Arun Mishra, J.
1. In this petition, petitioner has prayed for quashment of the order (P-13) of his removal from service from the post of Civil Judge, Class-I.
2. Petitioner was appointed as Civil Judge in the year 1983 and was promoted as Civil Judge Class-I in the year 1991. High Court of Madhya Pradesh initiated departmental enquiry as per memo (P-l). Charge-sheet (P-2) was issued containing 14 charges. Statement of imputation (P-3) and enquiry report (P-4) was submitted. Out of 14 charges, 11 charges related to lapse in judicial work. Petitioner filed a reply (P-5). Charge Nos. 7, 9 and 13 were also not proved. Charge No. 1 related to grant of interim injunction in violation of legal principles. Charge No. 2 is with respect to delay in deciding three cases. Charge No. 3 related to passing an order of discharge in a case under Section 307 read with Section 149 of the IPC and instead a charge under Section 326/149 was framed and petitioner proceeded with trial himself. Charge No. 4 related to deciding Criminal Case Nos. 8100/86,187/86 against all cannons of justice and acquitted the accused. Charge No. 5 related to keeping himself present after appointing the Commissioner for local investigation at the spot in the Civil Suit No. 108/1993 and took part in taking measurement which shows undue interest in the case. Charge No. 6 related to purchase of second-hand car from lawyer; Shri Sudhir Pathak, who was practising in his Court and was not merely a press representative which petitioner had claimed in his application for grant of permission for purchase of car. Charge No. 8 related to purchase of a car for Rs. 80,000/- from Anil Deshpande of Indore and obtaining permission by misrepresenting to the High Court. Charge No. 10 related to discharge of accused persons who were alleged to have committed various offences under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 which was not triable by the petitioner. Charge No. 11 related to illegally granting bail in Criminal Case No. 272/91 (State v. Suresh). Charge No. 12 related to Criminal Case No. 232/92 (State v. Narayan and Ors.,) which was a case under Section 326 of the IPC. Petitioner granted bail of which he had no power since that was an offence punishable with imprisonment for life. Charge No. 14 related to awarding inadequate punishment in a case punishable under Sections 338 and 304A of the IPC and those under Section 7 read with Section 16 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, which shows inefficiency or lack of integrity and amounts to grave misconduct.
3. Petitioner has submitted that so far as charges in relation to judicial work are concerned, no party or lawyer has made any grievance. Shri C.S. Gupta has dragged the charges to harass the petitioner malafidely. Committal Court has not to act as a post office, but, to apply his mind. Thus, no misconduct was made out while charge under Section 326 was framed though challan was filed under Section 307, IPC. Acquittals made in Food Adulteration cases were not challenged, non-compliance under Section 13(2) was not the only ground. In civil suit both the parties had prayed for inspection of spot by the petitioner, hence, no misconduct was committed. While in the case in charge No. 10, challan was filed under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, on perusal petitioner found that no offence under the Act was made out. Therefore took cognizance of offence under the Indian Penal Code. May be that entertaining the challan was not strictly legal, but the same was done as per orders of the then District Judge; who had directed that even in those cases, the accused should be committed. Charge No. 11 is incorrect as bail was granted by First Addl. Sessions Judge, Sehore. With respect to charge No. 12 as the police has sought remand of accused for offence under Section 325, IPC, therefore, bail was granted by the petitioner. Latter, while filing the challan, the police converted the offence under Section 325 to one under Section 326 of the IPC.
4. It is further averred that the charge No. 8 relates to purchase of a car from Anil Deshpande of Indore. Anil Deshpande was neither a relation of the petitioner, nor he was concerned with official work of the petitioner. There was no reason to conceal his name and state that purchase was made from Sudhir Pathak. There was no malafide. Petitioner had explained that the car was not purchased for Rs. 80,000/-. The old car did not value more than Rs. 55,000/- for which it was purchased by the petitioner. Preparation of draft of Rs. 80,000/- could be for various reasons. The draft for Rs. 80,000/- was made to accommodate Shri Anil Deshpande, as apparent from statement (P-10) of Rajmal Sethi, charge Nos. 6 and 8 neither show any misconduct on the part of the petitioner nor make his integrity doubtful. The enquiry officer held that the petitioner deliberately concealed the fact that the Sudhir Pathak was an Advocate and petitioner purchased the Car Benami in the name of Shri Sudhir Pathak for Rs. 80,000/-. The enquiry officer later on became the Registrar General of the High Court and it can not be ruled out that he acted as a catalyst to get the end result.
