Tapen Sen, J.
1. In this writ application, the petitioner, has prayed for quashing the order dated 26.10.1994 (Annexure 7) passed; by respondent No. 2 whereby and whereunder he came to the conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of the charges levelled against him and, therefore, in exercise of Rule 27.1 (ii) (d) of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') inflicted punishment of dismissal from service with immediate effect. The petitioner has also challenged and prayed for quashing the appellate order passed by the Board of Directors, Coal India Limited (respondent No. 6) and communicated by the Deputy Chief Personnel Manager (EE), Bharat Coking Coal Limited (respondent No. 7) vide his confidential letter dated 7.10.1997 informing him that the Board had not found any merit in his appeal and had accordingly rejected the same.
2. According to the petitioner, while he was posted as a Medical Officer, his duty was such that he had to check the health of all workers and issue certificates from time to time which stood recorded in the Registers maintained in the Dispensary which was used for the purposes of granting leave etc. While he was posted as a Senior Medical Officer in Putki Balihari area, he received the charge sheet dated 16.7.1987 (Annexure 1) issued by respondent No. 4 wherein the petitioner was charged with the offence of having issued a false certificate in relation to one Smt. Ram Kuer. The allegations were that the petitioner, in collusion with others, had certified that Smt. Ram Kuer had expired vide Certificate dated 22.4.1985. One the basis of that certificate, one Naresh Kumar Nishad (claiming to be her son-in-law) had applied for employment in the Bharat Coking Coal Limited under Clause 9.4.2 of the NCWA III. Additionally one Hakker Kewat (her husband) claimed gratuity and payments under Life Coverage Scheme and CMPF accumulations. These were processed by the colliery and relying solely on the said death certificate which had been issued by the petitioner, two cheques for the sums of Rs. 12,994.40 paise and Rs. 15,000/- were prepared and handed over to Hakker Kewat, the husband of Smt. Ram Kuer on 18.6.1986. Similarly a cheque for Rs. 21,294.84 paise dated 16.12.1986 was also released by the Coal Mines Provident Fund Commissioner against Account No. 1025 which was in the name of Hakker Kewat.
3. After all this had happened, Smt. Ram Kuer suddenly appeared on 19.3.1987 and demanded before the Agent of the Colliery that she should be allowed to join her duties.
4. The aforementioned incident was viewed very seriously by the Management who were of the opinion that on account of the issuance of the said false death certificate in relation to Smt. Ram Kuer, the petitioner, in collusion with others, had caused wrongful loss to the Company by fraudulent means. The aforementioned charge sheet has been annexed as Annexure 1 to the writ application. The petitioner, by reason of the said charge sheet, was informed that the action of the petitioner amounts to misconduct under Clause 4.1 (i), 4.1 (ii), 4.6, 5.1, 5.5 and 5.21 of the Rules which was punishable under Rule 27.1 (ii) and accordingly, he was directed to furnish explanation in triplicate within ten days as to why appropriate penalty including dismissal from service should not be imposed. By reasons of said charge sheet, it was also informed that in exercise of Rule 24.1 of the aforementioned Rules, the petitioner was being put under suspension with immediate effect.
5. Upon receipt of the charge sheet, the petitioner filed his explanation on 7.8.1987 denying the charges and termed them as 'untrue and incorrect'. In the said explanation, the petitioner further stated that he had not issued any death certificate and that he had never met nor come any Smt. Ram Kuer or Hakker Kewat or Naresh Kumar Nishad. He further pointed out that a criminal case for the same subject had also been instituted against him in which he had been enlarged on bail and the case was still under investigation.
