Hari Shankar Prasad, J.
1. This instant application under Section 482, Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing the Order dated 21.12.1998 passed in C/1 Case No. 586/1996, whereby and whereunder the learned Court below has been pleased to Order for framing charge against the petitioners under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
2. The case of the petitioners is that complainant-opposite party filed a case to the effect that he was in search of a suitable bridegroom for his eldest daughter Kiran Pandey then he got information that petitioner Purshottan Dubey, is also interested to perform marriage of his son and there was a negotiation between both the sides and in course of negotiation the petitioner said to the complainant-opposite party that there would be no demand of dowry. Thereafter the opposite party was telephonically informed to come to the residence of the petitioner and he went there and he was asked to pay sum of Rs. 1.50 lacs to meet the expenses of Barati, transportation, etc. which opposite party No. 2 - complainant agreed to pay and paid. Thereafter considering the desire or inquisitiveness of son of the petitioner, who was to be married with Kiran Pandey, daughter of opposite party No. 2 - complainant, about Maruti car, but by that time Maruti car was not to be supplied by the concerned company then he had purchased a Maruti car in black but the complainant opposite party No. 2 was again informed that the accused petitioner does not require Maruti Car and in place of Maruti car a sum of Rs. 2.00 lacs was demanded from the opposite party No. 2 - complainant. Then complainant-opposite party No. 2 sent a message to the petitioner No. 1 that he does not want to perform marriage of his daughter to the son of the petitioner No. 1 and thereafter he made a request for refund of Rs. 1.50 lacs, then on one pretext or other the amount was not refunded and then he filed the complaint case as aforesaid.
3. On the other hand, petitioners denied that they had taken money and a notice to the effect was served on the petitioners through the Lawyer and in reply to which petitioners denied the allegation that they demanded the money and further that no information regarding revocation of marriage was given to him.
4. The sole contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that no case under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is made out because no sanction has been obtained by the opposite party No. 2 for filing this case nor sanction has been obtained prior to the date of taking cognizance and learned Court was not justified in taking cognizance. Thereafter the petitioners came before the High Court by filing Cr. Misc. No. 2673/1998 (R), wherein the following Order was passed :
'29.6.1998-Heard both parties.
In view of the allegation made in the complaint petition. I think no case is made out for quashing the entire criminal prosecution relating to C/1 Case No. 586 of 1996. Accordingly, the prayer is rejected. However, petitioner's Advocate submitted that in this case cognizance has also been taken under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act besides other Sections of the Penal Code. So far as Dowry Prohibition Act is concerned, sanction is must and that has not been obtained. Counsel for the opposite party submitted that sanction may be obtained subsequently also. However, he also submitted that Trial Court may proceed even without sanction and provision of the Penal Code. Thus in view of the submission made on behalf of both the parties if the complainant will not be able to produce the necessary sanction for prosecution of the accused persons under the various provisions of Dowry Prohibition Act then in that case Trial Court will proceed under the provision of the Penal Code.
Accordingly, this application is disposed of in the manner indicated above.'
5. The learned Court below held that there is sufficient material for framingcharge under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and against thisOrder the petitioners have come again for quashing of the Order dated 21.12.1998.The learned Counsel in course of submission submitted that there was provisionfor sanction but by amendment made in the year 1984 by Central Government,the provision for obtaining sanction was deleted but Bihar Government had madean amendment in Dowry Prohibition Act, 1976, whereby provision was madethat for prosecution under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, sanction isrequired but in the instant case no sanction has been obtained. In this connectionlearned Counsel cited a number of case laws such as 1997 SCC (Cr.) 875, whereinit has been held that 'the short and simple question that requires an answer inthis appeal is whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the finding ofthe Sessions Judge, Sonbhadra, that the accused respondent No. 2 was not a'juvenile' under the Juvenile Justice Act, The record reveals that in arriving at itsabove finding the Sessions Judge detailed and discussed the evidence, both oraland documentary, adduced in the inquiry he held pursuant to an earlier directionof the High Court to ascertain the age of respondent No. 2 at the material time.The High Court set aside the above finding in exercise of its revisional jurisdictionwith the following observation.
'It is undisputed that the date of birth mentioned in the student register is admissible in evidence (see Harpal Singh v. State of H.P.). Further in the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhoop Ram v. State of U.P., it has been stressed upon that where there is difference in date of birth between school certificate and medical certificate, school certificate should be preferred as the certificate of MO is based on guess.'
The learned Counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance upon 1992 (2) PLJR 560.
6. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2 -complainant submitted that permission with regard to Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is changed by amendment of Dowry Prohibition Act made by Central Government Act, 63 of 1984. The sanction word has been deleted and for prosecution under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, no sanction is required and in this connection learned Counsel placed reliance upon AIR 1954 SC 752, wherein principle has been laid down that on the same question when there is legislation enacted by Parliament and also by the State Legislature in that case law laid down by Parliament will prevail. Further reliance was placed upon 1992 (2) PLJR 560, which also deals with the same principle.
In that view of the matter, it was submitted that for prosecution under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, no sanction is required.
7. After considering the submissions of both the sides and going through the case law cited on behalf of both the sides and further that earlier the petitioners had come before this Court for quashing the entire criminal prosecution and the same was rejected, vide Order 29.6.1998, I am not inclined to interfere with the Order.
8. In the result, this application has no merit and it is accordingly dismissed.