5. A show-cause notice (P-11) was issued as to why the report of enquiry officer be not accepted. Petitioner filed reply (P-12). However, the High Court accepted the finding of the report and recommended the respondent No. 1 that punishment of removal be awarded. Accordingly order of removal (P-13) was passed by the State of Madhya Pradesh. It is submitted that the penalty of removal is disproportionate to the gravity of the alleged misconduct and as such it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Proposed punishment was not intimated. Passing of judicial order can not be misconduct. Finding the car was purchased for Rs. 80,000/- is based on no evidence. Charge Nos. 6 and 8 are not made out and integrity of petitioner can not be doubted on that basis.
6. A return has been filed by the respondent No. 2; High Court of Madhya Pradesh. It is contended in the return that when the inspection of petitioner's work was done, several irregularities and grave lapse were found in the judicial orders. Inspection note (R-l) was submitted by the District Judge, Sehore on 6-12-1993. A DO (R-2) was written to the High Court on 10-12-1993 by the District Judge. District Judge (Vigilance), Indore Zone was appointed as enquiry officer. Petitioner was afforded full opportunity of defence in the enquiry. Witnesses were examined to prove the charges. Enquiry officer submitted his report. Charges except Nos. 7, 9 and 13 were found to be proved. Administrative Committee considered the matter and ordered issuance of a show-cause notice. Resolution (R-3) was passed on 27-1-1997. Petitioner submitted a reply. Matter was again placed before the Administrative Committee on 8-4-1997. The Administrative Committee resolved that the report of the enquiry officer be accepted and the petitioner be removed from service. Then the matter was placed before the Full Court in its meeting held on 17-4-1997. Having considered the report and the reply, Full Court resolved that the report of the enquiry officer be accepted and a major penalty of removal from service be imposed upon him. The enquiry has been held in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. Petitioner was afforded due and proper opportunity of hearing. There was no irregularity or illegality. The punishment does not call for any interference, by way of judicial review. Petitioner has virtually sought for reappraisal of evidence. Degree of proof as required in the matter of departmental enquiry is not as is required in criminal prosecution. Petitioner possessed of atleast 10 years of experience as a judicial officer. He was expected to know the substantive law atleast besides the procedural law. When a civil suit for injunction was filed against the body corporate or Municipal Corporation and temporary injunction was sought for stopping the public work, there was no such eminent urgency that without issuing the show cause notice to the Municipal Corporation temporary injunction was granted. Similarly, when in a civil matter, the Commissioner had been directed to be appointed, for spot inspection, it was wholly unnecessary on the part of the petitioner as a judicial officer to go himself to the spot at the time of the spot inspection and to take part in taking measurement. This was no part of his duly, but, certainly an act beyond his judicial work giving inference to the effect that he was otherwise interested in the matter. Similarly, when the police had filed a criminal case in his Court under the provisions of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, he should have atleast looked into the bare provisions of law and should have seen that it was not triable by Judicial Magistrate First Class, but, was exclusively triable by Special Court (Sessions Court) established under Section 14 of the Act. The petitioner not only granted bail illegally to the accused persons but also discharged the accused persons from the various offences under the above Act. This was an act of serious misconduct in the discharge of his duties as Judicial Officer. Not only in one case but in as many as eight cases, petitioner discharged the accused persons. Anr. instance of ignorance of law or a deliberate act on his part is to discharge the person accused of offence under Section 307 of the IPC which was also exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions and the Court of Sessions alone could have passed the order of discharge. Similarly, the petitioner granted bail for offence under Section 326, IPC in which he had no power to grant bail since the offence was punishable with imprisonment for life. Thus, several instances were brought to the notice to the High Court which led to an inference that either the petitioner was totally ignorant of the bare provisions of law or he deliberately did all these acts during the discharge of his duties as a Judicial Officer, which was wholly an act unbecoming of a Judicial Officer. It also led to an inference that he seriously lacked devotion to his duties and was absolutely inefficient. Shri C.S. Gupta had no role to play. He was neither the enquiry officer nor the competent authority to take a decision in the disciplinary proceedings.