6. On 17.12.1987, the disciplinary authority, apparently not being satisfied with the explanations furnished by the petitioner, ordered for holding a departmental proceeding and subsequently on 8.12.1988, the enquiry commenced. According to the petitioner, he repeatedly requested the production of the original death certificate but only a photo copy of the same was brought on record by the management vide Ext. M-1 and on 8.12.1988, the respondent No. 7 proved the photo copy of the said certificate. The petitioner has further state that even the Presenting Officer failed to produce the original death certificate and in spite thereof, the enquiry was concluded and report was submitted on 5.12.1990. The petitioner has stated at Paragraph 12 that a copy of this report was not given to him and that he was later on told by respondent No. 6 (meaning thereby the Enquiry Officer, who was initially impleaded as Sri R.P. Singh, 1st Enquiry Officer, but was subsequently deleted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, as would be apparent from the order dated 9.2.1999 passed in this case) that none of the charges of misconduct could be proved against the petitioner and that the petitioner had been exonerated from all the charges. This statement is not supported by any corroborative substance and therefore, this cannot be relied upon by this Court
7. It appears that on 13.4.1994 a letter was issued under the signature of the Director Personnel of Bharat Coking Coal Limited, by reason whereof, he was informed that pending decision of the contemplated disciplinary action, the competent authority has been pleased to allow the petitioner to resume his duties at Kus-taur with Immediate effect. According to the petitioner, this document itself is a piece of evidence that proves that nothing was found against him and it was only thereafter that a decision was taken to revoke his order of suspension. This order dated 13.4.1991 is contained in Annexure 4 to the writ application. This order, however, does not support the contention of the petitioner that the issuance thereof proved that nothing was found against him because the opening line of the 2nd paragraph of the said order says 'pending final decision of disciplinary action'.
8. According to the petitioner, he joined this duties and continued to work whereafter on 13.8.1992 he suddenly received the impugned order whereby and whereunder he was informed that in partial modification of the order dated 17.12.1988, one U.N. Lal, Deputy Personnel Manager (IR) was appointed an Enquiry Officer to re-enquire into the charges levelled against the petitioner vide charge sheet dated 16.7.1987. This document i.e. the order dated 13.8.1992 is Annexure 5 to the writ application.
9. Being aggrieved, the petitioner immediately retorted and by his letter dated 26/27.10.1992; he requested that a copy of the first enquiry report which had been submitted by Mr. R.P. Singh, Deputy Chief Personnel Manager (IR) te. First Enquiry Officer be given to him. He also demanded to know as to under what circumstances re-enquiry had been ordered and as to what was the subject-matter of the re-enquiry.
10. At Paragraph 2.1 the petitioner has stated that in any event and without prejudice to his rights and contentions against the said dated 13.8.1992 ordering re-enquiry, he duly participated in the same and once again demanded the production of the original death certificate. He has further stated that neither the disciplinary authority nor the presenting officer gave him or produced the said original death certificate and relied solely on the photo copy of the same. The petitioner has submitted that no person can be punished on the basis of a photo copy and non- production of the original creates suspicion in relation to the charges against him. He has further stated that on a number of other occasions, he requested the enquiry officer to furnish to him and/or allow him the inspection of various documents which included the original death certificate. One such demand is through letter dated 13.10.1992 which is a part of Annexure 6 and which is to be found at running page 33 of the writ application. At Paragraph 22, the petitioner has stated that second enquiry officer neither allowed the petitioner to inspect the documents nor did he furnish those documents. He has further state that the second enquiry officer mechanically conducted the enquiry and submitted his report. Thereafter on 26.10.1994, by reason of, the first impugned order (Annexure-7), the Disciplinary Authority (Chairman-cum-Managing Director) passed the order of dismissal of the petitioner from service with immediate effect.
