ORDER
Sanjay Yadav, J.
1. Challenge in this writ petition is to an order dated 16-6-2006 passed by First Additional Sessions Judge, Rewa in Criminal Revision No. 157/2008; whereby, the Revisional Court while affirming the order passed by the Appellate Authority under Section 52-A of the Forest Act, 1927, has directed the release of the truck which seized being involved in the forest offence.
2. The facts in nutshell are that the vehicle (truck) bearing No. UP 42/T 2007 on 27-10-2006 was seized at Haddi Hill at Ghateha Beat when the same was found loading metallic stone (gitti) in Compartment No. P-275 of Forest Compartment Barha Koodi, 40 meter inside State of U.P. Border. Forest offence under POR No. 10784/15 was registered and the said vehicle was seized along with implements like jhoomar, spades, hammer etc. used for breaking stones. The Authorised Officer/Sub-Divisional Officer, Rewa, after following the procedure under Section 52 of the Act of 1927, i.e., sending intimation to the Chief Justicial Magistrate, Rewa/Teothar and show-cause notice to the owner and driver of the truck and after recording evidence passed an order of confiscation On 30-11-2007 having the vehicle involved in violating the Sections 30(c), 32, 33(b), 52(1) and (2) of Forest Act, 1927. The said order of confiscation was challenged before the Appellate Authority/Conservator of Forest, Rewa under Section 52-A of the Act of 1927. The Appellate Authority vide order dated 17-3-2008 set aside the order of confiscation and remitted the matter to the Authorised Officer for a fresh decision on merit. This order was subjected to challenge by the respondent invoking Section 52-B of the Act of 1927 by filing Criminal Revision before the First Additional Sessions Judge, Rewa. The Revisional Court while affirming the order of remand passed by the Appellate Authority, directed the petitioner herein to release the vehicle in question on furnishing of bank guarantee of Rs. 50,000/- by the respondent. This order was passed on the ground that the vehicle was wearing away and that the offence was compoundable.
3. The petitioner assails the order on two counts.
4. Firstly, it is urged, that the order passed by the Conservator of Forest being a remand order and not a final order, it was beyond the competence of the Revisional Court to have entertained the revision which is maintainable only when a final order is passed by the Appellate Court. Learned Counsel places reliance on the provisions contained under Section 52-B(1) of the Act of 1927 and Jethanand v. State of M.P. : [1961]3SCR754 , to bring home the submissions that the order is final only when the finality is attached to the proceedings. In the case at hand, the remand order does not decide the dispute finally as would cast jurisdiction upon the Revisional Court. It is accordingly urged that since the revision was not maintainable, the order passed by the Revisional Court is non est in the eyes of law, which it is urged, is liable to be set aside.
5. Secondly, it is contended that the release of vehicle involved in a forest offence should be in the rarest case and not as a matter of course as adopted by the Revisional Court. Reliance is placed on the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. Krishnan : 2000CriLJ3971 and Section Forester and Anr. v. Mansur Ali Khan : AIR2004SC1251 .
6.The learned Counsel for the respondent on his turn has supported the order passed by the Revisional Court, contending, inter alia that, the revision was maintainable and it was within the powers of the Revisional Court to pass an order releasing the vehicle even while upholding the order of remand passed by the Appellate Authority. It is accordingly urged that the petition deserves dismissal.
7. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length.
8. To appreciate the rival contention, worth it will be to note the relevant provisions of the Act of 1927. It is pertinent to note that Sections 52, 52-A, 5-2B and 52-C of the Act of 1927 were substituted by Section 3 of M.P. Act 25 of 1983.
9. Section 52 provides for seizure of property when there is a reason to believe that a forest offence has been committed in respect of any forest produce and a forest produce, as per Section 2(4) and (b)(iv), includes all products of mines and quarries. This Section further provides for the procedure to be adhered to before confiscating such property. Section 52-A makes a provision for appeal against the order of confiscation before the Conservator of Forest/Appellate Authority. Sub-section (6) of Section 52-A stipulates.
