Dayaldas Vs. Latabai

- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture..........of the act, also could not be carried out on account of respondent's absence.4. the plaintiff/appellant examined himself in support of his petition.5. the learned trial court found that the plaintiff/appellant has not proved that respondent was suffering from any mental disorder and was incurably of unsound mind. it was also held that the appellant failed to prove that the respondent has deserted him. accordingly, his petition seeking divorce was dismissed.6. learned counsel for appellant submits that the appellant wishes to examine more witnesses in support of his case. he also filed an application under order 41 rule 27 of c.p.c. in this appeal. it has been submitted that, though the witnesses were available and could corroborate his statement, he was wrongly advised not to examine them. he prays that opportunity be granted to examine the said witnesses.7. after considering the said application and the circumstances of the case, it appears, that the prayer deserves to be allowed, and the plaintiff/appellant is permitted to examine witnesses, as has been prayed by him in his application under order 41 rule 27 of c.p.c.8. in view of above, the appeal is allowed. the judgment and decree of the trial court is set aside. the case is remanded back to the trial court for trial afresh after giving the plaintiff/ appellant an opportunity to lead further evidence. however, in the interest of justice, it is directed that the trial court before proceeding with the suit, shall issue fresh notice of the suit to the respondent/wife and also make an endeavour for reconciliation, as provided under section 23(2) of the act.