11. In the meantime, the criminal case which was instituted against the petitioner for the same offence ended in failure and by judgment dated 18.3.1996 (Annexure 8), the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Dhanbad acquitted the petitioner from the charges under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 472 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner also moved a writ application bearing CWJC No. 2743 of 1994 (R) wherein he challenged the validity of the second enquiry, but during the pendency thereof, the order dated 26.10.1994 dismissing him from service (Annexure 7) was issued. Consequently, the petitioner filed an amendment application in that writ application and by order dated 28.2.1996 (Annexure 9), the writ application was disposed off with an observation that since the petitioner had already filed an appeal against the order of dismissal from service, he could therefore move the High Court after disposal of the appeal. That order of the High Court dated 28.2.1996 is Annexure 9 to the writ application. It appears that even after the petitioner had filed the appeal, the same was not being disposed off which compelled him to once again file application bearing CWJC No. 3339 of 1996 (R) and by order dated 11.8.1997, that writ application was disposed off directing the appellate authority to dispose of the appeal within a period of one month from the date of the order. It was thereafter that the second impugned communication/ letter dated 7.10.1997 was issued vide Annexure 10 informing the petitioner that his appeal had been placed before the Board of Directors and they did not find any merit in the same and had accordingly, rejected his appeal.
12. A supplementary affidavit has been filed by the petitioner on 8.2.1999 which begins from running page 8.1 and ends at running page 115. In the said supplementary affidavit, the petitioner has annexed the report of the enquiry officer which is dated 8.9.1993. This has been marked as Annexure 12. Upon perusal of the said enquiry report, it is evident that the original death certificate which was issued was never produced by any of the parties before any of the proceedings and instead, only a photo copy thereof was produced and that became the subject-matter of the enquiry. One U.S. Singh, Deputy Personnel, Manager, Putki Colliery was examined as Management Witness and he had stated that the original was produced along with some photo copies at the Colliery Officer for purposes of receiving payments by Hakker Kewat who, immediately took the original back with him making available a photo copy in lieu thereof on the plea that it was required for filing an application for appointment on behalf of the dependent.
13. Therefore, the first question that needs to be answered is as to whether non-production of the original death certificate was fatal to the case of the management.
14. 'Ere at this stage, it would be apt to record that even before the criminal Court, no evidences were produced at all as a result whereof the same ended in failure on account of there being no evidence notwithstanding repeated opportunities having been given to the prosecution.
15. However, it has been repeatedly highlighted in the enquiry report that the original death certificate was not where available and there is a definite suggestion that the same may have been taken away by Hakker Kewat i.e. the husband who taking advantage of the death certificate received the benefits/ money in respect of his wife. The reference to U.S. Singh can be found at running page 91 of the writ application which deals with the statement of Sri U.S. Singh, Deputy Personnel Manager, Putki Colliery. However, the handwriting of the petitioner had been confirmed by one Sri K.M. Prasad, the Deputy Personnel Manager and also by U.S. Singh as also by many other management witnesses and on the basis of their evidences, the Enquiry Officer recorded a finding that the charges levelled against the petitioner were proved but could not be substantiated because the original death certificate had not been produced by the Presenting Officer. The Enquiry Officer further records that had the original been produced, the matter could have been further established by sending the same to the Hand Writing Expert.
16. From the enquiry report submitted it is therefore evident that although the original death certificate was not on record yet, in the supplementary counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, and as would be evident from Annexure B appended thereto at running page 125, it is evident that on 25.1.1993, the following questions were put and the respective answers given by the petitioner are :--
'Question (a)--By showing Ext. M-1, the Enquiry Officer had put a question to the charge sheeted Executive : Whether the signature is his signature?
Answer--This is photo copy of my signature.
Question (b)--Whether the date under the so called photo copy of your signature bears your writing?
Answer--Yes. This is the photo copy of my date also'.
17. From the foregoing paragraph, it is evident that the original death certificate having become traceless, the management on their side made every effort to prove that the photo copy of the same had been issued by the petitioner and in view of the specific answers given by the petitioner in the manner stated above, it cannot be held that non-production of the original death certificate, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, was fatal to the case of management. This point therefore is answered against the petitioner.
