J.G. Chitre, J.
1. The appellants in both these appeals are hereby assailing correctness, propriety and legality of the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Bench of this Court by which the learned Judge decided W.P. Nos. 1333/97 [2000 (122) E.L.T. 338 (M.P.)]and 849/98.
2. Shri Patankar while assailing the correctness and legality of the said judgments and orders submitted that the learned Judge did not take into consideration the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Suptd. of Central Excise, Jammu v. J.K. Cigarettes reported in 1996 (84) E.L.T. 412 (S.C). He submitted further that in view of the provisions of Section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, the duress, issued for the purpose of collection of Revenue by the Central Excise Department cannot be stayed. He submitted that the learned judge has done the same and, therefore, the said judgments and order need to be set aside by allowing these appeals.
3. Shri Chaphekar pointed out the provisions of Section 22 of SICA and submitted that in view of the provisions of Section 22(1) the duress is also to be stayed when the BIFR has taken cognizance of the petition presented by the alleged Sick Industry. Shri Chaphekar submitted that in addition to that, the BIFR pointed out in its judgment and order that the matter was under consideration for the purpose of preparation of the scheme. He submitted further that the challenge to such judgment and order by the appellant made before the AAIFR has also been dismissed. In view of that, Shri Chaphekar submitted that the appeals deserve to be dismissed.
4. That judgment of the Supreme Court quoted supra by itself indicates that it was an order passed by the Supreme Court keeping in view the consent rendered by the litigating parties. The facts were different. In the present matter the learned Judge has pointed out the provisions of Section 22(1) of the SICA which need to be quoted for the purpose of better understanding of the matter. Section 22(1) of SICA provides that where in respect of an industrial company, an inquiry u/s 16 is pending or any scheme referred to u/s 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal u/s 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, not withstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof (and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcementof any security against the industrial company or for any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company) shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the board, or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority; etc.
5. Here it is important to note that the word 'distress' has been totally disconnected with words 'no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution'. So also it has been totally disconnected with 'the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof (and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company)'. Therefore, the word 'distress' has to be given effect independently. If that is done, the submissions which have been advanced by Shri Patankar contending that by virtue of Section 22 of SICA the 'distress' which was challenged by the said writ petitions which were decided by the learned Single Judge could not be touched either by BIFR or AAIFR. We are unable to agree with him because that is not so as it has been pointed out by us in above mentioned paragraph. Apart from that, the challenge has been considered by the BIFR and AAIFR and again it has been considered by the learned Single Judge while deciding the Writ Petitions Bearing Nos. 1333/97 [2000 (122) E.L.T. 338 (M.P.)] and 849/98. When the judgments and orders which are being challenged, passed by the learned Single Judge are well reasoned and are dealing with all necessary facts of the matter, we do not find any ground for setting aside the said judgments and orders and, therefore, we do not come to the conclusion that these appeals are deserving to be allowed.
6. Both these appeals are dismissed with cost.