ORDER
D.K. Sinha, J.
1. The petitioner has preferred this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the entire criminal prosecution in G.R. No. 2949 of 2003 arising out of Ranchi S.C. & S.T. P.S. Case No. 29 of 2003, now pending in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi for the alleged offence under Section 3(1)(x)(2)(vii) of the S.C. and S.T. (Prevention of Attrocities) Act 1989 read with Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code.
2. The brief fact of the case as stands narrated in the written report presented by the Opposite party No. 3 before the Harijan Police Station was that he at the relevant time was posted as Section Officer in the Jharkhand Vidhan Sabha, Ranchi. He was the member of the Scheduled Caste and used to work under the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Assembly but his incharge of the work was the Deputy Secretary, Vinoda Nand Jha (Petitioner). On 17.10.2003 at about 1.15 p.m. while the informant was proceeding towards the office of Shri Kumar Jai Kishore Singh, Deputy Secretary, he was mid way called out by the petitioner, Vinoda Nand Jha, and pursuant to that when he went to the petitioner, it is alleged that the petitioner abused him by calling him Harijan and alleged that Chamar, Dusad tribal people were polluting the environment of the assembly on the issue of reservation. It was further alleged that the petitioner accosted him that females of their castes used to work in different trade as menial workers and there was no guarantee about their chastity including the females of his house and even then, the informant was raising the issue of reservation.
3. The occurrence was witnessed by several persons who were present in the chamber of Kumar Jai Kishore Singh, Deputy Secretary (Accounts). The informant highlighted the bias of the petitioner against him from before on account of the fact that he was Harijan and the police case as aforesaid was instituted on 17.10.2003.
4. Mr. Jai Prakash, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that as per written report the occurrence as alleged took place during the working hours of the Jharkhand Legislative Assembly within its premises but surprisingly the matter was not reported either to the Speaker or the Secretary or the law and order authority of the Assembly. Mr. Jha further submitted that from plain rending of the F.I.R. no imputation of inflicting insult by the petitioner against the informant is made out so as to attract the offence under Section 3(1)(x)(2)(vii) of the S.C. and S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 or under Section 504 IPC. Mr. Jha further added that the law was set in motion by Ranchi S.C. and S.T. police on the written report of the informant against the petitioner without compliance of the mandatory provisions as enshrined under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. and on this count alone, the criminal prosecution against the petitioner is liable to be quashed. Advancing his argument Mr. Jha submitted that the petitioner is presently posted as Additional Secretary in the Jharkhand Vidhan Shaba but at the relevant time of the alleged occurrence he was posted as Deputy Secretary (Accounts) having spent unblemish service career of more than 33 years. The petitioner has been suffering from serious heart ailment as well as high degree of diabetise under continuous medical care and treatment of cardiologist for long six years. Mr. Jha pointed out that the instant case under Section 3 of the S.C. and S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 against the petitioner was intentionally brought about keeping in mind to deprive him to seek anticipatory bail which was barred under Section 18 of the S.C. and S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. '
5. Mr. Jha further submitted that the informant as well as the petitioner in the instant case are the officers of Jharkhand Vidhan Sabha and with the intervention of common friends, they have settled the disputes and filed the compromise petition duly signed by the informant as well as the petitioner in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Ranchi with the prayer made therein to drop the criminal prosecution in terms of the compromise petition which was filed on 20.12.2005 duly signed on 17.12.2005. But no order was passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi on the said compromise petition signed by the informant and the petitioner duly identified by their respective lawyers.
6. It is relevant to mention that I.A. No. 741 of 2005 has been filed on behalf of the informant on 24.4.2006 to vacate the interim order granted to the petitioner on 5.4.2006 on the ground that the petitioner did not approach this Court with clean hands rather he misled by giving false statements and suppressing the material facts. It was stated therein that as a matter of fact, the informant did never appear before the court below nor sworn any affidavit in support of the compromise petition as stated in the supplementary affidavit which was mis-conceived and it was never executed by him.
7. Mr. Nilesh Kumar learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the informant submitted that the petitioner has tried to cheat this Court as well as the court below by furnishing/annexing false statement which was never executed or delivered by the informant. Advancing his argument Mr. Nilesh Kumar submitted that after investigation and finding the allegation prima facie true against the petitioner, the Investigating Officer sought for permission from the Secretariat of the Jharkhand Legislative Assembly to arrest the petitioner but without action.
8. By filing the rejoinder to the Interlocutory application No. 741 of 2005 Mr. Jai Prakash Jha submitted that it was shocking for the petitioner that signature of the informant on the compromise petition has been challenged and questioned though the informant had put his signature voluntarily duly identified by Bharat Bhushan Divakar, Advocate.
9. By filing a counter affidavit on behalf of the opposite party No. 3 in the instant case it is stated that the informant in utter surprise came to know about the compromise petition which was never filed on his behalf in any court and when he came to know about the alleged compromise petition, he immediately approached the court below and categorically stated that he never entered into compromise with the petitioner and upon consideration of the submission made on behalf of the opposite party No. 3/informant, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi rejected the compromise petition vide order dated 27.4.2006.
