ORDER
S.C. Vyas, J.
1. This is a petition filed under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code, for quashing Cr. Case No. 686/2004 pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shajapur against present petitioner, on the complaint of Junior Supply Officer, District-Shajapur.
2. Complainant has filed the complaint before CJM, Shajapur, on the allegation that on 18-12-2000 Food and Civil Supply Officer, M.K. Singhai inspected the shop, Vikram Cement, 43 A.B. Road, Shajapur, in presence of witness Manoj Mundra, accused No. 1 of the case, Depot In-charge, who was present at the time of such inspection, other officers of the food department were also present. On inspection, it was found that cement was being sold from that depot at unreasonable rates. The rate list of the same was not exhibited at the time of inspection for that date, there was a rate list available in the depot, which was of 16-12-2000. Stock register was also found incomplete, and it was found that from that shop cement was being sold @ Rs. 126/- per bag and Rs. 128/- per bag, whereas its rates were Rs. 111/- and Rs. 113/- per bag respectively, and thereby profit of Rs. 15 per bag was illegally collected by that company. In the complaint it has also been stated that as per the provisions of M.P. Essential Commodities (Exhibition of Prices and Price Control) Order, 1977 (hereinafter for short referred to as 'the M.P. Control Order, 1977'), it was necessary for the dealers to exhibit price list at the shop and to charge fix price of the commodities, but cement was being sold at higher rates and in that way Rs. 14,53,956/- were illegally earned by the company.
3. Present petitioner was the Vice President of the Vikram Cement Factory, therefore, he was also found equally responsible and he was also added as an accused in the complaint. It was stated in the complaint that present petitioner as well as accused Manoj Mundra violated Clauses 3, 4, 5 and 6(1) of the M.P. Control Order, 1977 and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 3/7 of Essential Commodities Act, 1955.
4. Earned Counsel for the petitioner contended that as per Annexure P-1, in the Order of 1977 Government of Madhya Pradesh in exercise of powers conferred by Section 3 of Essential Commodities Act, 1955 read with Order No. G.S.R. 316 (E), dated 20-6-1972 of the Government of India, in the Ministry of Agriculture and in Order No. S.O. 681 (E) and S.O. No. 682 (E) both dated 30-11-1974 of the Government of India in the Ministry of Trade and Supplies, enacted the M.P. Control Order, 1977, which was amended on 10-9-1998.
5. He has further submitted w.e.f. 1-3-1989 the Cement Control Order was extensively amended by the Central Government, whereby all the earlier controls on (i) Sale and Transport of Cement, (ii) disposal of stock, (iii) price, (iv) payment to Cement Regulation Account, (v) wholesale and retail prices, including price charged by the manufacturers, handling and transportation charges, godown charges, stockist's margin of profit, local taxes and additional transport charges, were removed from the Cement Control Order, and Clause 12 giving the Central Government power to vary prices and to alter the Schedule was deleted from the Cement Control Order, as per Annexure P-2.
6. He has further submitted that the Government of Madhya Pradesh with the prior concurrence of the Central Government, rescinded the M.P. Control Order, 1977, and due to the rescission of the said Order the prosecution against the present petitioner deserves to be quashed.
7. Earned Counsel for the petitioner in this regard placed the reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in the case of Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. : 2000(119)ELT257(SC) , Rayala Corporation Pvt. Ltd. v. Director of Enforcement New Delhi : 1970CriLJ588 and General Finance Co. and Ors. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Punjab : [2002]257ITR338(SC) .
8. Per contra, earned Counsel for the respondent/State has submitted that though, later on M.P. Control Order, 1977 was rescinded by the State of Madhya Pradesh, but on 18-12-2000 the M.P. Control Order, 1977 was very well in force and, therefore, the present petitioner as well as accused No. 1 Manoj Mundra were having equal obligation to comply different provisions of the M.P. Control Order, 1977 and to exhibit the price list at the appropriate place of shop and also to show available stock of the cement on that date on a notice board. But it was found by the inspector that neither the stock was shown nor price was exhibited and, therefore, their prosecution is not liable to be quashed.
9. The question which arises for consideration in this case is only this, that whether even after repeal, omission or rescission of a particular Order or Rule, prosecution for its infringement can be continued or not
10. First of all it will be useful to reproduce the Notification (Annexure P-8), so that its meaning can be properly understood. Notification reads as under:
(113)- Notification No. F 4-17-98-XXIX-1, dated the 2nd September, 2002 - In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (No. 10 of 1955), read with the order of the Government of India, the Ministry of Consumer Affairs Food and Public Distribution (Department of Consumer Affairs). No. GSR 104 (E), dated 15th February, 2002, the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (Department of Food) GSR 316 (E), dated 20th June, 1972, the Ministry of Industry and Civil Supplies (Department of Civil Supplies and Co-operation), S.O. No. 681 (E), dated 30th November, 1974 and S.O. No. 682 (E), dated 30th November, 1974, the State Government with the prior concurrence of the Central Government hereby rescind the Madhya Pradesh Essential Commodities (Exhibition of Price and Price Control) Order, 1977 with effect from the date of publication of this Notification in the 'Madhya Pradesh Gazette'.
11. Notification clearly shows that the State Government with the prior concurrence of the Central Government has rescinded the M.P. Control Order, 1977 with effect from the date of its publication in the M.P. Gazette and this Notification was published in M.P. Rajpatra, dated 13-9-2002 at Page 2114.
