Rajesh Tandon, J.
1. Heard Sri S.S. Negi Counsel for the appellant and Sri Pankaj Purohit Counsel for respondent No. 1 and Sri H.M. Katuri Counsel for respondent No. 3 and 4.
Present appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 26.6.1992 passed by Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, Pauri Garhwal.
2. Briefly slated the appellant Habib Ahmed has filed the claim petition for the grant of compensation on account of the death of his son Akiz Ahmed in an accident, who was employed as mason and constructing the house of Umesh Chandra Srivastnva. The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner allowed the application vide order dated 26.6.1992 and awarded a sum of Rs. 89,084/- as compensation along with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of accident.
3. Feeling aggrieved the present appeal has been filed by the appellant Umesh Chandra Srivastava.
Counsel for the appellant has contended that the deceased was working with the Contractor Sarif Ahmed in the house of the appellant. The appellant is not liable to pay compensation to the claimants. The alleged accident occurred due to the own negligence of the deceased and he did not care the electricity line. Further the compensation awarded to the claimant and interest thereon is exaggerated.
4. Section 2(1)(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, defines the workman as under:
(n) 'Workman' means any person [***] who is-
(i) A railway servant as defined in [clause (34) of Section 2 of the Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989)] not permanently employed in any administrative, district or sub-divisional office of a railway and not employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, or
[(ia) (a) A master, seaman or other member of the crew of a ship,
(b) A captain or other member of the crew pi an aircraft,
(c) A person recruited as driver, helper, mechanic, cleaner or any other capacity in connection with a motor vehicle,
(d) A person recruited for work abroad by a company,
And who is employed outside India in any such capacity as is II and the ship, aircraft or motor vehicle; or company, as the case may be, is registered in India, or;]
(ii) Employed [***] [***] in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, whether the contract of employment was made before or after the passing of this Act and whether such contract is expressed or implied, oral or in writing; but does not include any Person working in the capacity of any member of [the Armed Forces of the Union] [***]; and any reference to a workman who has been injured shall, where the workman is dead, include a reference, to his dependents or any of them.
5. Thus the Commissioner has rightly held that the deceased was employed by the appellant and he is liable to pay compensation.
So far as the amount of compensation is concerned the Commissioner has calculated the compensation as under:
1. 40% of the monthly wages of the deceased whichshall be presumed to be Rs. 1,000/- Rs. 400.002. Factor on the age of 21 years 222.713. 40% of the total compensation 89,084.00
6. So far as the interest is concerned the Workmen's Compensation Act, provides for payment of interest if the Compensation is not paid within one month from the date it fell due, which reads as under:
(3) Where any employer is in default in paying the compensation due under this Act within one month from the date it fell due, the Commissioner shall-
(a) Direct that the employer shall, in addition to the amount of the arrears, pay simple interest thereon at the rate of twelve per cent per annum or at such higher rate not exceeding the maximum of the lending rates of any scheduled bank as may be specified by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, on the amount due; and
7. Thus the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner has awarded 6% interest under the statutory provision of the Act, which could not be condoned or untitled by way of review application.
8. A Court while considering review application cannot re-adjudicate its own order as a Court of appeal. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case Northern India Cateres (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi MANU/SC/0339/1978 : (1978) 4 SCC 36, has observed as under:
It is well settled that a party ,is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court; is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so: Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan. For instance, if the attention oi the. Court is not drawn to a material statutory provision during the original hearing, the Court will review its judgment: G.L. Gupta v. D.N. Mehta. The Court may also reopen its judgment if a manifest wrong has been done and it is necessary to pass an order to do full and effective justice: O.N. Mohindroo v. Distt. judge, Delhi. Power to review its judgments has been conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 137 of the Constitution, and that power is subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or the rules made under Article 145. In a civil proceeding, an application for review is entertained only on a ground mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure,, and in a criminal proceeding on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record (Order 40 Rule 1, Supreme Court Rules, 1966). But whatever the nature of the proceeding, it is beyond dispute that a review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case, and the finality of the judgment delivered by the Court will not be reconsidered except 'where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility': Sow Chandra Kante v. Sheikh Habib MANU/SC/0523/1975 : 1975 (3) SCR 935.
9. In the present case the respondent has not deposited the amount of compensation within stipulated period of one month before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner and as such the Commissioner was justified by awarding interest at the rate of 6% per annum.
In view of above, impugned order passed by the learned Commissioner suffers no infirmity. Appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed with costs.