7. Shri A.D. Deoras, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that grant of injunction without following the procedure under Order 39, Rule 3 (b) can not be said to be a case of misconduct. He has further submitted that there was delay in delivery of judgment beyond 15 days in three cases which stood explained. The delivery of judgment beyond 15 days could not have been treated as misconduct. He has submitted with respect to charge No. 3 that though the challan was filed under Section 307/149, IPC. Charge was framed under Section 326/149, IPC. Since there was fracture of ulna bone, the petitioner discharged the accused under Section 307 and framed the charge under Section 326 of the IPC. The Magistrate as a Committal Court has not to act as post office. With respect to acquittal in Food Adulteration cases, it can only be said that he was not aware of the Full Bench decision of this Court, hence, it can not be said to be a case of misconduct. The petitioner was present on the spot at the time of inspection with the consent of both the parties. Thus, it can not be said to be a case of misconduct. Charge No. 10 relates to discharge of accused persons in certain cases of offences under the provision of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. These orders were passed in the year 1991-92, when the legal position was fluid whether charge-sheet was to be filed before the Sessions Court or the case was to be committed by Committal Court. As Committal Court does not act as post office, he could therefore rightly say that ingredients of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 arc missing. Even if error was made by the Judge, it can not be said to be a misconduct. In Criminal Case No. 272/1991 the order of discharge was proper as the Committal Court does not act as post office and bail was granted in a case under Section 326 of the IPC. Police has sought remand under Section 325 of the IPC and challan was filed under Section 326 of the IPC. Charge No. 14 related to punishment awarded in several cases prior to 1980. Lesser sentence was awarded which itself can not constitute misconduct. With respect to charge Nos. 6 and 8 he has submitted that the foundation of charge No. 6 is knocked down by charge No. 8 which alleges that the car was purchased from Anil Deshpande of Indore. There was no question of concealing the fact that Sudhir Pathak was a practising lawyer. The car was purchased for Rs. 55,000/- and Draft of Rs. 80,000/- was given to Anil Deshpande to accommodate him. At worst fault may be found that the petitioner did not inform the High Court that Sudhir Pathak was a lawyer. It is not a misconduct to invite punishment of removal from service. He has thus, submitted that the misconduct is not made out and punishment of removal from service is disproportionate.
8. Shri V.S. Shroti, learned Sr. Counsel appearing with Shri A.P. Shroti for respondent No. 2 has made a serious endeavour to make out that it was a case of reckless act in discharge of duty and clear case of misconduct. Petitioner did not observe basic provisions of law and acted in most arbitrary fashion. Thus, overall view which has been taken can not be faulted in the instant case. Petitioners discharged accused person in several cases in which he had no right to try the offence. The act amounts to gross misconduct. Charge Nos. 6,8 also indicates that the petitioner deliberately concealed the fact of purchase of benami car in the name of an Advocate practising in his Court. Car was purchased for a different amount and wrong information as to amount was submitted. Petitioner submitted false information before the High Court and suppressed material fact. It was highly improper when dealing was with an Advocate to conceal it.
9. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has mainly submitted that the charges relating to discharge of judicial function can not amount to misconduct. He has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Union of India and Ors. v. J. Ahmed, AIR 1979 SC 1022. The Apex Court has laid down that the disciplinary proceeding can be held against a member of the service for any act or omission which renders him liable to a penalty and such penalty can be imposed for good and sufficient reasons. All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1954, prescribe a code of conduct for members of service. Discipline and Appeal Rules provide for disciplinary action and imposition of penalties. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 of the Rules contemplates a situation where a member of service against whom disciplinary proceeding is pending is likely to retire, the proceedings may be thwarted. Rule provides for his retention in service beyond the date of his retirement till the completion of the inquiry, provided the delinquent officer is under suspension on a charge of misconduct. The inhibitions in the Conduct Rules clearly provide that an act or omission contrary thereto so as to run counter to the expected code of conduct would certainly constitute misconduct. Some other act or omission may as well constitute misconduct. Lack of efficiency, failure to attain the highest standard of administrative ability while holding a high post would not themselves constitute misconduct. There may be negligence in performance of duty and a lapse in performance of duty or error of judgment in evaluating the developing situation may be negligence in discharge of duty but would not constitute misconduct unless the consequences directly attributable to negligence would be such as to be irreparable or the resultant damage would be so heavy that the degree of culpability would be very high.
