K.L. Issrani, J.
1. This is an appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') against the award dated 12.3.1987, passed in Claim Case No. 21 of 1986 by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Bilaspur.
2. The appellant had filed a claim petition under Section 110-A of the Act before the Claims Tribunal, Bilaspur, claiming Rs. 60,000/- on account of the death of her husband, late Hanuman Prasad Agrawal, due to rash and negligent driving by respondent No. 2, Pritam Singh, who was driver of truck No. MTG 3178. The truck is owned by respondent No. 1, firm. It is insured with respondent No. 3, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Respondent No. 4, Gyarsilal, is the son of late Hanuman Prasad. Respondent Nos. 2 and 4 remained ex parte before the Claims Tribunal.
3. Case of the appellant is that her husband Hanuman Prasad was working as Munim with the respondent No. 1. In the intervening night of 31.5.1984 and 1.6.1984 he was crushed by the truck No. MTG 3178, which was being driven by respondent No. 2, Pritam Singh, rashly and negligently. Consequently, he died on account of the said accident on 1.6.1984 at about 7 a.m. The age of the deceased on the date of accident was 50 years. He was earning Rs. 700/- per month. He could have lived at least upto 70 years. She, therefore, claimed an amount of Rs. 60,000/-.
4. The respondent No. 1 has admitted the material facts pleaded by the appellant. The respondent Nos. 2 and 4 remained ex parte. The respondent No. 3, insurance company, disputed the age and income of the deceased and also the entitlement of the appellant to claim the compensation. Regarding accident it was pleaded by respondent No. 3 that the deceased was standing by the side of the cabin and was giving direction to the respondent No. 2, driver, for reversing the truck. Suddenly he fell down and was crushed.
5. The Claims Tribunal found that Hanuman Prasad died due to rash and negligent driving by respondent No. 2, Pritam Singh. The story of the accident put up by the respondent No. 3 was accepted, but the claim petition was dismissed with costs. According to the Claims Tribunal the claimant is not entitled to the claim because the accident took place in the premises of the mill, which was not a public place. The quantum to which the claimant would have been entitled has not been assessed. Aggrieved by the award, the claimant has filed the present appeal.
6. According to the appellant, the learned Claims Tribunal was wrong in not granting anything either against insurance company or the owner of the truck. According to her even in such type of cases, the insurance company is also liable. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 has opposed the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant and supported the award passed by the Claims Tribunal.
7. The first point which is to be seen is, as to whether the place where the accident took place [Sic. is covered by the definition of 'public place' under Section 2 (24) of the Act] and the liability of the respondents, owner, driver and insurance company. According to the claim petition, the accident took place at about 4 a.m. when deceased Hanuman Prasad was sleeping in the courtyard of Shanker Rice Mill, owned by respondent No. 1. This fact is admitted by the respondent No. 1 while respondent No. 3 has denied that the deceased died as a sequel to the rash and negligent driving of the said truck, while backing it, but according to this respondent Hanuman Prasad was giving directions to the respondent No. 2 for backing the truck in the mill premises. He tried to get in the cabin of the truck. However, he slipped and could not grip the handle near the door of the cabin. He fell down and consequently came under the front wheel of the truck. According to this respondent since accident took place in the mill premises, they are not liable to pay any compensation.
8. In this case it is surprising to note that no finding is arrived at by the Claims Tribunal as to whether the owner and driver are liable or not. The driver remained ex parte. The owner has virtually admitted the whole claim and the material facts alleged in the claim petition. So far as the liability of the insurance company is concerned, the insurance company has based its contention on Sections 94 and 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Section 94 speaks that no person shall use except as a passenger or cause or allow any other person to use a motor vehicle in a public place unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person or that other person, as the case may be, a policy of insurance complying with the requirements of this Chapter. Section 95 deals with the requirements of policies and limits of liability. Section 95 reads as under:
95. Requirements of policies and limits of liability.-(1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which-
(a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer or by a co-operative society allowed under Section 108 to transact the business of an insurer, and
(b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in Sub-section (2)-
(i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;
(ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place:
Provided that....
