ORDER
Vikramaditya Prasad, J.
1. Heard both sides.
2. The award of the Labour court, Annexure-5, which is impugned in this writ petition, has been assailed by the petitioner-D.P.S. School, on the grounds that : (i) as the petitioner school is an educational institution, the Industrial Disputes Act is not applicable to it, (ii) the respondent No. 2 had been employed under a contract, Annexure-4, and with the termination of the contract, the service of the respondent-workman came to an end and therefore, the termination does not amount to retrenchment as per Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and consequently Section 25F of the Act is not applicable and (iii) the respondent-workman had not worked for 240 days continuously and therefore, the question of applicability of Section 25FF did not arise.
3. Preliminarily, it was also canvassed on behalf of the petitioner earlier that the proceeding was quashed in CWJC No. 1322/1994R and therefore, this proceeding and the award are also bad and without jurisdiction.
On perusal of the order dated 3.4.1995 passed in CWJC No. 1322/1994R, it transpires that two parallel proceedings oneunder the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act and another under the Industrial Disputes Act were pending in the court of the same Presiding Officer. By the said order, the Court quashed the proceeding under the Blhar Shops and Establishments Act, i.e. B.S.E. Case No. 3/1993. Thus, the labour dispute, which was pending before the Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act, was not quashed. This argument has, therefore, no leg to stand.
4. The next question to be considered is whether the petitioner being a School, the Industrial Disputes Act is applicable to it.
The definition of industry as it stands today is wide enough to include a School. Of course, the proposed definition, which has not yet come into force, though was substituted by the Act 46 of 1992, excludes the educational institutions from the purview, but till it is not in force, the educational institutions are covered under the jurisdiction of the Industrial Disputes Act. Thus, this argument is also not accepted.
5. Annexure-4 is the appointment letter, which indicates that the appointment period of the respondent-workman started from 1st October, 1990, to 30th March, 1991, with the following clauses:--
'In case the Students/Staff Facility Centre will be closed down due to any reason, whatsoever it may be, in the above mentioned period, your services will automatically be considered as terminated.'
6. The leaned counsel appearing for the petitioner argued that in their written statement filed before the Tribunal a clear stand had been taken that the facility centre was closed down and with the closure of that centre the services of the respondent workman came automatically to an end under the clause specified in Annexure-4. Moreover, according to the petitioner, the contract came to an end on 30th March, 1990 and therefore, the case of the petitioner is not covered under Section 2(oo) of the Act.
7. I have examined the findings on this point and the reasons given for that in the award itself. It is found on perusal ofthe award that a passbook was produced by the workman which was Annexure -WE/III and which was proved by a management witness, who said that the salary of the workman was deposited in the passbook and the passbook showed the payment of salary till July, 1991. Thus, if the service was terminated on 31st March, 1991 according to Annexure - 4, then the question of payment of salary till July, 31st 1991, by the aforesaid passbook does not arise. This is a circumstance to indicate that the service did not come to an end, rather the salary was being paid by being deposited in the said passbook and it was continued upto 31st, July 1991. If a person started his working from the 1st October, 1990 and continued his working till July, 31st 1991, then he actually worked for 10 months continuously i.e. or more than 240 days from Annexure-4, it also transpires that the petitioner was appointed as Cook-cum-General Duties. If the petitioner also pleaded that the staff centre had closed, therefore, the work of a Cook was not required and this is a circumstance to indicate that the employment had ceased, but the service of the petitioner could be well utilized for the general duties, which includes many other things, which are expected to be rendered, regarding which mention has been made in the evidence of the worker in the court below. Thus, if the termination did not come to an end because of the contract itself on the stipulated date in the appointment letter, then it will amount to say that the service was allowed to continue. In that circumstances, any termination will not be protected under Clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act. In that circumstance, the termination will become a retrenchment requiring compliance of Section 25F of the Act and if without complying Section 25F termination has been made, then I do not think that there is any perversity in the order of the learned Presiding Officer of the Tribunal.
8. Discussions have already been made and evidence led with regard to the respondent-workman having worked continuously for 240 days. On this accountalso, there is no merit in the writ petition.In the result, there is no merit in this petition, warranting inference with the impugnedaward. Consequently, the writ petition isdismissed. The stay earlier granted standsvacated.