Shantanu Kemkar, J.
1. The appellant has filed this appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the order dated 15th March, 2001 passed by the learned VIth Additional District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 5-A/2001.
2. Brief facts necessary for disposal of this appeal are as follows:--
The appellant filed a civil suit against the respondent for declaration and injunction praying for following reliefs :--
'A. A decree be passed declaring that the arbitration proceeding be initiated by the defendant at Chennai is illegal and void and further a decree for permanent injunction be passed restraining the defendant taking any steps towards initiation of arbitration proceedings as mentioned in notice dated 16-12-2000.
B. Any other relief which being and appropriate under the circumstances of the case be passed along with cost of the suit.'
3. By way of interim relief the appellant filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying that the defendant/respondent be injuncted from initiating the arbitration proceedings as mentioned in the notice dated 16-12-2000 at Chennai against the plaintiff/appellant.
4. The respondent was noticed by the Trial Court, and it filed its reply to the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and also tiled an application raising preliminary objection about the maintainability of the suit.
5. The Trial Court after hearing the parties on the aforesaid applications, i.e., application tor grant of injunction as well as on the application about the maintainability of the suit, held that the appellant/plaintiff was not entitled for any interim relief. The learned Trial Judge further held that the suit itself was not maintainable and accordingly dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/appellant. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of dismissal of the suit, the appellant has filed the present appeal.
6. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the record, we are of the opinion that the appeal is sans merit.
7. Admittedly, the parties have entered into a hire-purchase agreement which stipulates a condition which is as under:--'Condition No. 16:
16. It is agreed between the parties that in case of any dispute arising under this Agreement the same shall be referred to an Arbitrator at the option of the Owner. The Arbitrator shall be nominated by the Owner and the award of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding on all the parties concerned, including the Guarantor. The venue of such arbitration shall be at Chennai. It is further agreed that in the event of said Arbitrator dying or being unable to act for any reason, the owner shall be entitled to appoint in his place another Arbitrator who shall be entitled to resume the said arbitration proceedings from the stage at which it was left by his predecessor.'
8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that he being an unemployed graduate took loan for purchasing a truck from the respondent, the respondent seized the truck because he was not repaying loan amount which is impermissible in law. His further submission is that the notice for initiation of the arbitration proceedings at Chennai is illegal because the transaction was held at Jabalpur. Further submission of the learned Counsel is that even if there is any agreement for arbitration that became extinct no sooner the respondent than has taken the step for seizing and selling the truck of the appellant and hence for the purpose of taking further steps in the matter a fresh agreement or proceeding ought to have been initiated as there was novation of contract.
9. Shri Pratul Shandilya, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent has submitted that in view of the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of P. Anand Gajapathi Raju and Ors. v. P.V.G. Raju (Dead) and Ors., (2000) 4 SCC 539 : 2000 Arb. W.LJ. 377 (SC), the suit filed by the appellant has rightly been held to be not maintainable by the Court below.
10. It is not disputed that there was a hire purchase agreement which contain the condition that the parties in case of any dispute shall refer such dispute to an Arbitrator nominated by the owner. Section 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') provides thus:--
'Extent of Judicial Intervention.-- Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part.' Section 8 of the said Act provides as under :--
'Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement.-- (1) A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration.
(2) The application referred to in Sub-section (1) shall not be entertained, unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof.
(3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made under Sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made.'
11. From the plain reading of the aforesaid provisions of the Act it is amply clear that the appellant has filed a suit about a dispute which is covered under the agreement of hire purchase and as per Clause 16 of the hire purchase agreement entered into between the parties, the disputes must be referred to the Arbitrator. In view of Sections 5 and 8 of the Act not only the Civil Court but all the judicial authorities are restrained from intervening in the matters governed by Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 except where so provided in Part I. The Apex Court in the judgment referred to above in Paragraph 4 was ruled thus :--
'4, Part I of the new Act deals with domestic arbitrations. Section 5, which is contained in Part I of the new Act, defines the extent of judicial intervention in arbitration proceedings. It says that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by Part I, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in that Part. Section 5 brings out clearly the object of the new Act namely, that of encouraging resolution of disputes expeditiously and less expensively and when there is an arbitration agreement, the Court's intervention should be minimal.....'
12. The submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that since the entire amount has been realised by the respondent by way of seizure and sale of the truck, the agreement comes to an end and thereby there is novation of contract which enables the Civil Court to adjudicate the lis in question. The appellant who is bound by the hire purchase agreement is free to demonstrate before the Arbitrator as how he has paid the entire dues and if such evidence is produced before the Arbitrator, certainly the Arbitrator will look into it, because such dispute would also fall within the domain of the Arbitrator. If such disputes as has been sought to be raised by the appellant are allowed to be entertained by the Civil Court, the very purpose of the arbitration agreement would be frustrated. The entire scheme of the Act provides for challenge only to the arbitration award by taking recourse to Section 34 of the Act but not otherwise and, therefore, the Trial Court has rightly refused to entertain the suit for declaration and injunction holding it to be not maintainable, in view of the existence of arbitration clause in the hire purchase agreement.
13. In view of the aforesaid premises we are of the considered opinion that the appeal is devoid of merit and the same is accordingly dismissed. Parties to bear their respective costs throughout.