Tapen Sen, J.
1. Heard Mr. P.P.N. Rai, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. T.K. Das, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No, 2.
2. The petitioner namely the Bihar State Road Transport Corporation has filed the instant Writ Application for quashing the Award dated 14.7.1997 as contained in Annexure-1.
3. According to the Corporation, the respondent No. 2 was appointed in the year 1972 by the Divisional Manager, Ranchi who ranks junior to the Additional General Manger. On 3.4.1982 and 3.8.1982 two charge sheets were served upon him on the allegation of disobedience as also carrying unbooked passengers. An Enquiry Officer was appointed who submitted the report in respect of both the charge sheets holding the respondent No. 2 guilty. Thereafter the Additional General Manager of the petitioner-Corporation dismissed the respondent No. 2 by letter-dated 21.1.1986. An appeal was then preferred before the Chairman-cum-Managing Director but that was rejected on 10.2.1987. Thereafter, a dispute was raised which culminated in the Reference which was referred to the respondent No. 1 for adjudication as to whether the dismissal of the respondent No. 2 was proper and justified and if not, whether he was entitled to reinstatement or for any other relief.
4. Before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi the workman had inter alia contended that the inquiry was defective and that the Additional General Manager namely Nanhe Prasad who had dismissed the workman on 21.1.1986 had no authority to do so. At paragraph 5 of the Award, it is apparent that the petitioner-Corporation refuted the aforementioned stand of the concerned workman and stated that Nanhe Prasad, the then Additional General Manager was in fact competent to terminate the concerned workman.
5. However, during the course of proceedings, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the inquiry was fair and proper and that the concerned workman had failed to prove the story of victimization. Thereafter, accepting the plea of the concerned workman to the effect that Nanhe Prasad, the then Additional General Manger had no authority to dismiss him, the Labour Court placed reliance on Standing Order No. 4-A and held that the dismissal by the said Nanhe Prasad, the then Additional General manager was neither legal nor proper and accordingly directed reinstatement of the concerned workman.
6. Mr. P.P.N. Rai has -challenged the aforesaid finding of the Labour Court which has been recorded at Paragraph 10 of the Award and has submitted that it is true that in 1954 Standing Order, it was the General Manager who could have taken action in terms of the Standing Order No. 4-A but according to him in view of Section 12(2) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, the Additional General Manager had been delegated with the powers to pass final orders in departmental proceedings in respect of such staff for whom the Divisional Manager was the Appointing Authority.
7. In support of the aforementioned contention, Mr. P.P.N. Rai has today filed in Court a supplementary affidavit bringing on record an Office Order No. 2/58, dated 1.10.1985 issued by the Chief of Administration purporting to be under the Orders of the Chairman-cum-Managing Director. He refers to Clause-14 under the Heading 'Additional General Manager' and which reads as follows :--
'14. Power to pass final orders in departmental proceedings conducted by Special Officer, Departmental proceedings in respect of such staff for whom the Divisional Manager/Works Manager/ Stores Officer are the appointing authorities. In other cases he will submit the findings of the conducting officers to the appropriate authority for orders.'
8. This Court has no hesitation in rejecting the argument of Mr. P.P.N. Rai and is not at all inclined to take into consideration the aforementioned supplementary affidavit at this stage because that would amount to reappraising evidence which is beyond the scope of the Writ Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Additionally, upon perusal of paragraph-2 of the Award, it is clear that one of the grounds pleaded specifically by the concerned workman was that the Additional General Manager had no authority to pass the Order and in rebuttal thereof the petitioner-Corporation at paragraph-5 had categorically stated that the then Additional General Manager was the competent authority to terminate the concerned work-man. In other words, the aforementioned point as to whether the Additional General Manager had the jurisdiction or not was very much an issue before the Labour Court and inspite thereof the petitioner-Corporation did not bring on record the aforementioned Office Order No. 2/58 which they have attempted to do before the Court through the supplementary affidavit.
