ORDER
1. In these appeals, a common question of law arise for decision, therefore, they are being heard together and a common order is passed.
2. Appellant, M.P. State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the 'Board') being aggrieved by the order dated 20-9-2002 passed in W.P. No. 5138/2002 by the learned Single Judge, has preferred these Letters Patent Appeals.
3. The facts in brief are that on 7-9-2001 eleven years old son of the second respondent, left his home for plucking flowers for 'Pooja' near B.T. Road in front of residence of Asharam Patel. An electric wire was lying by the side of the road. The little boy came in contact of electric wire and died due to electrocution.
4. It was alleged by the parents of the deceased boy that the Board was negligent and a claim petition was filed under Section 6(1) of the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') claiming a compensation of Rs. 2,25,000/-.
5. The first respondent, before whom the claim petition was filed, granted a sum of Rs. 25,000/- under the provisions of the Act. The impugned order of the Collector (Annexure P-3) was unsuccessfully challenged in W.P, No. 5138/2002. That is how the Board is before us in appeal.
6. The learned Counsel for the Board submitted that the definition of the word 'accident' will apply only to a person who is handling hazardous substance and further submitted that the Act will not cover matters pertaining to death due to electrocution.
7. It was further submitted that the liability on the principle of 'no fault' can not apply to the functionaries of the Board.
8. The Board operates throughout the State. Precautions are taken and in spite of precautions if somebody gets electrocuted, it can not be said that any liability can be cast on the Board without proof of negligence.
9. The Act provides for immediate relief to a person affected by accident occurring while handling hazardous substance and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The Act is a beneficial legislation and a liberal interpretation should be given to it. The provisions of the Act clearly enjoin on the owner to insure himself against any loss or liability.
10. Section 4 of the Act stipulates that every owner shall take out, before he starts handling any hazardous substance, one or more insurance policies whereby the owner is insured against any liability under Section 3(1).
11. Section 3(1) of the Act refers to 'no fault liability'. Section 3 of the Act reads as follows :--
3. Liability to give relief in certain cases on principle of no fault-- (1) Where death or injury to any person (other than a workman) or damage to any property has resulted from an accident, the owner shall be liable to give such relief as is specified in the Schedule for such death, injury or damage.
(2) In any claim for relief under Sub-section (1) (hereinafter referred to in this Act as claim for relief), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death, injury or damage in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of any person.
Explanation :-- For the purpose of this section,--
(i) 'Workman' has the meaning assigned to it in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.
(ii) 'Injury' includes permanent total or permanent partial disability or sickness resulting out of an accident.
12. Section 3 of the Act has to be read alongwith the Schedule. The quantum of liability under Section 3 of the Act is specified in the Schedule. The Schedule to Section of the Act reads as follows :--
'(i) Reimbursement of medical expenses incurred to a maximum of Rs. 12,500/- in each case.
(ii) For fatal accidents the relief will be Rs. 25,000/- per person in addition to reimbursement of medical expenses, if any, incurred on the victim up to a maximum of Rs. 12,500/-.
(iii) For permanent total or permanent partial disability or other injury or sickness, the relief will be (a) reimbursement of medical expenses incurred, if any, up to a maximum of Rs. 12,500/- in each case and (b) cash relief on the basis of percentage of disablement as certified by an authorised physician. The relief for total permanent disability will be Rs. 25,000/-.
(iv) For loss of wages due to temporary partial disability which reduces the earning capacity of the victim, there will be a fixed monthly relief not exceeding Rs. 1,000/- per month up to a maximum of 3 months; provided the victim has been hospitalized for a period exceeding 3 days and is above 16 years of age.
(v) Up to Rs. 6,000/-, depending on the actual damage, for any damage to private property.'
13. The total liability in fatal accident is Rs. 25,000/-. Although, we feel that this 'no fault liability' of giving immediate relief to the legal heirs is extremely meager and niggardly the only consolation is Section 8, which provides that no claim is precluded from ascertaining damages in accordance with law under any other law for the time being in force.
14. The fact that claim in any other forum would obviously mean that one has to prove negligence and it is a lengthy and arduous procedure. It has been fairly submitted by the learned Government Advocate that not many people, after moving the Collector under the Act, resort to action for tort for damages. It would have been infinitely better in today's hard times, if the 'no fault liability' was higher than what is stipulated in the Schedule. But Courts can not legislate. It is clear to us that once identity of the legal heirs is determined and the amount is paid in fatal accident, the Collector has no role to play. The purpose of this legislation was to make sure that the owner is cautious in all his dealings and takes sufficient care to protect the interest of the neighbour. In the Rylands v. Fletcher, this principle was clearly adopted by the legislation.
