ORDER
1. Heard both sides.
2. This appeal is by the Management. The appellant challenges the decision of the learned Single Judge setting aside a notice of termination of an Award in terms of Section 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and issuing a direction which, according to the appellant, went against the prior binding direction issued by a Division Bench of this Court.
3. The facts are not much in dispute. There was an Award in Reference No. 51 of 1990 dated 19.5.1992 which directed the Management to give employment as general mazdoors to 111 workmen within four months of publication of the Award. The Management challenged that Award in CWJC No. 3430 of 1992 (R). By judgment dated 17.1.1994, the Award was confirmed. The Court directed that the workmen who are entitled to the benefit of the Award be identified. This appeared to be for the reason that the Award mentioned only the names of the workmen and gave no other particulars, like the name of the father, age, address and so on. Being not satisfied with the dismissal of the writ petition, the Management filed a petition for special leave to appeal in the Supreme Court. That petition was subsequently withdrawn with liberty to seek a review of the judgment of the High Court. Subsequently, the Civil Review No. 59 of 1994 (R) was filed in this Court. On 28.8.1996, the Review Petition was disposed of. In paragraph 13 of that order, the Division Bench gave a specific direction regarding the identification of the beneficiaries of the Award. The Division Bench directed the Union to produce, within fifteen days of that judgment, the photographs of the workmen along with affidavits of each individual workman. The Management was to publish the photographs and details in the notice board inviting objections, if any. If no objection was received, the Management was, prima facie, to accept the photographs and affidavits produced by the Union and to re-employ those workmen. But the Management was given the liberty to take disciplinary action against those workmen who were found to be impersonating others and who are not genuinely covered by the Award. Thus, the Union was, more or less, given the privilege of identification of the workmen on production of their photographs with affidavits within the time fixed. The Management challenged that order in the Supreme Court. On 13.12.1996, the petition for Special Leave to Appeal, was dismissed. The Management thereafter filed a petition for modification of the order in the Supreme Court. On 31.12.1996 by Annexure-12 order, the Supreme Court retained the order dismissing the petition for Special Leave to Appeal, but added that the final word in the matter of identification would rest with the Management.
4. All this time, the Union did not produce the photographs and the affidavits as directed by the Division Bench in the order passed in Civil Review No. 59 of 1994. But 20 persons applied for employment claiming to be the beneficiaries of the Award. No affidavits were filed asserting that they were the persons concerned. The Management took the stand that the photographs were not routed through the Union and that they were not accompanied by affidavits as contemplated by the order in Civil Review No. 59 of 1994. Thereafter by letter dated 6/12.3.1998, the Management gave a notice to the Union under Section 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act, of the intention to terminate the Award on the expiry of the period of two months from that date in terms of Section 19(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act. There was some correspondence based on the said notice. Ultimately, the Union filed an application in the Supreme Court praying for a modification of the earlier order and seeking a direction to be Issued to the Deputy Commissioner to decide on the question of identification of the beneficiaries of the Award. By Annexure-12 order dated 24.2.1994, the Supreme Court dismissed that application as misconceived. The Union filed CWJC No. 47 of 2000 in this Court on 20.1.2000 praying for a writ of certiorari to quash the communication issued by the Management intimating the Union that the Management had already terminated Award dated 19.5.1992 and for an appropriate direction calling upon the Management to implement the Award in question. The Union took the stand that the Management had no right to terminate the Award in terms of Section 19(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act and that the unilateral action of the Management was unsustainable and unjustified on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. The Union also argued, presumably based on Section 19(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, that the Award of this nature could not be terminated by recourse to Sub-section (3) and (6) of Section 19 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Management resisted the writ petition by submitting that the Union never complied with the direction contained in the order in Civil Review No. 59 of 1994 and hence there was no occasion for the Management to accept any workman as beneficiary of the Award, and it was in that situation, and after a considerable, lapse of time, that the Management issued the impugned notice, Annexure-13 and that there was no reason to interfere with the direction of the Management. It was also submitted that in the light of the binding direction earlier issued by the Division Bench and affirmed by the Supreme Court, no relief could be granted to the Union on the facts and in the circumstances of the case.
5. The learned Single Judge, after referring to the relevant facts and the developments leading to the filing of the writ petition including the argument that the learned Single Judge could not modify the earlier order of the Division Bench, held that the termination of the Award was a hurried one and in that situation, the writ petition had merit. The learned Single Judge, therefore, issued a direction that the Management and the workmen will act in co-operation with each other. Photographs were already there with the conciliation officer when a conciliation was attempted prior to the reference of the matter to the tribunal, and the identification process must be completed within two months as per the direction of the Division Bench. With respect, we find some difficulty in fully understanding the implication of this judgment. Even when the order was passed on Civil Review No. 54 of 1994 and subsequent attempts were made before the Supreme Court to get them modified by both sides, the availability of photographs with the conciliation officer was an existing fact (if it was true). The Division Bench had issued an elaborate direction regarding the identification in its order in Civil Review No. 59 of 1994. Therefore, in the face of that direction, the learned Single Judge, at a later stage, was not entitled to resurrect the alleged existence of the photographs with the conciliation officer. The Order passed in Civil Review No. 59 of 1994 was clear and it was to the effect that Union would, within 15 days of the judgment, produce the photographs of the workmen along with their individual affidavits and, in that case, the Management was, prima facie, to accept the identification of those workmen.
6. Since the said directions are binding on both the parties, it is not open to us to alter, vary or substitute the direction issued by this Court in Civil Review No. 59 of 1994. Whatever may be the merit or demerit of the notice under Section 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act issued by the Management and subsequent termination thereof, we have to notice here that the fact now put forward was available even when the workmen moved the Supreme Court for modification of the order seeking a direction to the Deputy Commissioner to undertake the identification and the Union could not get the earlier order modified or this demand acceded to. We are mentioning this only Incidentally, since it is an aspect to be considered, if one has to go into the merits or demerits of Annexure-13 issued by the Management. But in this case, we find that it is not necessary to finally decide the question that the workmen sought to raise, namely, that in view of Section 19(5) of the Act, it was not an Award which could have been brought under Section 19(6) of the Act. On our part, we find that the Union had failed to comply with the direction of the Division Bench in the Civil Review No. 59 of 1994 which was confirmed by the Supreme Court which did not interfere on being approached again by both sides and the process of identification as directed by the Division Bench having not been resorted to by the Union, it cannot be held that there was anything wrong in the action of the Management in informing the Union that the Award could not be enforced. We arc satisfied that the effect of the decision of the learned Single Judge is to modify the earlier direction of the Division Bench and hence it requires to be interfered with. We are also satisfied that the writ petitioner has not made out a case for interference by this Court. We, therefore, allow this appeal and setting aside the decision of the learned Single Judge, dismiss the writ petition. We make no order as to costs.