10. Thus, Counsel for the petitioner submitted that error of judgment or negligence can not be a ground to initiate the departmental action. He has further relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Rasiklal Vaghajibhai Patel v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and Anr., AIR 1985 SC 504, in which it has been laid down that before punishing it is necessary that an act or omission is prescribed as misconduct, it is not open to the employer to fish out some conduct as misconduct and punish the workman even though the alleged misconduct would not be comprehended in any of the enumerated misconduct.
11. He has further relied on Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India and Ors. , AIR 1999 SC 2881, in which it has been laid down that to maintain any charge-sheet against a quasi judicial authority something more has to be alleged than a mere mistake of law, e.g., in the nature of some extraneous consideration influencing the quasi judicial order. If every error of law were to constitute a charge of misconduct, it would impinge upon the independent functioning of quasi judicial officers like the appellant. Negligence has to be culpable negligence not simple, carelessness, inadvertence or omission. A wrong interpretation of law can not be a ground for misconduct. It is different matter all together if actuated by malafides.
12. He has further relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Dr. Ram Ashray Yadav v. Bihar Public Commission, AIR 2000 SC 1448, in which the Apex Court has laid down that the charges against the Chairman of Public Service Commission related to misbehaviour showing special favour in matter of selection of wife of personal assistant to Chief Minister by suppressing academic marks of better candidate, instigating State Govt. to file false affidavit before Supreme Court, reducing Commission to status of private company and impropriety of using telephone facilities. There was, however, no indictment of Chairman in his individual capacity insofar as first three charges are concerned. Amount spent for using telephone facilities was within sanctioned amount. On facts the Apex Court has observed that though the Chairman did not exhibit exemplary behaviour or conduct expected of Chairman the aforesaid act can not be said to be such which amount to misbehaviour and removal was not warranted.
13. The misconduct with respect to the quasi judicial/judicial function has been considered in Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan, (1993) 2 SCC 56, if an officer has taken a decision in quasi judicial function, officer is not immune from disciplinary proceedings. 'The conduct of the officer in discharge of his duties and not correctness or legality of his decision is subject to disciplinary action'. The charges against ITO was of completion of income tax assessments in irregular and hasty manner with a view to confer undue favour upon assessees without maintaining absolute integrity and devotion to duty and exhibiting conduct unbecoming of a Govt. servant. It was held by the Apex Court that Govt. was not precluded from taking disciplinary action against respondent K.K. Dhawan. The observations in V.D. Trivedi v. Union of India, (1993) 2 SCC 55 were explained and limited and it was held that same may not be construed as laying down the law that in no case disciplinary action could be taken if it pertains to exercise of juridical powers.
14. The decision in K.K. Dhawan (supra) has been considered in P.C. Joshi v. State of UP. and Ors. , AIR 2001 SC 2788. The Apex Court has laid down that the test to be adopted in the case of judicial officer in Departmental Enquiry in Para 5 thus :-
'5. The test to be adopted in such case is as stated by this Court in the cases of Union of India v. A.N. Saxena, (1992) 3 SCC 124: (1992 AIR SCW 1336 : AIR 1992 SC 1333) and Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan, (1993) 2 SCC 56 : AIR 1993 SC 1478. In K.K Dhawan's case (supra), this Court indicated the basis upon which a disciplinary action can be initiated in respect of a judicial or a quasi judicial action as follows :-
(i) where the judicial officer has conducted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or devotion to duty;
(ii) that there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty;
(iii) that if he has acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers;
(iv) that if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party;
(v) that if he had been actuated by corrupt motive.'
Thus, it is clear that the Apex Court laid down that the judicial officer has to conduct in a manner where the judicial officer has conducted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or devotion to duty, act shows recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty or he has acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers or he acted in order to unduly favour a party or he had been actuated by corrupt motive, departmental enquiry can be held. These elements are present in the instant case.
15. In Govt. of Tamilnadu v. K.N. Ramamurthy, (1997) 7 SCC 101, the allegation against the delinquent was while exercising quasi judicial power as Dy. Commercial Tax Officer acted negligently and caused loss to public exchequer, there was failure to exercise quasi judicial power properly and negligence in making assessment of levy. The Tribunal or the Court can interfere only if on the charges (read with imputation or particulars of the charges, if any) no misconduct or other irregularity alleged can be said to have been made out, or the charges framed are contrary to any law.
