Judgment:
ORDER
M.Y. Eqbal, J.
1. Heard Mr. A.K, Sinha, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Mr. S.B. Gadodia, learned counsel for the respondents.
2. In this writ application the petitioner has prayed for quashing the notification contained in memo No. 60 dated 21.12.2000 issued by the State Government whereby the service of the petitioner has been taken back from Mineral Area Development Authority and has been handed over to parent department with immediate effect. A copy of the said notification has been annexed as Annexure 5 to the writ application.
3. It appears that respondent No. 4, the Managing Director, Mineral Area Development Authority made a requisition to the Urban Development Department for posting an Engineer as 'Techni-cal Member' in the said Mineral Area Development Authority and on the basis of the said requisition and recommendation of the State Government the services of the petitioner was handed over to Urban Development Department for his posting as Superintending Engineer/ technical member in the said authority. Consequently the Additional Secretary Urban Development Department, Government of Bihar, issued another notification dated 29.4.1999 by which the petitioner has been posted as Incharge Superintending Engineer in the said MineralArea Development Authority, Dhanbad (hereinafter referred to as MADA). The petitioner accordingly took charge of the Technical Member/Superintending Engineer and continued to work as such.
4. The grievance of the petitioner is that without initiating any proceeding and without any rhyme and reason the said State with mala fide intention, issued the impugned notification dated 21.12-2000 and decided to send back the petitioner to his parent department.
5. The first contention of Mr. Sinha is that the impugned notification has been issued contrary to mandatory provisions of Section-7 of the Bihar Mineral Area Development Authority Act, 1986. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner was holding a tenure post which is for a period of three years and, as such, before expiry of the period the respondents have no jurisdiction to return back the services of the petitioner to his parent department. In this connection learned counsel relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of L.P. Agrawal v. Union of India, 1992 (3) SCC 526, and a decision of the Division Bench in the case of Madan Mohan Prasad Verma v. State, 1986 PLJR 63. I do not find any force in the submission of the learned counsel. From perusal of Annexures 1 and 2 it is clear that by the said notification the petitioner was sent to MADA on deputation and he was posted as incharge Superintending Engineer till further order. By another notification dated 11.9.99, the petitioner was made as technical member in the said MADA till further order. Nowhere in any notification there is mention of posting of the petitioner as technical member of the authority for a period of three years. Even assuming that the petitioner was posted as technical member for a period of three years in terms of Section 7 of the said Act, he has not acquired any legal right to continue in the said post and challenged the impugned notification by which the services of the petitioner have been returned back' to his parent depart-ment. The decision relied upon by the petitioner in L.P. Agrawal's case (supra) and Madan Mohan Prasad Verma's case (supra) do not apply. In the facts of the present case. In L.P. Agrawal's case the petitioner was appointed as Director of All India Institute of Medical Science, New Delhi and in the letter of appointment specifically it was mentioned that the appointment was for a period of five years or till he attains the age of 62 years. The question which fell for consideration before the Apex Court was whether the service law concept of premature retirement in public interest is applicable to a tenure post filled by way of direct recruitment.
6. In Madan Mohan Prasad Verma's case (supra) the question which fell for consideration before the Division Bench was whether once licence granted under Rule 8 of the Bihar Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1974 for a period of three years, the said period can be curtailed on the ground that the lease on the basis of which the licensee was in possession of the building of cinema expired.
7. On the contrary it is well settled that person holding any particular post on deputation cannot claim as a matter of right that his services cannot be recalled or sent back to parent department. A similar question arose in the case of Sayeeduz Zafar v. State of Bihar and others, 1991 (1) BLJ 257. In that case the petitioner who was an employee of Urban Development Department as sent on deputation to Rosera Municipality to act as an Executive Officer of the said Municipality. Subsequently by a notification the service of the petitioner had been withdrawn with immediate effect by the Urban Development Department of the State of Bihar and in his place one Assistant Engineer of Zila Parishad was directed to act as Executive Officer of the said Municipality. The petitioner challenged the said notification on various grounds including that his service was recalled at the instance of some interested persons who requested the Minister towithdraw the petitioner from the Municipality. The petitioner had also alleged mala fide against the Minister and various other officers at whose instance the service of the petitioner was withdrawn illegally from the Municipality. Negativating the contention made by the petitioner, the Division Bench observed :--
'As regards the question as to whether the notification dated 18.4.1990 (Annexure I) recalling the petitioner to his parent department should also be quashed, it was pointed out on behalf of the petitioner that but for the letter addressed by the member of the Legislative Assembly to the Minister, Urban Development, there was no occasion to recall the service or the petitioner to his parent department and in this connection reliance was again placed on the aforesaid judgment of this Court in the case of Sri Abdul Muttalib (supra). It may be pointed out that the said case is in connection with an order of transfer. That principle cannot be extended where the service of an officer, who is on deputation to some other department or post, is recalled by his parent department. The principles of deputation is that an officer is deputed to act in some other department or against the post not belonging to the department for the time being. As such, the petitioner has no right to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the Court for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing his parent department to continue him again to the post of Executive Officer of the Municipality.'
8. In the instant case also, as noticed above, the petitioner was sent on deputation to MADA and was assigned a post till further order. The services of the petitioner was then returned to parent depart-ment' by the impugned notification. No legal right has been created in favour of the petitioner to compel the authority to allow him to continue in the said post. In such cases, I am of the considered opinion that the doctrines of pleasure will apply and this Court cannot issue writ directing the State or the Authority to allow the petitioner to continue in the said post.
9. For the reasons aforesaid, there is no merit in this writ application which is, accordingly, dismissed.
10. Writ application dismissed.