S.K. Dubey, J.
1. The appellants are the claimants who aggrieved of the award passed on 3.9.1990 in Claim Case No. 6/88 by the IInd Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Raigarh, whereby the claim of the appellant has been dismissed, have filed this appeal.
2. Circumstances giving rise to this appeal are thus: Deceased Megnath aged about 28 years, was earning Rs. 20/- per day by doing the job of Carpenter. On 24.3.1987 he was going on a bycycle by sitting at the back seat, of PW 2 Ghansai who was going from village Kudumkela towards Teram, a Bus No. CIN-642 driven by respondent No. 1, owned by respondent No. 2 was coming from the same direction in a speed of about 60 km., when it blew the horn the deceased to fumbled and save himself jumped on the road, who then was crushed by the rear wheel of the bus in the middle of the road. The driver of the bus applied brakes but bus could be stopped at about 50 paces from the place of the accident. The claimants No. 1 and 2. are the parents, while claimant No. 3 is the widow of the deceased and Nos. 4 and 5 are his minor children who filed an application under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 claiming compensation of Rs. 4,75,000/- for the death arising out of the motor-accident. The owner and driver have filed their separate written statements denying the manner in which the accident occurred and took a stand that it was the deceased himself who was responsible for the accident. When the deceased jumped, the driver of the bus immediately applied brakes to stop the vehicle and inspite of taking steps like a prudent man, the accident could not be avoided. The accident was inevitable in the circumstances and for that no liability can be fastened, therefore, the claimants are not entitled for any compensation.
3. The appellants/claimants examined PW 1 Chamar Singh father of the deceased, PW 2 Ghansai-Cyclist and PW 3 Vijayram, an eye-witness. On behalf of the respondents the driver of the Bus did not examine himself nor any evidence in rebuttal was adduced. The Tribunal on appreciation of evidence, considering the circumstances and the manner in which the accident occurred and the fact that there are contradictions and inconsistencies in the statements of the witnesses, PW 2-Ghansai and PW 3-Vijayram, held that the claimants have failed to establish the rash and negligent act of the driver of the Bus, the driver of the Bus tried to avert the accident, but, it could not be avoided, thus, dismiss the application for compensation.
4. Mr. Ajit Singh, Counsel for the appellants and Mr. A.G. Dhande Counsel for the respondents heard.
5. After hearing Counsel, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal has made an approach of the case that like that of a criminal case and applied the law of rash and negligent applicable to a criminal case where the guilt of an accused is to be proved to the hilt. From the evidence adduced and the circumstances which emerge, it is clear that the deceased was sitting on the back seat of the cycle which was being driven by Ghansai. The bus was coming from the same direction from which the deceased and cyclist were coming. The bus driver blown horn, but when horn was blown, there was no time left for the two persons to take a decision, therefore, deceased Megnath to save himself took a jump. The driver of the Bus when saw at distance that two persons going on a cycle did not stop or slowed down the bus but came with the same speed, which crushed the deceased Megnath. The bus could be stopped at a distance of about 50 paces. The above circumstances are sufficient to establish that the bus driver was rash and negligent. It is well settled that when a motor driver takes a defence of inevitable accident or the fact that the deceased or injured contributed to the accident, such plea has to be established by adducing legal evidence and for that bus driver should examine himself, who had the first hand information of the manner and the circumstances in which the accident occurred. Surprisingly, in this case the driver was not examined, therefore, in the opinion of this Court the Tribunal ought to have raised adverse inference against the respondent to discard the defence taken by the respondent. Moreover, in the circumstances of the present case we can safely apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur which is the rule of evidence to avoid hardship, as the true cause of accident remained solely within the knowledge of the bus driver who caused the accident. The claimants have proved the accident but could not prove how it happened to establish negligence on the part of the respondent. This hardship can to be avoided by applying the principle of res ipsa loquitur. The general purpose of the words res ipsa loquitur is that the accident 'speaks for itself' or tells its own story/There are cases in which the accident speaks for itself so that it is sufficient for the claimants to prove the accident and nothing more. In our opinion, the present case is like that where the accident speaks for itself. See the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Pushpabai v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1977 SC 1735, and the decision of this Court in case of State of M.P.V. Ashadevi (1989 JLJ 541) and Dhanvanti (Mahila) and Ors. v. Phulwant and Ors. 1994 JLJ 101. Therefore, by applying the principle and the circumstances in which the accident occurred and the fact that the bus could be stopped at about 50 paces, the finding that the driver of the bus was not rash and negligent cannot be sustained.
7. On compensation, we would have remitted the case to the Tribunal as the Tribunal has not assessed the compensation. But remand would cause a great injustice to the claimants who lost the young bread earner. The application for compensation was filed as long as back on 15.6.1987 and claim was decided by the Tribunal on 3.9.1990, this appeal has come up for hearing before us in April 1996, therefore, instead of remitting the case to the Tribunal, on the evidence adduced by the parties, we decide the issue of compensation ourselves. It is not in dispute that the deceased was a carpenter and was earning Rs. 20/- per day, taking into account his earning for 25 days the deceased's earning would come to Rs. 500/.- per month, after deducting his personal living expenses of 1/5th, the dependency would come to Rs. 400/- per month, yearly Rs. 4,800/-. The deceased was in threshhold of his career and was in twenties, therefore, by applying the multiplier of 16, the compensation would come to Rs. 76,800/-, to which a conventional figure of Rs. 10,000/- is to be added in the head of consortium, the total compensation would be Rs. 86,800/-, making it to a round figure, we award the compensation of Rs. 87,000/- which shall carry interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the application. However, we are not inclined to grant interest for such a long period as from the record it is evident that the Corporation cannot be blamed for the delay in disposal of the case before the Tribunal or disposal of the appeal before this Court, therefore, we direct that on the amount of compensation so determined by us, the claimants would be entitled to interest for a period of five years only at the rate of 12% per annum. The appellant Corporation shall deposit the amount within a period of 3 months, failing which the amount shall carry interest for the period so awarded at the rate of 15% per annum. On deposit, the Tribunal shall disburse the amount taking into the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in case of General Manager Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas AIR 1994 SC 1631 : I (1994) ACC 346 (SC).
8. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the award of the Tribunal is set aside. The appellant to get the costs of this appeal. Counsel's fee Rs. 750/- if pre-certified.