Dipak Misra, J.
1. In this appeal preferred under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity the Act' substantiality and legal acceptability of the Award passed by the Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Sonkutch, District Dewas (for short 'the tribunal') in Claim Case No. 99/97 dated 30-9-1997 is called in question by the claimant/appellant (hereinafter referred to as 'the claimant').
2. The facts which are imperative to be' exposited for adjudication of this appeal, in essence, are that Mahant Harnamdasji was proceeding to Allahabad from Indore along with other Sadhus and his Guru Mahant Poorandas on 8-1-1995 in a Jeep bearing registration No. MP-09 H-4768. The first respondent, Lalaram, the driver of the Jeep due to his rash and negligent driving lost control over the vehicle as a consequence of which the same got dashed against a 'Palash' tree. In the accident Harnamdas breathed his last on the spot. One Devchandra sustained injuries and eventually expired on 15-1-1995 at Choithram Hospital, Indore.
3. The claimant, Mahant Shyamdas, initiated an action under Section 166 of the Act contending, inter alia, that he was the 'Guru Bhai', the spiritual brother of deceased. Harnamdas who was earning about Rs. 20,000/- per year from donation and from performance of religious rites and rituals. It was put forth that the claimant had performed the funeral rites of said Harnamdas and immense loss had been caused to him inasmuch as he had lost his source of sustenance and also suffered mental agony. On the aforesaid base he claimed compensation for a sum of Rs. 5,60,000/-.
4. The aforesaid claim of the claimant. appellant was resisted by the respondent insurer on the foundation that the claim put forth by the claimant was bound to founder as the application preferred by him was not maintainable, for the claimant is not the legal representative of deceased Harnamdas and further Harnamdas was a gratuitous passenger in the Jeep. That apart, a stand was taken that the driver had no license and there had been breach of terms and conditions of the policy.
5. On the basis of the pleadings on record, the tribunal addressed to the issues whether the accident had occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the vehicle in question and in the said accident the deceased died; whether the claimant could be treated as the legal representative and successor of the deceased; whether the terms and conditions of the insurance policy had been violated to absolve the insurer from the liability; and whether the claimant is entitled in law to get compensation and if so, what could be the resultant quantum.
6. On delineation on the aforesaid spectrums and in the backdrop of material brought on record, the tribunal came to hold that the accident had occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the first respondent; that Mahant Harnamdas had died in the accident; that there had been no breach of terms and conditions of the policy; and that the claimant is the successor and legal representative of Harnamdas and hence, is entitled to compensation; that Harnamdas was sixty-eight years of age; that the claimant had not been able to prove any major damage caused to the Ashram of which said Harnamdas was the Mahant; that the appellant Mahant Shyamdas has suffered mental agony; and that he is entitled to receive Rs. 50,000.00 towards compensation. Be it noted the Tribunal had also directed that the aforesaid amount would carry interest at the rate of 12% p.a. from 19-6-1995 till the date of payment.
7. Assailing the soundness of the award, it is contended by Mr. R.K. Vyas, learned Counsel for the appellant that the award passed by the tribunal is absolutely faulty inasmuch as the tribunal has not computed the loss sustained by the claimant despite returning a finding that he was the legal representative of Guru Harnamdas, the deceased. It is his further submission that the tribunal has fallen into grave error by not considering the factum that deceased was earning Rs. 20,000.00 per year and on that basis the tribunal would have been well advised to compute the compensation. It is propounded by Mr. Vyas that the tribunal has not granted any amount towards the mental agony, the rituals performed, the funeral rites carried out and all such other aspects and passed an award of Rs. 50,000.00 on the ground of no fault liability which is impermissible in the obtaining factual matrix when the findings as regards the legal representative and entitlement have been recorded in favour of the claimant.
8. Mr. S.V. Dandwate learned Counsel appearing for the third respondent, the insurer, submitted that the finding of the tribunal with regard to entitlement of the appellant is sensitively vulnerable and, therefore, the question of enhancement of compensation does not ensue. It is urged by him that the insurer has not thought it apposite to prefer any appeal as the tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 50,000.00 on the bedrock of no fault liability but on a keener scrutiny it is quite vivid that the claimant has miserably failed to establish his right to get compensation under the Act. It is canvassed by Mr. Dandwate that the manner in which the concept of legal representative has been dealt with by the tribunal is far from being satisfactory and it does not deserve acceptance in the remotest way and hence, this Court should decline to interfere with the award for the purpose of enhancement. Learned Counsel's further proponement is that the finding with regard to the status of the appellant being neither correct nor sound, the respondent-insurer, though has not preferred any appeal, can challenge it without filing the cross-objection and this Court should address itself on that score to put the controversy to rest.