12. The meaning of the word 'Rescind' as per Chambers 21st Century Dictionary is to cancel, annul or revoke (an order, law, custom etc.). This meaning shows that by using the word rescind the actual intention is that of cancelling or annulling an order and making annulling the particular order indicates that thereby that particular order, law or custom etc. was removed for taking effect and has been revoked and has been omitted from the law books.
13. In the case of Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. (supra), the five Judges Bench of Supreme Court has considered the effect of deletion of Rule 10 and Rule 10-A of Central Excise Rules on 6-8-1977 and effect of introduction of new provision. At that time proceedings were going on against petitioner of that case for recovery of certain amount rebate of which was erroneously sanctioned to their personal ledger account. The question for consideration before Supreme Court was whether after omission of old Rules 10 and 10-A and their substitution by new Rule 10 by Notification No. 267/77, dated 6-8-1977 the proceedings initiated by the notice, dated 27-4-1977 could be continued in law. In this regard the provisions of Section 6 of General Clauses Act were considered by the Supreme Court and has been quoted in Paragraph 16 of the judgment. In Paragraph Nos. 37 and 38 of the judgment, it was held as under:
Paragraph 37 - The position is well known that at common law, the normal effect of repealing a statute or deleting a provision is to obliterate it from the statute-book as completely as if it had never been passed, and the statute must be considered as a law that never existed. To this rule, an exception is engrafted by the provisions of Section 6(1). If a provision of a statute is unconditionally omitted without a saving clause in favour of pending proceedings, all actions must stop where the omission finds them, and if final relief has not been granted before the omission goes into effect, it cannot be granted afterwards. Savings of the nature contained in Section 6 or in Special Acts may modify the position. Thus the operation of repeal or deletion as to the future and the past largely depends on the savings applicable. In a case where a particular provision in a statute is omitted and in its place another provision dealing with the same contingency is introduced without a saving clause in favour of pending proceedings then it can be reasonably inferred that the intention of the legislature is that the pending proceedings shall not continue but fresh proceedings for the same purpose may be initiated under the new provision.
Paragraph 38: In the present case, as noted earlier, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act has no application. There is no saving provision in favour of pending proceedings. Therefore, action for realisation of the amount refunded can only be taken under the new provision in accordance with the terms thereof.
14. Therefore, on the basis of the law laid down by the five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in the abovestated case, it is very clear that normal effect of repealing the statute or deleting the provision is to obliterate it from the statute-book as completely as if it had never been passed, and it should be considered as a law that never existed. Unless there is a saving clause in favour of pending proceedings, all actions must stop where the omission finds them.
15. Notification of the year 2002 for the resentment of the M.P. Control Order, 1977 contains no saving clause for any pending prosecution. The Control Order, which has been rescinded for not an Act passed by the Parliament. This was the order issued by the State Government, which has now been rescinded.
16. In the case of M/s. Rayala Corporation (P) Ltd. (supra), the effect of omission of Rule 132-A of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 was considered along with the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and in that case also it was held that-
In the case before us, Section 6 of General Clauses Act cannot obviously apply on the omission of Rule 132-A of the D.I.Rs. for the two obvious reasons that Section 6 only applies to repeals and not to omissions, and applies when the repeal is of a Central Act or Regulation and not of a rule. If Section 6 of the General Clauses Act had been applied, no doubt this complaint against the two accused for the offence punishable under Rule 132-A of the D.I.Rs. could have been instituted even after the repeal of the rule.
17. In Paragraph 19 of the judgment, it has been held as under:
Paragraph 19 - In this connection, Mr. Desai pointed out to us that, simultaneously with the omission of the Rule 132-A of the D.I.Rs., Section 4(1) of the Act was amended so as to bring the prohibition contained in Rule 132-A (2) under Section 4(1) of the Act. He urged that, from this simultaneous action taken, it should be presumed that there was no intention of the Legislature that acts, which were offences punishable under Rule 132-A of the D.I.Rs., should go unpunished after the omission of that rule. It, however, appears that when Section 4(1) of the Act was amended, the Legislature did not make any provision that an offence previously committed under Rule 123-A of the D.I.Rs. would continue to remain punishable as an offence of contravention of Section 4(1) of the Act, nor was any provision made permitting operation of Rule 132-A itself so as to permit institution of prosecutions in respect of such offences. The consequence is that the present complaint is incompetent even in respect of the offence under Rule 132-A (4). This is the reason why we hold that this was an appropriate case where the High Court should have allowed the applications under Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and should have quashed the proceedings on this complaint.
18. In the case of General Finance Company and Anr. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab (supra), also the law laid down by the Constitutional Bench of Supreme Court was again affirmed and the proceedings of prosecution under Section 276DD of the Income Tax Act were quashed after omission of Section 269SS of the Income Tax Act. Non-compliance of which was made punishable under Section 276DD of the Income Tax Act.
19. On the basis of above stated settled position of law, it can easily be held that after omission, deletion, rescission etc. of particular rule or order the prosecution for its non-compliance cannot be continued, unless such prosecutions are saved by some provisions in the Act providing for rescission, deletion or omission of that provision.
20. Therefore, in view of the foregoing discussion the petition succeeds and is allowed. The prosecution of the petitioner herein in the Criminal Case No. 686/2004 pending before Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shajapur is hereby quashed.