16. Thus, in my opinion, judicial officer is not totally immune from discipline action and in the circumstances enumerated in the above decision enquiry can be held against him.
17. Coming to the instant case, question is whether the petitioner was discharging the duties in most reckless or improper manner as has been found by the enquiry officer in report (P-4). At the outset it may be stated that even though the charge No. 2 of delivering the judgments beyond 15 days may not amount misconduct, however, there are certain charges which makes out that the petitioner has been rightly found guilty of misconduct. It may also be stated with respect to charge relating to keeping himself present after appointing the Commissioner on the spot may also not amount to misconduct, but, it was not proper exercise of jurisdiction by the petitioner to order his own presence when the Commissioner was appointed.
18. There are other serious charges which go to show that the petitioner has not only purchased a Car for Rs. 80,000/-, benami in name of an advocate practicing in his Court, there are also serious charges found established in exercise of judicial function. Charge Nos. 6 and 8 are first taken up for consideration which did not relate to the exercise of judicial power. Charge No. 6 related to purchase of a car from Sudhir Pathak who is admittedly an Advocate and he was shown to be a journalist in the application filed before the High Court, Car was purchased from Anil Deshpande for Rs. 80,000/- and wrong fact of purchase for Rs. 55,000/- was informed to the High Court. It was not disputed at the stage of enquiry that the petitioner had purchased the Car from Shri Sudhir Pathak, Advocate. Value of the Car was shown to be Rs. 55,000/- in the application (A-l) submitted for obtaining permission to the High Court. Information (Ex. A-2) was sent by the petitioner and Shri Sudhir Pathak was shown as correspondent and was shown to be not connected with official function. Letter (A-3) was also written by Shri Alakh Sinha in which it is mentioned that Sudhir Pathak has got prepared Demand Draft for Rs. 80,000/- for payment to Shri Anil Deshpande for the purchase of Car, it was also not disputed that Shri Alakh Sinha petitioner had purchased Car from Sudhir Pathak and had shown it to be worth of Rs. 55,000/-. Petitioner very well knew that Sudhir Pathak was practicing Advocate in his Court and he had purchased the Car benami in the name of Shri Sudhir Pathak for Rs. 80,000/-. It has been found by the enquiry officer that a sum of Rs. 80,000/- was paid to Shri Anil Deshpande and Sudhir Pathak was practising Advocate in the Court. Deliberately a wrong information was sent to the High Court. Sudhir Pathak has stated that the petitioner had called him to his house and petitioner asked him to purchase the car from Anil Deshpande in his name as he had not obtained the permission so far from the High Court. As soon as the permission was obtained, he would get the car transferred in his own name. Statement of Sudhir Pathak has been relied upon in support thereof. Enquiry Officer has relied upon a bank Demand Draft for Rs. 80,000/-. Further it has been found that when the car was purchased from Anil Deshpande for a sum of Rs. 80,000/-. Petitioner has shown its purchase for a sum of Rs. 55,000/- to the High Court. Sudhir Pathak was not in a financial position to purchase a car, as to his financial status Sunil Sethi (D.W. 2) has also stated. It has also come in the evidence of Shri Sudhir Pathak that Shri Rajmal Sethi, Shri Alakh Sinha along with him and he had gone to Indore for purchase of the car. Thus, charge Nos. 6 and 8 have been rightly found to be established of purchase of a car benami in the name of Shri Sudhir Pathak from Anil Deshpande submitting wrong information to the High Court and suppressing correct information as to status of Shri Sudhir Pathak.
19. Clause (3) of Sub-rule (2a) of Rule 19 of the M.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965 provides that every Government servant shall report to the prescribed authority every transaction entered into by him either in his own name or in the name of a member of his family in respect of movable property, if the value of such property exceeds Rs. 5,000.00 (Five thousands) and it is further provided that the previous sanction of the prescribed authority shall be obtained by the Government servant, if any, such transaction is with a person having official dealings with him. Clause (3) of Sub-rule (2a) of Rule 19 is quoted below:-
'19. Movable, Immovable and valuable property.-
(2a)....................................