9. According to the insurance company, mill compound is not a public place, as such the insurance company is not liable for the same. Section 2 (24) of the Motor Vehicles Act defines 'public place' as under:
2 (24) 'public place' means a road, street, way or other place, whether a thoroughfare or not, to which the public have a right of access and includes any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage carriage;
10. In this case the insurance company has not filed insurance policy or its copy on record to show as to whether such restrictions were put in the policy or not. Otherwise as per the definition of the 'public place' it means road, street, way or other place, whether a 'thoroughfare' or not, to which the public have a right of access and includes any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage carriage. The insurance company has not disputed the fact that deceased was not the workman on the truck. On the contrary, it is their own pleading that he was on duty on the truck and while giving the direction to the driver for reversing the truck deceased fell down and died on account of being crushed by front wheel of the truck. It is also not disputed that the truck was either at its stand or the place where it was kept and was coming from that place. It is also not specifically pleaded and proved that the place where the accident took place, the entry to the other public is prohibited or the public have no right of access as it was specifically prohibited and no one could enter that place without the permission of the owner. No evidence to that effect was ever led by the insurance company. Not only that no question in cross-examination was ever put by the insurance company to the witnesses of the claimant-appellant, especially to Arjun Lal Tambell, AW 2, who was an eye-witness and also an employee of the respondent firm. In such a case the contention of the insurance company, respondent No. 3, is that insurance company is not liable, the place of accident being not a 'public place'. This court in the case of Sardul Singh v. Kalloobai 1981 ACJ 343 (MP), has dealt with this point, which was a similar type of case where the bus while gliding backward dashed against another stationary bus. While dealing with the provisions of Section 2 (24) and Section 110-A of the Act, this court has held as under:
(4) The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the spot where the accident occurred not being a public place, the claim was not maintainable. He has relied upon decisions in Randall v. Motor Insurance Bureau 1969 ACJ 193 (QBD, England) and Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Karthyani 1975 ACJ 226 (Orissa), decided by the High Court of Orissa. Those decisions are beside the point. They did not lay down that an application under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, would not be maintainable unless the accident took place on a public place. There is no provision to the effect that an application for award of compensation under Section 110-A of the Act would not be maintainable unless the accident took place on a public place. The said contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is also, thus, without substance.
In the case of Lanka Sarmma v. Rajendra Singh 1984 ACJ 198 (AP), it has been held that a private place to which access is gained by the public is also comprehended within the definitional meaning of the words 'public place'. In the case of Madarsab Saheblala Kattimani v. Nagappa Vtitappa Katabugol 1982 ACJ 279 (Karnataka), it has been held that where an accident is caused by a truck in a private place Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain and try the application. In this case the truck went into the field for carrying sugarcane load and ran over the deceased. It was held that accident was due to the rash and negligent driving by the truck driver. It went further to hold that the terms of the insurance policy do not confine the insurer's liability for accidents occurring in a public place. The insurance company was held liable because by contract in the policy a wider field can be carved than what is contemplated by Section 95 of the Act. In the present case policy has not been filed, as stated above, in order to note such restrictions in a policy and are also not pleaded by the insurance company. In a recent decision of this High Court in the case of Narsingh v. Balkishan 1988 ACJ 288 (MP), it has been held that the compound of a printing press owned by an individual where trucks have access and there is office of Text Book Corporation and public at large cannot be denied access to such an office, is a public place. The insurance company was held liable for the accident. In the case of Pandurang Chimaji Agale v. New India Life Ins. Co. Ltd. 1988 ACJ 674 (Bombay), a Full Bench of Bombay High Court has also held that the private place to which the public have permissive access is also a public place.
11. In the present case it cannot be held that place where the accident took place, the public had no entry. Even if it is presumed to be so, the place was the stand of the truck where it was used to be kept for use and the accident took place while use of the vehicle. The driver, owner and insurance company are liable for the accident. The driver was negligent for the same. Therefore, I hold that the place is covered under Sub-section (24) of Section 2 of the Act.
12. The rulings relied on by the learned counsel for the insurance company as laid down in Chairman, Neyveli Lignite Corporation v. Nayathan 1989 ACJ 95 (Madras) and Kannammal v. A.S. Kasim 1989 ACJ 647 (Madras), are not applicable in the present case. In those cases there was pleading and proof of prohibition for entry in the area where the incident took place, which is lacking in the present case. Moreover, this court is bound by the decisions of this court. Therefore, in my opinion, the place where the accident took place is covered under the definition of Section 2 (24) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and the application under Section 110-A of the said Act was maintainable before the Claims Tribunal. Therefore, the insurance company was also liable besides the liability of the owner and driver of the truck.
13. Regarding quantum, the Claims Tribunal has neglected to assess the quantum of claim payable to the appellant. Admittedly the monthly income of Hanuman Prasad (deceased) as admitted by respondent No. 1 was Rs. 700/- and his age on the date of incident was 50 years. The insurance company has not led any evidence contrary to it. There is no reason to disbelieve the same. As per the statement of the appellant, Sahodra Devi, AW 1, her father-in-law expired at the age of 75 years. According to her, her deceased husband would have lived at least upto 70 years. Indian longevity of life these days can be expected upto 70 years. Her husband was drawing Rs. 700/- per month. No question has been asked from her as to what amount the deceased used to pay to her for house expenses. Even if I take that an amount of Rs. 200/- (Sic. Rs. 250/-) per month was being contributed by deceased for house expenses, he must be giving Rs. 200/- (Sic. Rs. 250/-) per month to his wife, then on applying 20 years multiplier, the amount comes to Rs. 60,000/-. If I take Rs. 5,000/- as consortium, Rs. 4,000/- for pain, suffering and shock, the amount comes to Rs. 70,000/-. On deducting Rs. 10,000/- the amount comes to Rs. 60,000/- as claimed by the appellant.
14. I, therefore, hold that the amount of compensation claimed by the appellant is just and reasonable. The claimant is awarded an amount of Rs. 60,000/- (Rupees sixty thousand) as compensation with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of application to the date of payment. The owner, driver and insurance company are liable to pay the same jointly and severally.
15. The appeal is, therefore, allowed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-, if certified.