M.Y. Eqbal, J.
1. Since common question of law has been raised by the appellant and the facts are also common, these appeals have been heard together and are disposed of by this common judgment.
2. These appeals are directed against the common judgment passed by the Land Acquisition Judge, Dhanbad in Reference case Nos. 565, 613 and 614 of 1971.
3. It appears that the lands of Mouja Sangjori, P.S. Chas, district-Dhanbad have been acquired for the purpose of Bokaro Steel Project. Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) was issued on 9.8.1956 and the declaration under Section 6 of the said Act was issued on 17.8.1962. Possession of the land was taken on 29.9.1968. The Land Acquisition Collector made an award giving compensation of the acquired lands. The' said award was made on 23.3.1969.
4. The respondents-claimants, after receiving the compensation amount, challenged the award of the Land Acquisition Collector and the matter was referred to the Land Acquisition Judge, Dhanbad under Section 18 of the said Act. The Land Acquisition Judge enhanced the valuation of the land at the rate of Rs. 8000/- per acre in respect of 1st class, paddy land and Rs. 6000/- per acre in respect of 1st class, Gora land. The Land Acquisition Judge, by the impugned judgment, besides the compensation, allowed additional compensation at the rate of 12% p.a. on the market value of the land from 10.8.1956 to 29.7.1968 under Section 23 of the said Act. The Land Acquisition Judge also allowed interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from 10.8.1959 to 24.3.1969 under Section 4(3) of the said Act. The Land Acquisition Judge also awarded interest at the rate of 9% p.a. from 25.3.1969 to 24.3.1970 and at the rate of 15% p.a. from 25.3.1970 till realization under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act. The appellant-State of Bihar, aggrieved by the said judgment, has preferred these appeals.
5. Mr. Pradeep Modi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant assailed the impugned judgment and award mainly on the ground that payment of additional compensation at the rate of 12% p.a. from 10.8.1956 to 29.7.1968 is illegal and wholly without jurisdiction. Learned counsel submitted that since the award by the Collector was made on 23.3.1969 i.e. much before coming into force of the Amendment Act, 1984, the amended provision cannot be made applicable retrospectively. Learned counsel submitted that interest at the rate of 6% p.a. under Section 4(3) of the said Act is also against law.
6. Before appreciating the submission made by the learned counsel I would like to refer some of the relevant provisions of the Act as amended by Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, Section 23 of the Act requires the court to take into consideration six factors which are mentioned therein for determining the market value of the land. Sub-section (1-A) provides for an additional amount calculated at the rate of 12% p.a. on the market value of the land for the period commencing on and from the date of publication of the notice under Section 4(1) to the date of the award of the Collector or to the date of taking possession of the land. Sub-section (2) requires the court to award, in every case, a sum of 30% on the market value determined under Section 23(1) in consideration of the compulsory nature of acquisition by way of solatium.
7. Section 23(1-A) was inserted and Section 23 was also amended by the Amending Act, 1984. By virtue of Section 30 of the amending Act an independent transitional provision has been made which reads as under :
'30. Transitional provisions.--(1) The provisions of Sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 of the principal Act, as inserted by Clause (a) of Section 15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to-
(a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act pending on the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982 in the House of the People, in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date;
(b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not an award has been made by the Collector before the date of commencement of this Act.
(2) The provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by Clause (b) of Section 15 and Section 18 of this Actrespectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People) and before the commencement of this Act.'