15. The next question that arose for consideration before this Court whether electricity is a hazardous substance Section 2(a) of the Act which defines the word 'accident', reads as follows:--
'2, (a) 'accident' means an accident involving a fortuitous, or sudden or unintended occurrence while handling any hazardous substance resulting in continuous or intermittent or repeated exposure to death of, or injury to, any person or damage to any property but does not include an accident by reason only of war or radio-activity.'
16. The word 'owner' is defined under Section 2(g) of the Act, which reads as follows :--
'2. (g) 'owner' means a person who owns, or has control over handling, any hazardous substance at the time of accident and includes,--
(i) in the case of a firm, any of its partners;
(ii) in the case of an association, any of its members; and
(iii) in the case of a company, any of its directors, managers, secretaries or other officers who is directly in charge of, and is responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company,'
17. The question whether electricity is a hazardous substance or not is no longer res Integra. The Supreme Court in M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumar and Ors., reported in 2002(2) M.P.H.T. 324 (SC) = (2002) 2 SCC 162, has pronounced that the Board would be liable to pay damages in similar circumstances. Although, the Supreme Court in Shall Kumar's case did not deal with the provisions of the Act, it pronounced that in the very nature of such activity of generating electricity, there is a liability cast on the owner which is a 'strict liability'. The Supreme Court in Paras 7 to 13 has held as follows :--
'7. It is an admitted fact that the responsibility supply electric energy in the particular locality was statutorily conferred on the Board. If the energy so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being, who gets unknowingly trapped into it the primary liability to compensate the sufferer is that of the supplier of the electric energy. So long as the voltage of electricity transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension the managers of its supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not remain live on the road as users of such road would be under peril. It is no defence on the part of the management of the Board that somebody committed mischief by siphoning such energy to his private property and that the electrocution was from such diverted line. It is the look out of the managers of the supply system to prevent such pilferage by installing necessary devices. At any rate, if any live wire got snapped and fell on the public road the electric current thereon should automatically have been disrupted. Authorities manning such dangerous commodities have extra duty to chalk out measures to prevent such mishaps.
8. Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as 'strict liability'. It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way i.e., the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he can not be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions.
9. The doctrine of strict liability has its origin in English common law when it was propounded in the celebrated case of Rylands v. Fletcher. Blackburn, J., the author of the said rule had observed thus in the said decision : (All ER P. 7 E-F) 'The true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land, and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.'
10. There are seven exceptions formulated by means of case law to the doctrine of strict liability. It is unnecessary to enumerate those exceptions barring one which is this: 'Act of stranger, i.e., if the escape was caused by the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule does not apply'. (Vide p. 535, Winfield on Tort, 15 Edn.).
11. The rule of strict liability has been approved and followed in many subsequent decisions in England. A recent decision in recognition of the said doctrine is rendered by the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co Ltd. v. Eastern Counties Leather plc. The said principle gained approval in India, and decision of the High Courts are a legion to that effect. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Chamn Lal Sahu v. Union of India and a Division Bench in Gujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai had followed with approval the principle in Rylands v. Fletcher. By referring to the above two decisions a two Judge Bench of this Court has reiterated the same principle in Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.
12. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, this Court has gone even beyond the rule of strict liability by holding that: (SCC p. 421, para 31) Where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm is caused on anyone on account of the accident in the operation of such activity, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate those who are affected by the accident; such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions to the principle of strict liability under the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.
13. In the present case, the Board made an endeavour to rely on the exception to the rule of strict liability (Rylands v. Fletcher) being 'an act of stranger'. The said exception is not available to the Board as the act attributed to the third respondent should reasonably have been anticipated or at any rate its consequences should have been prevented by the appellant/Board. In Northwestern Utilities Ltd. v. London Guarantee and Accident Co. Ltd., the Privy Council repelled the contention of the defendant based on the aforecited exception. In that case a hotel belonging to the plaintiffs was destroyed in a fire caused by the escape and ignition of natural gas. The gas had percolated into the hotel basement from a fractured welded joint in an intermediate pressure main situated below the street level and belonging to the defendants which was a public utility company. The fracture was caused during the construction involving underground work by a third party. The Privy Council held that the risk involved in the operation undertaken by the defendant was so great that a high-degree care was expected of him since the defendant ought to have appreciated the possibility of such a leakage.'
18. Following the aforesaid judgment and for the reasons stated therein, there is no merit in these appeals and the same stand dismissed accordingly. If the amount has not been disbursed, the Collector shall disburse the amount as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order.
No costs.