9. Apart from the aforesaid. Standing Order No. 4-A of 1954 which has been taken note of by the learned Labour Court is necessary to be taken note of. That Standing Order which was produced for perusal of this Court is as follows :--
'It has been noticed that cases of appointment, promotion, reward, punishment etc. in respect of staff of various sections are put up direct to the General Manger of the State Transport Commissioner by the Officer Incharge of different branches. As this practice causes considerable difficulties in maintenance of proper record and leads to confusion, it has been decided that henceforth all such cases should be sent through the Administrative Branch. All Officers Incharge of different branches of the Rajya Transport should, therefore, send their proposals regarding establishment matters viz., appointment, promotion, reward, punishment etc. in respect of their staff to the Deputy General Manager who after necessary examination will submit the cases to the General Manager and the State Transport Commissioner for their orders. In order to facilitate quick decision the proposals should be self-contained in the form of a letter.
No deviation from the above instruction should be made in future.
R.N. Roy,
General Manager.
[Italics by Court]'
10. It is an admitted case of the parties that Standing Order No. 4-A of 1954 was a Certified Standing Order duly certified under the provisions of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. The said Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act is an Act to require the employers in an industrial employment to define conditions of employment under them. Thus, the Standing Orders once certified are deemed to be statutory and are meant to be followed. According to Mr. P.P.N. Rai, the provision, of Section 12(2) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, relates to the powers to appoint Committee and delegate functions and the CMD had delegated the powers under Section 12(2) to the Additional General Manager. Section 12(2) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 reads as follows :--
'12(2) The Chairman, Vice-Chairman or Managing Director may delegate any of his power and duties (including powers and duties delegated to him under subsection (1) to any officer of the Corporation, and the officer to whom such powers and duties are delegated, shall exercise and perform such powers and duties under the control and supervision of the Managing Director.
[Italics by Court]'
11. Upon perusal of Section 12(2) it is evident that the aforementioned provisions relates to delegation of the own powers of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Managing Director to any other Officer. But this provision cannot be allowed to restrict, curtail or take away the provisions of the Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act, 1946 which is to prevail in so far as the cases relating to industrial employment and terms and conditions of service are concerned.
12. In a case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Hindustan Brown Boveri, Ltd. v. Their Workmen and Anr.' reported in '1968 (1) LLJ 571, a similar matter arose for consideration. .The relevant paragraphs of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India are quoted below :--
'The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act was passed for requiring employers in Industrial establishments to define conditions of employment under them. Section 3 of the Act requires the employers to submit to the certifying officer draft standings orders proposed by him in his establishment. Section 5 provides that the certifying officer should forward a copy thereof to the trade union, if any, or in its absence to the workmen in such mariner as may be prescribed, together with a notice requiring objections if any to such draft. The section further provides that the certifying officer should decide after an opportunity of being heard is given to the employer and the trade union or such other representatives of the workmen as may be prescribed whether or not any modification of or addition to the draft is necessary and thereafter certify the standing orders with or wi'thout modification as the case may be. Under Section 13 if an employer acts in contravention of such certified standing orders, he is liable to a fine and in case of a continuing offence with a higher fine. These provisions show that the purpose of the Act is to have for each industrial establishment standing orders laying down conditions of work for the employees therein and ensuring security of employment. Section 2(d) defines as 'employer' as meaning the owner of an industrial establishment and includes in a factory any person named as manager and in any other industrial establishment any person responsible to the owner for supervision and control of such establishment. The definition is expressed in comprehensive terms to enforce the object of the Act, that is, to require all industrial establishments to submit and have certified standing orders defining the conditions of work. But the definition can be availed of for the purposes of the Act and in respect of questions arising thereunder or if it is otherwise made applicable. Where the standing orders themselves define a 'company' for the purpose of distribution of duties and powers, it is that definition which is relevant when a question arises as to who is to exercise those powers and perform those duties. There can be no manner of doubt that the company as defined by Standing Order 2(a) is the company with reference to its activities at Faridabad but which has its head and registered office at Bombay. Therefore as provided by Standing Orders 23 and 27, it is that company which is given the power to pass order of punishment in respect of both minor and major offences.
