ORDER
M.Y. Eqbal, J.
1. In this writ application the petitioner Central Coalfields Ltd. has prayed for quashing the order passed by the District Land Acquisition Officer, Hazaribagh in Land Acquisition Case No. 1/2000-01 whereby he has redetermined, the amount of compensation under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act and directed the petitioner to deposit the difference of amount of compensation.
2. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass.
3. The land of Khata No. 7 of village Tapin, P.S. Mandu measuring 12.10 acres was acquired under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1884 (in short the said Act) and a Land Acquisition Case No. 20/78-79 was initiated and a sum of Rs. 74,473.54 was awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer vide award dated 12.6.84. It appears that one Mr. Parmeshwar Prasad and Baidyanath Prasad whose land was also acquired moved the Land Acquisition Officer for reference under Section 18 of the said Act for the enhancement of compensation. The Land Acquisition Judge by Judgment and order dated 16.7.90 enhanced the compensation amount. On the basis of the said award passed by the Land Acquisition Judge respondent Nos. 3 to 5 filed an application under Section 28A of the said Act on 29.6.2000 before the Land Acquisition Officer for - re-determination of compensation. Petitioner filed objection before the Land Acquisition Officer challenging the maintainability of the application on the ground of limitation as it was filed after 9 years from the date of the award passed by the Court in the Reference Case. The Land Acquisition Officer after hearing the parties allowed the said application filed by respondent Nos. 3 to 5 and re-determined the compensation amount.
4. Section 28A was introduced by Section 19 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act. 1984 with effect from 24.9.1984. The new Section provides for reconsideration, in certain circumstances of the award of the Collector which has become final, in the light of the award of the Court in other cases. Section 28A reads as under :--
'Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court (1) where in an award under this part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4, Sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had made an application to the Collector under Section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court :
Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.
(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under Sub-section (1), conduct enquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants.
(3) Any person who has not accepted the award under Sub-section (2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector the determination of the Court and the provisions of Sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under Section 18.'
5. From bare reading of the aforesaid provision, it is manifest that where compensation awarded by the Collector under Section 11 is enhanced by the Court in reference under Section 18, persons interested in the acquired land who were not parties to the reference may, by written application to the Collector made within three months from the date of the award of the Court request the Collector to re-determine the amount of compensation payable to them on the basis of amount awarded by the Court.
6. Admittedly in the instant case, the award was made at the instance of other claimants on 16.7.90 under Section 18 of the Act. Application under Section 28A was filed by the respondents on 29.6.2000.
7. Mr. Devi Prasad learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner assailed the impugned order passed by the Land Acquisition Officer as being illegal and wholly without jurisdiction. Learned counsel submitted that the Land Acquisition Officer committed grave error of law in entertaining the application after 9 years and re-determined the compensation merely on the basis of concession made by the Govt. Pleader. Learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of 'Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese and Anr. v. Land Acquisition Collector and Anr.', (1996) 6 SCC 746, in the case of 'Mewa Ram (deceased) v. State of Harayana', (1986) 4 SCC-151 and in the case of 'Union of India v. Kar-nail Singh and Ors.', (1995) 2 SCC-728.
8. Mr. Kalyan Roy, learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that limitation for filing of application under Section 28A of the said Act will run from the date of knowledge of the award. Learned counsel submitted that immediately after knowing the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, the claimants filed application under Section 28A of the said Act and the Govt. Pleader did not oppose the application on merit of the claim of the respondents.
9. From perusal of the impugned order, it appears that the lawyer appearing for the petitioner Central Coalfields Ltd. did not oppose the case' on merit, rather he admitted the case of the petitioner. The only objection raised by the petitioner was on the point of delay in filing the application. Learned Court below is of the view that when the application under Section 28A was filed and opinion was sought for from the Govt. Pleader who found the case fit for condonation of delay and thereafter application was entertained. In that view of the matter the question of limitation should not be raised at the final stage of hearing of the application. The Court is also of the view that provisions should be liberally construed so that respondent should not be deprived of their due on technical ground.
10. After hearing the rival submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the only question that falls for consideration is as to whether application under Section 28A of the said Act can be entertained after expiry of the period fixed under the said provisions of the Act.
