all sorts of technical objections. It turned out at the hearing that the Management took the stand before the conciliation officer that there has to be a separate conciliation proceeding with each union and a combined conciliation attempt would bear no fruit. Though there were some attempts at conciliation as can be seen from the rejoinder filed on behalf of the Steel Plant, when the conciliation officer proposed a joint conciliation conference, the Management took the stand that there could only be individual conciliation proceeding with each of the Union and raised an objection before the conciliation officer. It is common ground that the decision of the conciliation officer on that aspect is awaited. Learned Senior Counsel for the Management submitted before us that if the conciliation officer still took the view that it is be a joint or common conciliation, the Management was willing to participate in it and the fact of raising a point that conciliation has to be separate, did not mean that the Management was not participating in the conciliation proceedings. As noticed, learned counsel for respondent No. 8, supported by other counsel, essentially took the stand that the Management was not willing to come to the negotiating table and the strike being a legitimate weapon in the hands of the workers, the Court could not prohibit the strike as sought for by the Steel Plant. It was also argued that the dispute now raised may not come within the purview of NJCS and the fact that there is such a forum cannot stand in the way of the workmen asserting their rights in terms of the Industrial Disputes Act and setting in motion the machinery available under that Act, including the resort to a strike. Counsel argued that the strike was a legitimate weapon in the hands of the Union and it is resorted to bring a recalcitrant Management to the negotiating table, so that the grievances of the workmen could be redressed. There was no reason to interfere at this stage. Counsel appearing for the other Unions, in addition to supporting the submissions of counsel for respondent No. 8, also reiterated that it was the reluctance of the Management to come to the negotiating table that led to the strike notice and if the Management is willing to negotiate, there is no reason why the Unions should go on strike. The argument of the Senior Counsel for the Steel Plant that the workmen had no legal, moral right was also sought to be met.
5. In this case, we do not think that it is necessary to go into the question whether the workmen have any fundamental, statutory or moral right to resort to strike. The authorities seem to suggest that there is no fundamental right to strike and there is no statutory right to strike. Even though the statute does not prevent a strike, it does place restrictions on it. The question whether workmen have any moral right to strike is to be adjudged from the angle of the consequences arising out of that strike. Apart from the loss of production resulting in national waste, some times strikes unleash other consequences and the more it is prolonged, the more miseries it brings to the families of the workmen themselves. But that apart, in a case like the present one where possible consequences, financial or otherwise are highlighted, it is necessary for the Unions to ask themselves, whether they would be morally justified in resorting to a strike. Suppose the strike in the plant leads to release of carbon monoxide gas as suggested by the Plant, leading to loss of human lives, could a Union of workmen justify the claim that they have the right to go on strike? Similarly, if, by the freezing of the molten steel, crores of rupees were to go down the drain, can a union claim that they have a moral right to go on strike? We are living in a competitive world and an all-round efforts must be made to avoid loss of production, minimize investment and maximize production; then only can we survive in the world economy. This is all the more so for a country which is poised to make grand strides in the world economy. We, therefore, think, it is time that those involved in trade union activities seriously take stock of the present needs of the nation and the national interest, so as to arrive at a consensus on the question. Since for the purpose of this case, we do not see the necessity to pursue this aspect further, we leave it here.
6. It is clear that the conciliation proceeding are still going on. The Unions are therefore disentitled to resort to strike in view of Section 23 of the Act. Any strike has to await the consequence of the conciliation proceedings and in case of break down of that proceedings, the reporting in that behalf and the period that is to expire before the strike can be resorted to.
7. Whether even then a strike should be resorted to by the Union is a matter on which we do not think it necessary to pronounce at this stage. It cannot be assumed that the conciliation proceedings would not bear fruit, especially in the context of the submissions of one of the Unions before us, respondent No. 10, that it has withdrawn from strike move. We leave open that question for decision, if and when the occasion arises and this Court is approached in that behalf. Similarly, we do not also think it necessary to answer finally the question whether all the disputes in the steel industry has to be settled only through NJCS.
8. Now that it is clear on the submissions that the strike cannot be resorted to pending the conciliation proceedings, all that is necessary is to direct respondents 6 to 13 to desist from resorting to any strike during the pendency of the conciliation proceedings and as envisaged by Section 23 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, there will be a direction to respondents 6 to 13 not to go on strike until the conciliation proceedings are concluded, and against the terms of Section 23 of the Industrial Disputes Act.
9. The writ petition is thus allowed tothe above extent.