The next question is whether we should permit Sri Gokhale to take the additional ground, viz., of the company having assigned its power of dismissal to the works manager. The application is in substance one for leading additional evidence to establish the power-of-attorney said to have been executed by the company in favour of its works manager though it is in the guise of raising an additional ground. We must therefore be guided by those well-settled principles under which only additional evidence is allowed to be adduced at the stage of the hearing of an appeal.
In view of the decision in Jabalpur Electric Supply Company, 1962-11 LIJ 216, the company no doubt could delegate its disciplinary powers unless such delegation is debarred by its Articles of Association which regulate the conduct of its business. Therefore, where such delegation is properly made, the delegate can validly discharge the duty and exercise the power delegated to him. However, it is undisputed that the company failed to produce the power-of-attorney and allowed the Labour Court as also the respondents to remain in ignorance of it. That is somewhat strange, for the reference was in very wide terms. It referred two questions for adjudication :--
'(i) Whether the demotion of Arjan Singh is justified and in order? If not, to what relief he is entitled?
(ii) Whether the termination of service of Samunder Lal and Asa Singh is justified and in order? If not to what relief they are entitled?'
The company should have known that the words 'in order' would include the competence of the Works Manager to pass the orders in question. These words should have put the company on guard. Even if the reference did not do so, the statement of claim filed by the respondent-workmen clearly raised the question whether 'the person awarding the punishment had no jurisdiction to do so.' Unfortunately, the Labour Court while framing the issues did not specifically raise the issue as to the Works Manager's authority. The workmen also did not apply for raising such a separate issue. Nevertheless the question was expressly raised by the workmen at the stage of arguments and it is clear that it was on the basis of those arguments that the Labour Court held that the company and not the Works Manager had the power to pass the said orders. The company at that stage could have applied to the Labour Court either to disallow the workmen from raising the contention in view of there being no issue or to raise an additional issue in view of the wide terms of the reference and allow it to produce the power-of-at-torney or to give some time for its production if it felt that the contention raised by the workmen had taken it by surprise. The company adopted none of these courses and allowed the matter to proceed on the record as it then was before the Labour Court. It did not even inform the Labour Court of the existence of the power-of- attorney. Even when the company filed its special leave petition it failed to urge therein that the company had executed a power-of-at-torney. As already stated, the point as to the existence of the power-of-attorney was raised for the first time in the application for leave to raise an additional plea filed after the special leave petition was lodged. Even at that stage it failed to annex along with that application the power-of-attorney and contented itself with producing some extracts from it.
Now, the principles on which the appellate Court permits additional evidence are well-known. It is quite clear that this is not a case where the company can avail itself of any of those principles. There is no manner of doubt that the company was negligent in not producing the document. This is therefore, not a case where the company could not produce this additional evidence or was prevented from doing so, or that it has now discovered a fresh piece of evidence. In these circumstances, we would not be justified in granting at this stage leave to produce additional evidence. In the absence of such evidence the company obviously must be held to have failed to establish delegation of power of dismissal to the Works Manager.'
Their Lordship ultimately held that the power of the Works Manager of the Company to direct dismissal or demotion contrary to the provisions of Standing Order No. 27 which reserved such power to the Company was bad and the Works Manager had no power to dismiss. In that case also the company wanted to bring on record additional evidence to show that there was delegation of powers and that additional evidence was through the shape of a power-of-attorney. The Hon'ble Supreme Court declined to grant such liberty and did not give them relief to produce such additional evidence. For the same reasons also, this Court is not inclined to entertain the aforementioned supplementary affidavit which amounts to bringing on record the additional evidence at this stage.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the Award. Consequently, this Writ Application is dismissed. There shall however be no order as to costs.