9. To appreciate the rival submissions raised at the bar, we have bestowed our anxious consideration and scrutinized the award and the material brought on record.
10. Three questions emanate for consideration in this appeal. First, whether the tribunal is justified in treating the claimant as the legal representative of the deceased; second, whether this Court at this juncture can delve into and dwell upon the same; and third, whether the amount of compensation that has been awarded is just and proper under the provisions of the Act.
11. It is unnecessary to emphasize that the first two issues are interlinked and for the sake of putting the controversy to rest and to have the lis adjudicated in the completest sense, we are disposed to address to the facet of entitlement as the legal representative on merits. That apart, the learned Counsel for the parties have also addressed us on the said score.
12. To have the apposite deliberation it is necessitous to refer to certain provisions of the Act. Section 166 reads as under:
166. Application for compensation.- (1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 165 may be made -
(a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or
(b) by the owner of the property; or
(c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or
(d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be:
Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined, Shall be impleaded as respondents to the application.
13. Section 168 of the Act is as follows:
168. Award of the Claims Tribunal -
On receipt of an application for compensation made Under Section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the provisions of Section 162 may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in making the award the claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be:
Provided that where such application makes a claim for compensation Under Section 140 in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, such claim and any other claim (whether made in such application or otherwise) for compensation in respect of such death or permanent disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of chapter X.
(2) The claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned expeditiously and in any case within a period of 15 days from the date of the award.
(3) When an award is made under this section, the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award, shall within 30 days of the date of announcing the award by the Claims tribunal, deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner as the Claims Tribunal may direct.
14. On a perusal of the aforesaid provisions, it is luminiscent that compensation can be claimed by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased and all the legal representatives are required to be impleaded as respondents and the tribunal has the duty to grant just compensation specifying the person or persons to whom the compensation is payable in the case at hand the claimant in his application under Section 166 of the Act has asserted that he is the Guru Bhai of deceased Harnamdas. He has deposed that he and Harnamdas are pupils of Guru Mahantdas and Mohandas and both of them are residing together at Sindwida Ashram. He has claimed cult inheritance by such assertion. Thus, in quintessentiality, the claimant has put forth his claim on the bedrock that he is in the category of brother of the deceased and, therefore, is entitled to compensation.
15. Section 166 of the Act came to be interpreted by a Full Bench of this Court in Smt. Bhagwati Bai v. Bablu alias Mukund 2007 (1) MPHT 25 : AIR 2007 MP 38 (Full Bench), wherein the learned Chief Justice speaking for the Court has stated thus:
A reading of Sub-section (l)(a) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, would show that only a person who has sustained the injury, can file an application for compensation. Further a reading of Sub-section (1)(d) of Section 166 would show that any agent duly authorised by the person injured can also file such application for compensation for injury suffered by such person. Sub-section (l)(c) of Section 166 provides that where death has resulted from the accident, all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased can file an application for compensation and Sub-section (l)(d) of Section 166 provides that a legal representative of the deceased can also file claim where death has resulted from the accident. Thus, in a case of personal injury not resulting in deaths of the legal representative of such person who was injured and who dies subsequently not on account of accident but for some other reason cannot maintain an application for compensation for personal injury sustained in an accident under Sub-section (1) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
16. Before we advert to the realm whether 'Gurubhai' can be regarded as a brother for the purpose of maintaining a claim petition under Section 166 of the Act, it is appropriate to refer to a two Judge Bench decision of the Apex Court rendered in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai : [1987]3SCR404 . In the aforesaid case, the question that emerged for consideration is whether the brother of a person who is killed in a motor vehicle accident can claim compensation in a proceeding instituted before a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal established under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Their Lordships referred to the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846 the initial reformative legislation enacted by British Parliament, the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which came to be passed on 27th of March, 1855 for India, the recommendations of the British Royal Commission, the Fatal Accidents Act, 1959, the 85th Report of the law Commission of India on claims for compensation under Chapter VIII of the Act on which the Parliament declined to take any action which is suggestive of the intendment to confer wider meaning on the expression 'legal representative' and took note of the fact that when the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was enacted there were no motor vehicles on the roads in India; that roads have been rendered by the use of the motor vehicles highly dangerous; that 'hit and run' cases were increasing in number and thereafter analysing the concept of taking insurance policy under the 1939 Act and scanning the anatomy of various provisions of 1939 Act eventually expressed the view as follows (para 9):
