Judgment:
ORDER
1. The delay in filing the appeal is condoned. The appeal is taken up for consideration.
2. Mr. Mahesh Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner-appellant submits that the learned Single Judge erred in holding that respondent No. 1 is not an Authority covered by Article 226 of the Constitution of India nor an Instrumentality of the State, and therefore, according to Mr. Tiwari the dismissal of the writ application on that ground (as being not maintainable) was not proper. Mr. Tiwari has relied upon a recent Constitution Bench Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institution of Chemical Biology and Ors., reported in (2002) 5 SCC 111.
3. After hearing Mr. Tiwari's detailed arguments, we find ourselves unable to agree with the point of view that respondent No. 1 is an Authority covered by Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Even in Pradeep Kumar Biswas's case (Supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held that the question whether a particular body is covered by Article 12 or not will be decided on the cumulative facts of each case (as the facts are established) such as financial, functional and administrative aspects etc. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bokaro Steel Employees (Administrative Services) Cooperative Credit Society Ltd. and Ors. v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors., reported in 2000 (3) JLJR 83 : 2002 (3) JCR 319 (Jhr), while discussing various relevant aspects of respondent No. 1 in that case clearly held that it is not covered under Article 12 of the Constitution. Mr. Tiwari laid great stress on the aspect relating to the constitution of the Managing Committee but here also we found that out of the sanctioned/ prescribed nine Members of the Managing Committee, the Bokaro Steel Ltd. has only the power to nominate three Members. On overall consideration, therefore, we find that the learned Single Judge was right in holding Respondent No. 1 not an Authority covered by Article 12 of the Constitution.
4. The learned Single Judge also held that the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies was correct in not entertaining the application under Section 48 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1975 because the dispute raised by the writ petitioner-appellant related to disciplinary action taken by the Co-operative Society against him, who was the paid servant of the Society.
5. The last submission of Mr. Tiwari was that the writ application could not have been dismissed by the learned Single Judge because it was admitted in 1998 and the pendency of the writ application for four years was a good enough ground for it being allowed. This argument of Mr. Tiwari is noticed only to be out rightly rejected. Merely because a Writ Court admits a writ application at one stage, whether four year ago or otherwise, does not prevent it from examining the merits of the case and considering the rival contentions of the parties at the stage of final disposal. It happens very often that the writ application filed under Article 226 of the Constitution being in the nature of discretionary relief are admitted for hearing presumably because at the stage of admission the Writ Court seized of the matter ex facie considers the points worth examination, but that does not mean that later on when the respondent appears and puts up a defence with respect to the maintainability of the writ application, either on technical grounds (including the grounds relating to jurisdiction) or on questions of fact, the Writ Court is precluded from dismissing the writ application merely because it had admitted the same some time back. If the contention of Mr. Tiwari is accepted, that would mean that in every case whenever a writ application is once admitted for hearing by the Writ Court, its result should be a foregone conclusion because later on, after expiry of few years whenever it comes up for hearing it must be allowed. Such a situation is not comprehended by the Constitution.
6. The appeal is dismissed.