Cit Vs. Shantilal Chhajed

.....act, 1961 s.10(14) in the madhya pradesh high court, indore bench , a.m. sapre & ashok kumar tiwari, jj. - section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined.....orderthis is a reference made at the instance of the revenue under section 256(1) of the income tax act by the tribunal to answer the following question of law for opinion:'whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the tribunal was justified in holding that the assessee was entitled to claim 40% expenses out of the amount received by him by way of incentive bonus or commission?'2. heard shri r.l. jain, learned counsel for petitioner. despite repeated summons sent to the assessee, he has not chosen to either accept the summons or receive the summons. under these circumstances, we have no option but to proceed to answer the reference made to this court by the tribunal.3. having heard the learned counsel for the revenue and having perused the record of the case including the statement of the case drawn by the tribunal, we are of the opinion that the question involved in this case and as referred to by the tribunal to this court referred (supra) stands already answered by the division bench of this court in a case in cit v. a.k. ghosh : [2003]263itr536(mp) .4. it is in this case i.e., a.k. ghosh (supra) question referred to this court was examined and answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. we sitting as a coordinate bench is bound by the law laid down by the division bench of this court in the case of a.k. ghosh (supra). moreover, we have not been able to find any contrary view taken by the supreme court of india on the question referred to this court, subsequent to the decision by d.b. in the case of a.k. ghosh (supra) which may entitle us to take a view taken by the supreme court on the aforesaid question.5. accordingly and in view of the aforesaid discussion and in view of the law laid down by this court in the case of a.k. ghosh (supra), we do not wish to burden our order by narrating the entire facts except to answer the question referred to us in favour of the revenue and against the assessee.6. accordingly and in view of.....