10. Mr. Nilesh Kumar further submitted that the statement made in paragraph-9 of the quashing petition was itself enough to prove that on 17.10.2003 the occurrence had taken place based upon the admission of the petitioner himself, whereas, in the earlier statement it was stated that no occurrence much less the occurrence as alleged had taken place. The petitioner admitted on oath that there was some altercation for which the case was lodged.
11. Mr. Jha, the learned Counsel by way of reply submitted that the opposite party No. 3 (informant) is liable to be prosecuted at the instance of the court below after due enquiry under Section 195 read with Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for giving false evidence in the court below for denying his genuine signature on the compromise petition. He concluded his argument by submitting that without obtaining sanction under Section 22 of the S.C. and S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 as well as under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. the petitioner has been criminally prosecuted. Even in case of occurrence alleged to have been committed in the premises and within the view of the Vidhan Sabha authority, for the argument sake, the Speaker as well as the Secretary of the Jharkhand Assembly should have been informed bringing the matter to their notice. Mr. Jha, the learned Counsel attracted the attention that the alleged occurrence did not take place in the view of the public at large which can be evident from the bare perusal of the F.I.R. and on such fact the prosecution of the petitioner under Section 3(1)(x) of the S.C. and S.T (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is unsustainable.
12. The opposite party No. 2 after appearing also filed counter affidavit in the instant case stating therein that an attempt was made to compromise but he could not succeed.
13. Having regard to the facts and circumstances, I find that the petitioner has raised the question of maintainability of his criminal prosecution under Sections (1)(x)(2)(vii) of the S.C. and S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act on the ground that no sanction was obtained either under Section 22 of the said Act or under Section 197 of Cr.P.C.
14. Section 22 of the Act device protection of action taken in good faith which reads thus:
No suit, prosecution or the other legal proceeding shall lie against the Central Government or against the State Government or any officer or authority of the Government or any other person for any thing which is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act.
15 Similarly Section 197(1) of the Cr.P.C. requires sanction in case of prosecution of judges and public servants which speaks:
Prosecution of Judges and public servants. -
(1) When any person who is or was a judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction-
(a) in the case of a person who is employed or , as the case may be was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government.
(b) in the case of a person who is employed or as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government.
16. The object behind the above provision of law is to prevent cognizance of vexatious proceedings against public servant regarding their acts which may be offence under the law. The provision of law as stated above extend protection and does not apply to all the public servants. The necessary elements of the above section are that the offence must be in respect of an act done or purported to be done in the discharge of an official duty and it does not apply to the acts done purely in a private capacity by a public servant. There must be reasonable ground between the Act and the official duty.
17. In catena of decisions it was held that the sanction is necessary only when the public servant is acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duty.
18. In the present case the nature of the allegations as made against the petitioner are not as such to attract that the act as alleged was done in discharge of his official duty. The allegation against the petitioner of abusing the informant in his caste name and generalsing the characters of the females of his caste and others questioning their chastity, certainly did not come within his official duty as Deputy Secretary of the Jharkhand legislative Assembly and in my opinion, therefore, the sanction to prosecute him under the relevant law is not necessary.
19. As regards the application of Section 3(1)(x) of the said Act winch has been challenged, it prescribes punishment for the offence of atrocities Section 3(1)(x) speaks:
Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribes,- (x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled aste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to five years and with fine.
20. Mr. Jai Prakah that the learned Counsel submitted that the manner of the occurrence as alleged by the opposite party No. 3/informant did not take place within the public view. He submitted that the public view means the presence of stranger at open place or at public place and the office of the petitioner specially his chamber where occurrence as alleged took place, does not come within the meaning of the public view and therefore, the criminal prosecution under Section 3(1)(x) of the said Act is not sustainable against the petitioner.
21. In V.P. Shetty v. Sr. Inspector of Police, Colaba, Mumbai and Anr. reported in 2005 (4) East Cr. C.544 (Bom) the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court observed:
In various decisions apart from the decision of Bai alias Laxmibai, this Court has time and again held that the expression' within public view' has specific meaning and in order to attract the provision of law under Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocities Act, the acts amounting to insult or humiliation to the member of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes should be visible and audible to the public.
The court was constrained to interpret the expression 'within public view' on the ground that same would virtually amount to legislate upon the said provision in the statute and that was beyond the scope of the powers of the court.
22. In the instant case, the occurrence as alleged prima facie did not take place in the cabin of the petitioner or only within the hearing and visibility of the petitioner and the informant, rather the informant has named the other witnesses in his written report in whose presence the occurrence took place. It would not be proper to comment upon the compromise petition duly signed by the parties which can be agitated before the appropriate forum.
23. In the facts and circumstances, I do not find merit in the present petition to interfere with the criminal prosecution of the petitioner, Vinoda Nand Jha in Ranchi S.C. and S.T. Case No. 29 of 2003 and hence the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is dismissed. The interim order dated 5.4.2006 stands vacated.
I.A. No. 241 of 2006
In view of the order dated 1-12-2006 passed in Cr.M.P. No. 1065 of 2006 the I.A. No. 241 of 2006 stands disposed of.