Clauses (b) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 110A of the Act provide that an application for compensation arising out of an accident may be made where death has resulted from the accidents by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased or by any agent duly authorized by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. The proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 110-A provides that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. The expression 'legal representative' has not been defined in the Act. Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 defines 'legal representatives as a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. The above definition, no doubt, in terms does not apply to a case before the Claims Tribunal but it has to be stated that even in ordinary parlance the said expression is understood almost in the same way in which it is defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. A legal representative ordinarily means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person or a person on whom the estate devolves on the death of an individual. Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act authorizes all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased to make an application for compensation before the Claims Tribunal for the death of the deceased on account of a motor vehicle accident and Clause (c) of that sub-section authorizes any agent duly authorized by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased to make it. The proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act appears to be of some significance. It provides that the application for compensation shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased. Section 11O-A(l) of the Act thus expressly states that (i) an application for compensation may be made by the legal representatives of the Bedeased Or their agent and (ii) that such application shall be made on be- half of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives. Both the person or persons who can make an application for compensation and the persons for whose benefit such application for compensation can be made are thus indicated in Section 110-A of the Act. This section in a way is a substitute to the extent indicated above for the provisions of Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which provides that 'every such action or suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor, administrator or representatives of the person deceased'. While the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 provides that such suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child of the deceased. Section 10-A(l) of the Act says that the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of the legal representatives of the deceased. A legal representative in a given case, need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent and child. It is further seen from Section 110-B of the Act that the Claims Tribunal is authorized to make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. This provision takes the place of the third paragraph of Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which provides that in every action, the Court may give such damages as it may think proportioned to the loss resulting from such death to the parties respectively for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be brought. Persons for whose benefit such an application can be made and the manner in which the compensation awarded may be distributed amongst the persons for whose benefit the application is made are dealt with by Section 110-A and Section 110-B of the Act and to that extent the provision of the Act do supersede the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 in so far as motor vehicles accidents are concerned. These provisions are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. As the right of action created by the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was 'new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles, in every way new' the right given to the legal representatives under the Act to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is equally new and an enlarged one. This new right cannot be hedged in by all the limitations of an action under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies.
17. It is worthy to note that the Apex Court approved the view taken in the case of Megitbhai Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai : AIR1977Guj195 and observed that the said view is in consonance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience having regard to the conditions of the Indian society inasmuch as every legal representative who suffers on account of death of a person due to motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realization of compensation and that is provided under Sections 110-F of 1939 Act. In that context, the Apex Court proceeded further to lay down : [1987]3SCR404 :
The determination of the compensation payable and its apportionment as required by Section 110-B of the Act amongst the legal representatives for whose benefit an application may be filed under Section 110-A of the Act have to be done in accordance with well-known principles of law. We should remember that in an Indian family brothers, sisters and brothers, children and sometimes foster children live together and they are dependent upon the bread winner of the family and if the bread winner is killed on account of a motor vehicle accident, there is no justification to deny them compensation relying upon the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which as we have already held has been substantially modified by the provisions contained in the Act in relation to cases arising out of motor vehicle accidents. We express our approval of the decision in Megitbhai Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai : AIR1977Guj195 (supra) and hold that the brother of a person who dies in a motor vehicle accident is entitled to maintain a petition under Section 110-A of the Act if he is a legal representative of the deceased.
18. As is manifest, the Apex Court has given a wider meaning to the words 'legal representative' that occurred in Section 110-A of the Act. The same is the position under the 1988 Act. Thus, there is no shadow of doubt that a brother can maintain an application for grant of compensation and at his instance the claim petition is entertainable.
19. The gravamen of the matter is whether the claimant who is not a natural relative of the deceased can be treated as a brother for the purpose of being brought under the penumbra of legal representative under the Act. It is submitted by Mr. Vyas that religious order has its own sacrosanctity and the conception of spiritual brotherhood has been traditionally received acceptation in many parts in India. It is urged by him that charitable trusts and endowments are created and math or debutter is quite in harmony and tune with the Indian religious philosophy.
20. In this context we may fruitfully refer to the fundamental conception of religion. The term 'religion' has not been defined. The Apex Court in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. L.T. Swamiar : [1954]1SCR1005 has observed as under (para 17):
Religion is certainly a matter of faith with individuals or communities and it is not necessarily theistic. There are well known religions in India like Budhism and Jainism which do not believe in God or in any Intelligent First Cause, A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well being, but it would not be correct to say that religion is nothing else but a doctrine or belief. A religion may not only lay down a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are regarded as integral parts of religion, and these forms and observances might extend even to matters of food and dress. : [1954]1SCR1005 .
