M.Y. Eqbal, J.
1. This appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 filed by the appellant-Steel Authority of India Limited is directed against the judgment and order passed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner-cum-Commissioner Workmen's Compensation, Bokaro Steel City in W.C. Case No. 4/2002(C), whereby compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act amounting to Rs. 2,71,120/- has been awarded to the claimant-respondents.
2. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass:
Claimant/respondent No. l being widow of late Abid Ansari filed claim application before the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation Act, claiming therein that her late husband Abid Ansari was a workman having Staff No. m215585, working as Operator, Sintering Plant(O) in the Bokaro Steel Plant. Claimant's case was that her husband met with an accident on 24.5.2001 while he was returning after his G. Shift Duty. He fell down from the scooter near Bhasin Petrol Pump and sustained injuries on his head and succumbed to the injuries. It was further alleged that her husband was aged about 55 years at the time of accident and his wage was approximately Rs. 10,000/- per month.
3. The appellant being the employer appeared before the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation and denied and disputed the death of Abid Ansari and specifically alleged that the accident did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, hence appellant is not liable to pay any compensation. Appellant's case was that when the deceased-workman reached his resident after completing his G. Shift duty, he changed his dress and when he was again leaving his residence to some other place, he fell down from his scooter and sustained injuries on his head and died. The Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation after considering the facts of the case and evidence adduced by the parties awarded compensation of Rs. 2,71,120/-. Hence, this appeal by the appellant.
4. Learned Counsel for the appellant assailed the impugned judgment and award as being illegal and wholly without jurisdiction. Learned Counsel submitted that the court below has failed to appreciate that the workman died while returning after his G. Shift duty and he was on the main road, away from his working premises and after working hours and therefore, the accident cannot be said to have arisen 'Out of and in the course of employment'. Learned Counsel submitted that admittedly the accident occurred near Bhasin Petrol Pump on the side of the road which is did not fall towards the resident of the workman and therefore, claim of the petitioner is not covered under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
5. Mr. B.V. Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the claimant-respondent on the other hand argued that no substantial question of law is involved in the instant appeal and therefore, the appeal cannot be entertained.
6. From perusal of the impugned order, it appears that the tribunal after considering the evident held that on the relevant date after completing his duty in G. Shift the deceased was going to his residence in Sector 12 by his scooter and on the way he fell down from his scooter and sustained injuries. According to the tribunal, therefore, the accident took place in course of employment and the employer is liable to pay compensation.
7. In the facts of the case, the only question that falls for consideration is to whether the death took place in course of employment?
8. Admittedly, the deceased after completing his duty in G. Shift left the factory premises. The accident took place while he fell down from his scooter in the main road near Bhasin Petrol Pump, which is admittedly not the factory premises. The accident, therefore, cannot be said to be occurred in course of employment. Similar case was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of 'Steel Authority of India Limited. v. Smt. Nirmala Devi (2002)3 JCR-147. In that case the deceased-employee was employed as Driver in Bokaro Steel Plant. On 4.12.1905 while coming from his resident to join his duty in general shift, on way, he was shot at by some miscreants and died. The widow of the deceased filed application for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the Labour Court awarded compensation. The said order was challenged by the employer-Steel Authority of India Limited before this Court. The Division Bench held that the deceased was murdered on the way while he was coming from his residence to join his duty and, therefore, it cannot be said that he was in the course of his employment and the employer shall not be liable to pay compensation. The Court observed:
It is well settled that when workman is on public road, he is there as any other member of the public and is not there in the course of this employment unless the very nature of employment makes it necessary for him to be there. The workman is not in the course of his employment from the moment he leaves his home and is on way of work. He certainly is in the course of his employment if he reaches his place of work or the area which comes within the theory of national extension, out side of which the employer is not liable to pay compensation for any accident happens to him.
9. In the case of Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation and Anr. v. Francis De Costa and Anr. : (1997)ILLJ34SC , the claimant was employed in a factor at Koratty. He was going to his place of working on bicycle and was hit by a lorry. The question that fall for consideration was whether the said accident occurred in course of employment The Supreme Court observed:
12. This is precisely the case before us. Here also, we have a case of a person going from his home to his place of work. But he suffers injury in an accident on the way. It cannot be said that the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment. It was faintly suggested by Mr Chacko, appearing on behalf of the respondent, that the bicycle was bought by taking a loan from the employer. That, however, is of no relevance. He might have borrowed money from his Company or from somewhere else for purchasing the bicycle. But the fact remains that the bicycle belonged to him and not the employer. If he meets with an accident while riding his own bicycle on the way to his place of work, it cannot be said that the accident was reasonably incidental to the employment and was in the course of his employment. The deeming provision of Section 51C, which came into force by way of an amendment effected by the Employees' State Insurance (Amendment) Act of 1966 (Act No. 44 of 1966), enlarged the scope of the phrase 'in the course of employment' to include traveling as a passenger by the employer's vehicle to or from the place of work. The legal fiction contained in Section 51C, however, does not come into play in this case because the employee was not traveling as a passenger in any vehicle owned or operated by or on behalf of the employer or by some other person in pursuance of an arrangement made by the employer.
10. In recent decision, in the case of Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali and Anr. (2006) AIR SCW 6009, the Supreme Court held that for awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act for the death or injury sustained to the employee there must be a casual connection between the injury and the accident and the accident and the work done in the course of employment.
11. Considering the ratio decided by the Supreme Court and this Court, I have no hesitation in holding that the claim made by the respondents is not covered under the Workmen's Compensation Act inasmuch as death was not caused in course of employment. The impugned judgment and award, therefore, cannot be sustained in law.
12. Having regard to the facts that it will be a great hardship on the part of the claimant who is widow, learned Counsel for the appellant very fairly submitted that the claimant/respondent shall be paid a sum of Rs. 50,000/- (rupees fifty thousand) by way of ex gratia payment provided the same shall not be a precedent. This Court appreciates the good gesture shown by the appellant. Accordingly, I direct for payment of Rs. 50,000/- to the claimant. However, this order of payment shall not become a precedent.
13. This appeal is, accordingly, allowed but with the aforesaid direction and the impugned award is set aside.