11. In the case of Mewa Ram v. State of Harayana (Supra), the Supreme Court interpreted the provisions and held that under Section 28A, the amount of compensation can be re-determined provided condition laid down therein are fulfilled. The forum is the collector and the application has to be made before him within 3 months from the date of the Award, and the right is restricted to persons who had not applied for reference under Section 18 of the Act. The Apex Court refused to grant special leave. Their lordships observed :--'Furthermore, there is no provision in the Act part from Section 28A for re-opening of an award which has become final and conclusive. No doubt Section 28A nor provides further re-determination of the amount of compensation provided the conditions laid down therein are fulfilled. For such re- determination the forum is the Collector and the application has to be made before him within 30 days from the date of the award, and the right is restricted to persons who had not applied for reference under Section 18 of the Act. If these conditions were satisfied, the petitioners could have availed the remedy provided under Section 28A of the Act. In that event Section 25 would ensure to their benefit. Any other view would lead to disastrous consequences not intended by the legislature.'
12. In the case of 'Union of India v. Karnail Singh (Supra), relied upon by the petitioner the Apex Court was of the view that the cause of action for making an application under Section 28A would arise when an award has been made by the Civil Court, on a reference under Section 18, enhancing the compensation over and above the amount awarded by the Collector under 11 and the earliest of the successive awards would furnish the starting period of the limitation of three months. But the said decision has been overruled by the Supreme Court in subsequent decision in the case of 'Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari, (1995) 2 SCC- 736. their Lordships held that right to made application under Section 28A arises from the Award of the Court on the basis of which persons making application is seeking re-determination of compensation. There is nothing in Sub-section (1) of Section 28A to indicate that this right is confined in respect of the earliest award that is made by the Court after coming into force of Section 28A of the said Act.
13. In the case of 'Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese (Supra), the Supreme Court after re-considering, its earlier decision held :--
'We may now refer to the case-law. A two Judge Bench of this Court in Babua Ram v. State of U.P., dealt with this precise question and held that the period of limitation begins to run from the date of the first award made on a reference under Section 18 of the Act and successive awards cannot save the period of limitation: vide paragraphs 19 and 20 of the reporter. This view was reiterated by the same bench in Union of India v. Karnail Singh, wherein this Court held that the limitation of three months for an application for re-determination of compensation must be computed from the date of the earliest judgment rendered by an appellate Court. This was followed by the decision of three judge bench in Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari 1995 (2) SCC 736 wherein it was held that the benefit under Section 28A can be had within three months from the date of the award of the Reference Court on the basis whereof re-determination is sought. The earlier two decisions in the case of Babua Ram and Karnail Singh were over-ruled on the limited question that they sought to confined the right to seek re-determination to the earliest award made by the Court under Section 18 of the Act, after the introduction of Section 28A into the Act. There is, however, no doubt that the period of limitation has to be computed from the date of the Court's award under Section 18 on the basis whereof re-determination is sought. Admittedly, in both the cases at hand, the applications for re-determination of compensation under Section 28A made long after the expiry of three months from the date of the award of the Court which constituted the basis for seeking re-determination. We are, therefore, of the opinion that High Court was right in taking the view that both the applications were time-barred.'
14. As noticed above, cause of action for filing application under Section 28A arose on 16.7.90, when the award was made by the Court at the instance of other claimants under Section 18 of the said Act. The concerned respondents filed application under Section 28A on 29.6.2000 i.e. after more than 9 years from the date of award passed by the Court. Admittedly, no application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation was filed by the respondents showing sufficient causes' for not filing the application within time. Nothing has been stated even in the counter affidavit as to the reasons for not filing application within three months from the date of the award passed by the Court, which is mandatory requirements of law. It is true that the words 'sufficient cause' occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be given liberal construction so as to advance the cause of substantial justice. But the parties seeking condonation of delay must satisfy the Court by filing an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is well settled that the Court should not come to the aid of a party where there has been unwarrantable delay in seeking statutory remedy. Any remedy must be sought with reasonable promptitude having regard to the circumstances.
15. Having regard to the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions referred to herein above with regard to the limitation for filing an application under Section 28A of the said Act, I have no option but to hold that the application filed by respondent Nos. 3 to 5 under Section 28A of the Act was hopelessly barred by Limitation, inasmuch as it was filed after 9 years from the date of the award passed by the Court without giving any explanation or showing sufficient cause for condonation of delay. In absence of satisfactory explanation and sufficient cause the Court below had no jurisdiction to extend the period of limitation fixed under the said provisions of the Act and entertained the application after 9 years from the date of award passed by the Court. The impugned order therefore cannot be sustained in law.
16. For the reasons aforesaid, this writ application is allowed and the orderpassed by the Land Acquisition Officer re-determining the compensation amount is set aside.