21. B. K. Mukherjea, J. in his Tagore Law lecture of Hindu Law of Religion and Charitable Trusts had spoken thus:
Now religion is absolutely a matter of faith of individual or communities and does not necessary theistic (e.g. Buddhism). All that we understood by religious purpose is that the purpose or object is to secure the spiritual well being of a person or persons according to the tenets of the particular religion which he or they believe in. This may imply belief in a future state of existence where a man reaps the fruits of his pious act done in this world and it may be connected with the idea of atonement for past errors of a man and that of making peace with his maker.
22. V.K. Varadachari in his book 'The Law of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment has observed thus:
Temples and Matts are two principal institutions of the Hindu religion system. They supplement each other in regard to the spiritual welfare of the persons belonging to that system. While temple afford opportunities for prayer to adoration of the super Being in His various manifestations Mutts exist chiefly for importing of spiritual instructions by preceptors.
23. In Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir AIR 1980 SC 707 the Apex Court while dealing with concept of 'Math' has expressed thus (para 19):
'Math' means a place for the residence of ascetics and their pupils, and the like. Since the time of Sankaracharya, who established Hindu maths, these maths developed into institutions devoted to the teaching of different systems of Hindu religious philosophy, presided over by ascetics, who were held in great reverence as religious preceptors, and princes and noblemen endowed these institutions with large grants of property. Dr. Bijan Kumar Mukherjea in his Tagore Law Lectures on the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts, 4th ed. p. 321 succinctly states:'Math' in ordinary language signifies an abode or residence of ascetics. In legal parlance it connotes a monastic institution presided over by a particular order who generally are disciples or co-disciples of the superior.
24. In this context we may refer with profit to the decision rendered in Sital Das v. Sant Ram : AIR1954SC606 wherein the Apex Court has ruled that (para 20):
It is well known that entrance into a religious order generally operates as a civil death. The man who becomes an ascetic severs his connection with the members of his natural family and being adopted by his preceptor becomes, so to say a spiritual son of the latter. The other disciples of his Guru are regarded as his brothers, while the co-disciples of his Guru are looked upon as uncles and in this way a spiritual family is established on the analogy of a natural family.
25. In Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir AIR 1980 SC 707 (supra), their Lordships have opined as follows (paras 20 and 21):
The property belonging to a 'math' is in fact attached to the office of the mahant, and passed by inheritance to no one who does not fill the office. The head of a math, as such, is not a trustee in the sense in which that term is generally understood, but in legal contemplation he has an estate for life in its permanent endowment and an absolute in the income derived from the offerings of his followers, subject only to the burden of maintaining the institution. He is bound to spend a large part of the income derived from the offerings of his followers on charitable or religious objects. The words 'the burden of maintaining the institution must be understood to include the maintenance of the math, the support of its head and his disciples and the performance of religions and other charities in connection with it, in accordance with usage; See Sammantha Pandara v. Sellappa Chetti (1879) ILR 2 Mad 175; Giyana Sambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Kandasami Tambiran (1887) ILR 10 Mad 375; Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami v. Vidyanidhi Thirtha Swami (1904) ILR 27 Mad 435; Kailasam Pillai v. Natraja Thambiran (1910) ILR 33 Mad 265; Ram Prakash Das v. Anand Das (1916) 43 Ind. App 73 (PC) : AIR 1916 PC 256 and Vidya Varuthi Tirtha v. Baluswami Iyer ILR (1921) 48 Ind App 302 (PC) : AIR 1922 PC 123. From these principles, it will be sufficiently clear that a math is an institutional sanctum presided over by a superior who combines in himself the dual office of being the religious or spiritual head of the particular cult or religious fraternity and of the manager of the secular properties of the institution of the math. In the instant case, the evidence on record sufficiently establishes that a math came to be established at Garwaghat and the building known as 'Bangla Kuti' and certain other building including the house in suit constituted the endowment of the math itself.
26. In Mother Superior Adoration Convent Ranjijammatom v. D.E.O. Kottayam 1977 KLT 303 the Bench after referring to the decision rendered in Shitaldas AIR 1954 SC 606 (supra) has held as under:
This being the general consequence of becoming a monk or nun and joining the Holy Order it has to be taken that with the taking of the perpetual vow the person concerned ceases to have any connection with the members of the natural family. So far as the natural family is concerned, the woman is taken as dead and therefore her parents and other members specified in Rule 79, Part HI KSR are not taken as blood relations thereafter. Consequently even though such category of persons are alive, the legal effect of a person becoming a nun is that she cannot thereafter be considered as having a father or mother or other relatives mentioned in Rule 79.