18. The other points raised by Mr. Kalyan Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner is that after submission of the report of the first enquiry officer and after allowing him to resume his duties, the disciplinary authority could not have either passed an order for re-enquiry or for appointment of another enquiry officer. In support of the aforesaid contention, Mr. Roy relies upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of K.R. Deb v. The Collector, Central Excise, Shilong, (1971) 2 SCC 102. However, in the facts of this case, it is evident, and as has been stated in Paragraphs 17 and 18 of the counter affidavit that the disciplinary authority, after examining the matter, found that the enquiry was not complete in all respects and, accordingly, exercising power under Clause 30.0 of the aforementioned Rules, ordered for re-enquiry. It has further been stated that the earlier enquiry did not contain the examination of the main witnesses and some documents were also not produced and it was in that back ground that a re-enquiry was ordered to be held.
19. K.R. Deb's case has been explained by a subsequent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. P. Thayagarajan, 1999 (1) SCC 733 wherein it has been held that a de novo enquiry is permissible if the disciplinary authority finds that the enquiry officer had not followed the correct procedure.
20. That part, under Rule 30.0 of the CDA Rules, 1978, the Disciplinary Authority has the power to re-enquire, if it is not satisfied. Rule 30.0 of the said Rules reads thus :--
'30.0. Action on the inquiry report--The Disciplinary Authority, it is not itself the Inquiry Authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing remit the case of the Inquiry Authority for fresh or further inquiry and report and the Inquiring Authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the provisions of Rule 29.3 as far as may be.
30.1. The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings to the Inquiring Authority on any article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose.
30.2. If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in Rule 27 should be imposed on the employees it shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 31 make an order imposing such penalty.
30.3. If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge, if of the opinion that no penalty is called for, it may pass an order exonerating the employee concerned.'
21. Additional upon perusal of Annexure 5, which is the order dated 13.8.1992, it is evident that this is not a case where the earlier report had been set aside. It is merely an order of re-enquiry. Considering the gravity of the offence, the explanations given by the respondents in their counter affidavit justifying their decision to re-enquire into the matter, it cannot be said that their decision was improper and/or illegal. At Paragraph 11, the respondents have stated that the petitioner was a doctor and he issued a bogus medical certificate about the death of one Smt. Ram Kuer. in his own hand writing and in his own pad on 15.3.1985 under official seal and on the basis of the said certificate, Gratuity, Coal Mins Provident Fund Accumulation, Leave Cover benefit and other dues were fraudulently withdrawn, although the person in respect of whom the certificate of death had been issued, was alive. It is also apparent from the enquiry report which has been brought on record vide Annexure 12 appended to the supplementary affidavit, that on 15.3.1985 i.e. the date of death certified by the petitioner, Smt. Ram Kuer (as she has herself stated vide running page 86) was at her native place as she had sustained some injuries and while she was there, she was told that her dues had been withdrawn by her husband and that this could be made possible with her son-in-law (one Dilip) as well as with the help of others. The petitioner cannot be allowed to claimed benefit of doubt because the concept of benefit of doubt in the facts and circumstances of this case, goes against the petitioner and in favour of the management and that too, when there was overwhelming evidence as is evident from the said enquiry report to the effect that the death certificate had been issued by the petitioner. In fact, he could not even dispel the pointed questions that were put to him and which have been quoted above. The management suffered huge loss on account of such fraudulent act and, therefore, the contentions of violation of the principles of natural justice cannot come to the rescue of the petitioner who alleges non-supply of various other documents. The principle of natural justice cannot be stretched too far and it cannot be used to upset detailed evidences which have been arrived at in the course of the proceedings.
22. The other submission of Mr. Roy to the effect that the appellate authority has not furnished reasons cannot also be accepted because after looking into the enquiry report and the order of the disciplinary authority, it was not necessary for the appellate authority tb continue to go on supplying reasons after reasons justifying their act. In the support of the aforesaid contention, reference may be made to the case of the Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay v. Union of India and Ors., 1991 Supp (2) SCC 12 and also to the case of Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 2043.
23. For the foregoing reasons therefore, this Court holds that there is no merit in this writ application and it is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.