(3) Every Government servant shall report to the prescribed authority every transaction entered into by him either in his own name or in the name of a member of his family in respect of movable property, if the value of such property exceeds Rs. 5,000.00 in the case of a Government servant holding any Class I or Class II post or Rs. 1500.00 in the case of a Government servant holding any Class III or Class IV post:
Provided that the previous sanction of the prescribed authority shall be obtained by the Government servant, if any, such transaction is with a person having official dealings with him.'
Thus, it is clear that the petitioner had dealing not only with an Advocate, but, purchased a car benami in the name of an Advocate and suppressed the fact that he had purchased the car from an Advocate. It was purchased benami in the name of Sudhir Pathak Advocate from Shri Anil Deshpande, thus, petitioner failed to obtain the previous sanction of the prescribed authority as the transaction was with a person having official dealing with him. Shri Sudhir Pathak was having official dealing with him, was practising Advocate in the Court. Thus, suppressing the fact and purchasing the car, in addition showing the purchase of car for Rs. 55,000/- and making payment of Rs. 80,000/- by the petitioner to Shri Anil Deshpande. Purchasing it benami initially in the name of Shri Sudhir Pathak and then getting it transferred from Sudhir Pathak showing its purchase from Journalist for a sum of Rs. 55,000/- was clearly an act in breach of mandatory Rule 19 (2a) (3) and has been rightly held to be a case of misconduct.
20. In discharge of the judicial power correctness of the orders passed by the petitioner is not subject-matter of the enquiry, but, his conduct while passing such an order, whether he was discharging the duty in reckless manner or such a manner so as to infer that act was improper or unbecoming of a judicial officer. Petitioner has discharged the accused persons in several cases in which Court had no right of trial. In Criminal Case No. 322/92 challan was filed under Sections 307, 148, 149 and 326 of the IPC and the petitioner had no right to try the offence and still discharged the accused while appreciating the evidence which was not at all permissible, is not a case of wrong exercise of power. Petitioner was passing such orders consistently in number of cases. The inference has been drawn by the enquiry officer of improper conduct and motive. Petitioner ought to have known the basic law that it was not open to him to appreciate the evidence in the case in which he had no right to try and discharge the accused persons in several cases. Process of committal of cases was also not followed, inference of misconduct and improper motive has been drawn which can not be said to be a perverse finding. Apart from that the petitioner has discharged the accused persons in the number of cases under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Petitioner had no jurisdiction to discharge the accused persons as he had no right to make the trial. The enquiry officer has rightly drawn the inference of improper conduct, such an offence is triable by Special Court. Petitioner had no right to conduct the trial, is not in dispute. Filing of the challan in his Court, can not give right the petitioner to deal with the cases in cavalier fashion. Enquiry officer has discussed in detail the various cases in which such orders were passed and has come to the conclusion that no such finding was recorded that such a case under Prevention of Atrocities Act, was not made out. He had no right to consider the merits and demerits of the case which was function of the Special Court. In the case No. 372/91 it was also found established that the challan was filed under Section 307/34, IPC. Petitioner appreciated the evidence and without following the procedure of committal, framed the charges under different section and discharged the accused under Section 307, IPC. Charge No. 12 relates to releasing the accused persons on bail under Section 326 of the IPC. Charge-sheet was filed on 19-6-1992 under Section 326, IPC. The defence that remand was sought under Section 325 of the IPC has been considered by the enquiry officer. Case was registered under Section 326, IPC. Fact was brought to the notice of the Court. Petitioner granted bail mentioning that in case offence under Section 326, IPC is ultimately found, bail will be cancelled and still did not make any efforts when challan was filed under Section 326, IPC to cancel the bail. It was also not found by the petitioner that offence under Section 326, IPC was not made out while granting the bail. Apart from above petitioner has been found guilty of passing orders in flagrant violation of law contrary to the Full Bench decision of this Court in Prevention of Food Adulteration Act cases. Charge No. 4 has been found to be established. In addition, it has been found that the petitioner did not impose minimum punishment in several cases which have been found established while dealing charge No. 14. From the overall conduct of the petitioner, it can be inferred that his orders/acts were highly reckless and amounted to culpable negligence. It was not a mere case of negligence and misconduct has been rightly found established. In totality of the circumstances of the case taking cumulative effect of the nature of orders which were passed, petitioner acted in most derogatory fashion. Thus, in my opinion he has been rightly found guilty of misconduct by the enquiry officer. Scope of interference in the conclusion of finding recorded in a departmental enquiry is limited and this Court can not reassess the evidence.