8. In view of the conflicting decisions, the question whether the benefit of Sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 of the Act is to be granted only in the proceedings for the acquisition of the land referred to in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 30(1) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 or it is to be granted in all proceedings pending before the courts on the 24th September, 1984, was referred to the Constitution Bench for resolving the conflict in the case of K.S. Paripoornan v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 1012. The Constitution Bench, after considering all the earlier decisions and interpreting the provisions of the Act held :
'Merely because Sub-section (1) of Section 30 only refers to award made by the Collector while Sub-section (2) of Section 30 also refers to an award made by the Court as well as the order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal against such award does not mean that Section 23(1-A) was intended to have application to all proceedings which were pending before the Civil Court on the date of the commencement of the amending Act. The difference In the phraseology In Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 30 only indicates the limited nature of the retrospectivity that has been given to provisions contained in Section 23(1-A) under Section 30(1) as compared to that given to the provisions of Sections 23(2) and 28 under Section 30(2). The limited scope of the retrospectivity that has been conferred in respect of Section 23(1-A) under Sub-section (1) of Section 30 does not lend support to the contention thatthe scope of such retrospectivity should be enlarged by reading such further retrospectivity into the provisions of Section 23(1-A). For the reasons aforementioned we are of the view that has been conferred in respect of Section 23(1-A) under Sub-section (1) of Section 30 does not lend support to the contention that the scope of such retrospectivity should be enlarged by reading such further retrospectivity into the provisions of Section 23(1-A). For the reasons aforementioned we are of the view that in relation to proceedings which were initiated prior to the date of the commencement of the amending Act Section 23(1-A) would be applicable only to those cases which fall within the ambit of Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act. In this context it is also necessary to bear in mind the rule of statutory construction that even where a statute is clearly intended to be to some extent retrospective: it is not to be construed as having a greater retrospective effect than its language renders necessary. [See Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. 44, para 924]. There is, therefore, no scope for extending the ambit of retrospective operation of Sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 beyond the limits specified in Section 30(1) of the amending Act so as to apply it to all proceedings initiated prior to the date of coming into force of the amending Act which were pending before the civil court on reference under Section 18 of the principal Act irrespective of the date on which the award was made by the Collector. For the reasons aforementioned we are unable to subscribe to the view taken in Zora Singh, 1992 (1) SCC 673, (supra) that Sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 would apply to all proceedings pending in the Reference Court on the date of commencement of the amending Act irrespective of the date on which award was made by the Collector. In our opinion the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act and Section 30(1)of the amending Act have been correctly construed in Filip Tiago, AIR 1990 SC 981 (supra) to mean that the obligation to pay additional amount in respect of proceedings initiated before the date of commencement of the amending Act is confined to the matters covered by Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act and we endorse the said view.'
9. The Constitution Bench overruled the earlier view taken in Zora Singh s case 1992 (1) SCC 673, where it was held that the additional amount is payable in all cases where reference was pending before the Court on September 24, 1984 irrespective of the date on which the award was made by the Collector. Their lordships observed that obligation to pay additional amount under Section 23(1-A) did not exist prior to enactment of the said provision by the amending Act. If such provision is applied, the acquisitions proceedings which commenced prior to its enactment and additional obligation in the matter of payment of compensation is imposed for such acquisition, the effect would be that the provisions would be operating retrospectively in respect of transactions already past. Parliament has given clear indication of its intention in Section 30(1) of the amending Act regarding the extent of retrospective operation.
10. In the instant case, as noticed above, notification under Section 4 of the said Act was issued in 1956 and declaration under Section 9 of the said Act was made in 1962. The award of the Collector was made In 1969 and in the same year compensation amount was paid. In 1971 reference under Section 18 of the said Act was made to the Land Acquisition Judge who passed the impugned judgment in 1987. Relying upon the law laid down by the Constitution bench of the Supreme Court referred to hereinabove, I am of the opinion that the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is well founded and the respondents-claimants are not entitled to additional compensation at the rate of 12% p.a. from 10.8.1956 to 29.7.1968.
11. So far the market value of the land assessed by the Land Acquisition Judge in the impugned judgment is concerned, I do not find any reason to disturb the said finding. I further hold that the respondents are entitled to solatium and interest at the rate of 9% p.a. and 15% p.a. in accordance with the amended provisions of the Act.
12. For the aforesaid reasons theseappeals are allowed in part and the impugnedjudgment and award so far it relates topayment of additional compensation at therate of 12% p.a. from 10.8.1956 to 29.7.1968,is set aside.