N.K. Jain, J.
1. Pursuant to the order of Reference, passed on 3-10-97 by one of us. (N.K. Jain, J.) this M.Cr.C. has been placed before us for resolving the question as extracted below :
Whether the High Court can, in an appropriate case, in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., grant permission to the parties to compound a non-com-poundable offence or quash criminal prosecution as a result of such compromise between the parties, to secure ends of justice, keeping in view the statutory bar contained under section 320(9) Cr.P.C.?
2. The applicants herein are facing criminal trial (Criminal Case No. 3771/95 State of M.P. v. Deepak) in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, instituted on a police report, under Sections 406 and 498A, IPC. When the case was fixed for evidence on 30-5-97, an application was filed by respondent No. 3 Smt. Leena Dawar, under Section 320(2) Cr.P.C., for permission to compound the offences against the applicants. The learned trial Magistrate by his order dated 30-5-97, dismissed the application holding that the offences against the applicants are non-compoundable and no permission can, therefore, legally be granted in view of the express bar contained under Sub-section (9) of Sections 320, Cr.P.C. Aggrieved by the said Order, the applicants came up before this Court under sections 482, Cr.P.C. seeking quashment of the proceedings against them.
3. As there was divergence of judicial opinion of various High Courts as also of this High Court, on the question as to whether a non-compoundable offence can be allowed, or directed to be compounded by the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C, the single Bench, vide its order dated 3-10-97 was of the opinion that the question needs to be resolved by a Larger Bench. The matter was accordingly placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice and by his Order the matter has been placed before us for resolving the question, as extracted above.
4. We have heard Shri P. Prasad, learned counsel for applicants and Shri Amit Agrawal, learned counsel for respondent-State.
5. Full Benches of High Courts of Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan have taken a view that no non-compoundable offence under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, can be allowed, or directed to be compounded by the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (see Ghousia 1996 Cri LJ 2973 and Mohan Singh 1993 Cri LJ 3193). However, contrary view is taken by the High Courts of Delhi and Punjab and Haryana (see Vinod Kumar v. State (1993) 4 Cur Cr R 2590; Arvind Bhushan v. Dr. Promilla (1992) 48 Delhi LT 112; Satnam (1993) 1 Crimes 401; and, Jagmohan Singh, (1995) 1 Crimes 616.
6. This Court in Nathu Khan, 1995 (1) MPWN 162, and Bhagwandas 1995 (2) MPWN 47, has allowed compromise in non-compoundable offences. In Ratandeo v. Sitaram (Cr. Rev. No. 136/90decided on the parties were allowed to compound offences under Section 498A and 506-B, by this Court in revision. All these decisions were obviously based on the Supreme Court decision in Mahesh Chandra (AIR 1988 SC 2111) : (1989 Cri LJ 121). However, the decision in Mahesh Chandra's case rested on the plenary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, which is not available to this Court. In neither of the aforesaid decisions the import of Section 320(9) Cr.P.C. was considered.
7. This Court in Criminal Appeal No. 15/91 and Criminal Revision No. 257/90 (reported in 1996 (1) Crimes 203) (State of M.P. v. Saud) heard analogously, has considered the case of Nathu Khan (1995 (1) MPWN 162) (supra), and held :
The jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure either in revision or appeal and the restrictions imposed on the power of Criminal Court in the matter of granting permission to compound is as such applicable to the Court of Magistrate and Court of Sessions Judge as to the High Court. To say that the Supreme Court in a given case adopted a particular course of action is one thing; to say that the High Court or even an inferior criminal Court can do whatever the Supreme Court did is quite a different thing. The jurisdiction of the High Court should be traced to some provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under the scheme of Section 320, no person has right to compound any offence not specifically mentioned therein. I am, therefore, unable to consider the decision of the learned single Judge in Natthu Khan's case as laying down a binding precedent.
8. While making an Order of Reference, the learned single Judge was of the view that decision in Saud's case (1996 (1) Crimes 203) (supra), lays down the correct position of law.
9. Without entering into any detailed discussion, we may state that the controversy now stands resolved by two recent Supreme Court decision in Ram Lal AIR 1999 SC 895 : (1999 Cri LJ 1342) and Surendra Nath Mohanty (1999) 5 SCC 238 : (1999 Cri LJ 3496). In Ram Lal (supra), the Apex Court after referring to its earlier decision in Mahesh Chand (AIR 1988 SC 2111 : (1989 Cri LJ 121) held :
It is apparent that when the decision in Mahesh Chand AIR 1988 SC 2111 : (1989 Cri LJ 121) (supra) was rendered attention of the learned judges was not drawn to the aforesaid legal prohibition. Nor was attention of the learned judges who rendered the decision in Y. Suresh Babu, (1987) 2 JT(SC) 361 (supra) drawn. Hence those were decisions rendered per incuriam. We hold that an offence which law declares to be non-compoundable even with the permission of the Court cannot be compounded at all, The offence under Section 326, IPC is, admittedly, non-compoundable and hence we cannot accede to the request of the learned counsel to permit the same to be compounded.
10. In Surendra Nath Mohanty (1999 Cri LJ 3496) (supra), the Apex Court reiterated the view taken in Ram Lal (1999 Cri LJ 1342) (supra) and observed 'that the course adapted in Ram Pujan v. State of U.P. 1973 SCC (Cri) 870 : (1973 Cri LJ 1612) and, Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan (1989 Cri LJ 121) (supra), was not in accordance with law.
11. The question as posed before us thus, deserves to be answered in negative. We do so and hold that the High Court, in exercise of its inherent powers under section 482, Cr. P.C. cannot grant permission to the parties to compound a non-compoundable offence or quash criminal prosecution as a result of such compromise between the parties. Such a compromise is expressly barred under Sub-section (9) of Section 320, Cr. P.C. The decisions in Nathu Khan, Bhagwandas and Ratandeo (supra), passed by this Court, thus stand overruled.
12. This case shall now be listed before the single Bench for disposal of the Misc. Criminal Case No. 2983/97.