21. In the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer during the course of departmental enquiry, scope of interference is available only in certain circumstances. It is not open to this Court to appreciate the evidence and record the conclusions different from that of disciplinary authority considering facts and circumstances of the case. No interference can be made even if the Court considers that another view is also possible. It is laid down by the Apex Court in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi, (1991) 2 SCC 716. Similar is the law laid down in Anil Kapoor (Dr.) v. Union of India, (1988) 9 SCC 47. Until and unless finding is perverse, even if another view is possible, no interference can be made by a Court. If there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is the law laid down by the Apex Court in High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416 - AIR 2000 SC 22.
22. In Bank of India and Anr. v. Degala Suryanarayana, AIR 1999 SC 2407, the Apex Court has laid down that strict rules of evidence are not applicable. The only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent officer must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravamen of the charge against the delinquent officer. Mere conjecture or surmises can not sustain the finding of guilt even in departmental enquiry proceedings. The Court exercising the jurisdiction of judicial review would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings excepting in a case of malafides or perversity, i.e., where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that finding. The Court can not embark upon reappreciating the evidence or weighing the same like an appellate authority. So long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained.
23. Apex Court in High Court of Judicature, Bombay v. Udaysingh and Ors. , (1997) 5 SCC 129, has laid down that technical rules of evidence and proof beyond doubt are not applicable to departmental enquiry. Preponderance of probabilities and conclusions drawn as a reasonable man from evidence on record are sufficient for the purpose, of departmental enquiry. It has been further laid down by the Apex Court that acceptability of judgment of a judicial officer depends upon confidence which litigating public reposes it gets shaken where there is lack of integrity and character. In K.K. Dhawan (supra), the order was passed in irregular and hasty manner and with a view to confer undue favour, hence, the delinquent was held guilty.
24. Coming to the next argument raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner on the strength of decision rendered in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 2386, in which it has been laid down as under :-
'9. Re: contention (d): Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the 'decision making process'. The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court-Martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender.
It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court-Martial, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, (1984) 3 WLR 1174 (HL), Lord Deplock said :-
'......Judicial Review has I think, developed to a stage today when without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds upon which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call 'illegality', the second 'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety'. That is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of 'proportionality' which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community.....'
In Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 454, this Court held:-
'It is equally true that the penalty imposed must be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct and that any penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct would be violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.'
The point to note and emphasise is that all powers have legal limits.
In the present case the punishment is so strikingly disproportionate as to call for and justify interference. It can not be allowed to remain uncorrected in judicial review.
25. He has further relied upon the decision of Apex Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Giriraj Sharma, AIR 1994 SC 215, in which it has been laid down that when an employee has overstayed the leave and application was rejected and there was no willful intention to flout the order, the Apex Court held that the punishment of dismissal was harsh and disproportionate. The said decision has no applicability to the facts of the instant case.
26. Counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Ors. v. Mahesh Kumar Mishra and Ors. , AIR 2000 SC 1151, wherein it has been held that it is not, that the High Court can, in no circumstances, interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee after disciplinary proceedings. Not only Supreme Court but also the High Court can interfere with the punishment inflicted upon the delinquent employee if, that penalty, shocks the conscience of the Court.
27. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is limited and confined to the applicability of one or other of the well-known principles known as Wednesbury Principles. Lord Greene in the Wednesbury case has laid down that if the order is contrary to law or relevant factors were not considered or the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken and the action is arbitrary, Court can examine in the proportionality. If the action is irrational and not based on sound reason and it can be described as unreasonable under Article 14. In the facts of the instant case even applying the principles of secondary review and applying the Wednesbury's Principles, it can not be said that the discretion exercised by the administrative authority on facts found caused excessive infringement of the rights. The facts makes out the misconduct which has compelled the Court to take action on administrative side.
28. In my opinion, the punishment has been inflicted can not be said to be disproportionate or such which shocks the conscience of the Court. Considering the nature of the orders which were passed in large number of cases, and he has also been found guilty to other misconduct than discharge of judicial duty, which were also serious in nature.
29. Resultantly, in my opinion, no case for interference is made out. Writ petition is devoid of merits and is dismissed. No costs.