52-A. (6) On the date fixed for hearing of the appeal or 'suo motu' action, or on such date to which the hearing may be adjourned, the Appellate Authority shall peruse the record and hear the parties to the appeal if present in person, or through any agent duly authorised in writing or through a legal practitioner, and shall thereafter proceed to pass an order of confirmation, reversal or modification of order of confiscation:
Provided that before passing any final order the Appellate Authority may, if it is considered necessary for proper decision of appeal or for proper disposal of 'suo motu' action, make further inquiry itself or cause it to be made by the Authorised Officer, and may also allow parties to file affidavits for asserting or refuting any fact that may arise for consideration and may allow proof of facts by affidavits.
10. This provision thus empowers the Appellate Authority to pass an order of confirmation, reversal or modification of order of confiscation, thus a finality is attained in respect of the controversy regarding confiscation and in order to achieve this finality the proviso empowers the Appellate Authority to make further enquiry.
Sub-section (7) of Section 52-A stipulates:
52-A. (7) The Appellate Authority may also pass such orders of consequential nature, as it may deem necessary.
11. This provisions empowers the Appellate Authority to also pass such orders of consequential nature, as it may deem necessary. By way of illustration the provisions can be understood to mean that while modifying the order of confiscation the Appellate Authority may by taking aid of Sub-section (4) of Section 52-A to pass an order of interim nature for custody preservation or disposal (if necessary) of the subject-matter of confiscation, as may appear to be just and proper in the circumstances of the case. Or, in case, the Appellate Authority does not propose to exercise the discretion vested in him under proviso to Sub-section (6) to make further enquiry and finds that there is an improper appreciation of evidence on record, may remand the matter by reversing the order of confiscation with a further discretion to the Authorised Officer to pass a fresh order, in accordance with the observation, as in the case at hand, would tantamount to attaching finality to the proceedings before it. The contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the expression 'order of consequential nature' has to carry its shade from the expression 'final order' and the order of remand being not a final order, is misconceived. The basic fallacy in the submissions of learned Counsel for the petitioner creeps in is because of the relevant aspect lost sight of, i.e., while remanding the matter there is a reversal of the order of confiscation, meaning thereby that, the order of confiscation passed by the Authorised Authority is no more in existence, as in the present case.
12. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, there is no force in the contentions raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner that the revision was not maintainable under Section 52-B of the Act of 1927, which stipulates:
52-B. Revision before Court of Sessions against order of Appellate Authority.- (1) Any party to the appeal, aggrieved by final order or by order of consequential nature passed by the Appellate Authority, may within thirty days of the order sought to be impugned, submit a petition for revision to the Court of Sessions within the Sessions division whereof the headquarters of the Appellate Authority are situate.
Explanation: In computing the period of thirty days under the sub-section, the time requisite for obtaining certified copy of order of Appellate Authority shall be excluded.
(2) The Court of Sessions may confirm, reverse or modify any final order or an order of consequential nature passed by the Appellate Authority.
(3) Copies of the order passed in revision shall be sent to the Appellate Authority and to the Authorised Officer for compliance or for passing such further order or for taking such further action as may be directed by such Court.
(4) For entertaining, hearing and deciding a revision under the section, the Court of Sessions shall, as far as may be, exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as it exercises and follows while entertaining, hearing and deciding a revision under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (No. 2 of 1974).
(5) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (No. 2 of 1974), the order of the Court of Sessions passed under this Section shall be final and shall not be called in question before any Court.
13. This takes us to the next argument of the petitioner that the order of releasing the vehicle can be only in rarest of the case and that it was beyond the powers of the Revisional Court to have ordered the release of vehicle. Before examining this issue one aspect has to be kept in mind; in the case at hand, after passing of order by the Appellate Authority, no order of confiscation is in existence and it is only the order of seizure which survives. The Revisional Court records the following findings in respect of exercise its power under Section 52-B(4) which empowers the Court of Session to exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as it exercises and follows while entertaining, hearing and deciding a revision under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The reasons recorded by the Court of Session are:
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14. In the considered opinion of this Court, the Revisional Court did not exceed its jurisdiction while passing an order of releasing the vehicle. Thus the second limb of the arguments of the petitioner also fails. The judgments relied upon by the petitioner in the context turns on their own fact and the principle of law laid down therein are not attracted in the case at hand.
15. In the result petition fails and is hereby dismissed. However, no costs.