27. A Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mother Superior S.H. Convent 1994 (2) TAC 341 after referring to the decision in Mother Superior Adoration Convent Ranjiramattom v. D.E.O. Kottayam (supra) has held as under:
The deceased joined the Holy Order of the Sacred Heart Congregation after renouncing her natural family. As soon as she professed the perpetual vow she ceased to be a member of her natural family and became a member of the Holy order. She had embraced a life of poverty, chastity and obedience. The convent became her family and the Mother Superior became the head of the family as well as her legal representative. All her income by way of her salary and other benefits will devolve on the convent of which the Mother Superior is the Administrator. Therefore, the Mother Superior being the head of the convent is entitled to claim compensation on account of the death of the deceased.
28. In Narmadanand v. Board of Revenue, M.P. Gwalior 1994 R.N. 130 a Division Bench of this Court has held as under:
As per Mitakshara Succession under the Hindu Law, the heir to the property of a hermit (Vanaprashtha) is his spiritual brother belonging to the same hermitage, to that of as ascetic (Sanyasi) a virtuous pupil, and to that of a student in theology (Brahmachari) his religious preceptor. These heirs are entitled to succeed in preference to the kindred of the deceased. In default to kindred, the property of a deceased Hindu, who became an ascetic (hermit), even though he be a Sudra, passes to his preceptor; if there be no preceptor, to his disciple; and if there be no disciples to his fellow student. In determining who is the preceptor, a disciple or a fellow student, the Court will only consider the imparting of purely religious instruction. Entrance of a Hindu into a religious order generally operates as a civil death. The man who becomes an ascetic sever his connection with the members of his natural family and being adopted by his preceptor becomes, so to say, a spiritual son of the latter. The other disciples of his Guru are regarded as his brothers, while the co-disciples of his Guru looked upon as uncles and in this way a spiritual family is established on the analogy of a natural family. (See 590 of Chapter 16 of the Mayne's Hindu Law & Usage, 13th Edition).
29. From the aforesaid annunciation of law it is clear as noon day that if a man becomes ascetic and severes all connection with his natural family he becomes the spiritual son of his preceptor and the other disciples of his Guru become his brothers. The whole relationship gets converted to a spiritual relationship. The concept of inheritance is recognised in the religious order and that makes disciples of same Guru as brothers. Be it noted, every Gurubhai cannot become a spiritual brother unless he satisfies the fundamental requirements i.e. becoming an ascetic and severing his connections with his natural family. It is not out of place to take note of the fact that there are many people belonging to a particular cult or sect who call each other 'Gurubhai', when they are 'Grahsthis'. They do not segregate their connections with the family. Their mere calling each other 'Gurubhai', because of a common Guru would not make them spiritual brothers to put forth a claim as legal representatives'. There has to be a distinction between the two categories. There are two 'Ashrams' namely 'Purvaashram' and 'Parasharam' whereby the concept of natural pedigree is lost and there is civil death of the person concerned. Unless that is proven he cannot be conferred the status of a legal representative.
30. In the case at hand there is evidence that claimant was residing in the Ashram. He has changed his name in the traditions of the 'Math'. He has no connection with his natural family. There has been no cross-examination that he had any link with the natural family. In the absence of that we are of the considered opinion that he is the spiritual brother or Gurubhai of the deceased and, therefore, is entitled to maintain an application as legal representative as engrafted and envisaged under Section 166 of the Act.
31. Once we have held that the claimant is entitled to maintain the application, the computation has to follow. The tribunal has recorded the finding that income of the deceased was Rs. 20000/- per year. It has also been held that no damage has been done to the activities of Ashram. Be that as it may, calculation has to take place on the basis of the loss of contribution and entitlement. We are disposed to think that the claimant would be entitled Rs. 12000/- per year. Multiplier of 5 would be applicable. Thus, the amount of compensation would come to Rs. 12000/- x 5 = Rs. 60,000/-. To the aforesaid amount we shall add a sum of Rs. 4,500/- on two heads, namely, loss of estate and funeral expenses. Ergo, the claimant would be entitled to get 64,500/- in toto. The differential sum shall carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of presentation of the application till the date of payment.
Consequently, the appeal is allowed in part. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.