ORDER
Faizanuddin, J.
1. The order passed in this petition will also govern the disposal of M.P. No. 1903 of 1988 (Nandu Singh v. State of M.P.); M.P. No. 2161 of 1988 (Shiv Dayal v. State of M.P. and 2 Ors.); M.P. No. 2195 of 1989 (Jaggi and Bhana v. Director General of Prisons Bhopal and 2 Ors.) M.P. No. 2204 of 1988 (Balram v. State of M.P. and Anr.) M.P. No. 2328 of 1988 (Shamser Singh, Kunj Bihari Singh, Prithvipal Singh and Netraj Singh v. State of M.P.) M.P. No. 2643 of 1988 (Rannu, Chunwad and Kirpal Singh v. State of M.P. and Anr.); M.P. No. 2927 of 1988 (Ram-chandar alias Kaliya v. State of M.P.); M.P. No. 2929 of 1988 (Kachroo Singh v. State of M.P. and Anr.); M.P. No. 3383 of 1988 (Khunna v. State of M.P. and Anr.); M.P. No. 3/89 (Semali v. State of M.P. and Anr.); M.P. 3035 of 89 (Shiv Sahay v. State of M.P. and Anr.) and M.P. No. 3835 of 1989 (Umashanker and Jamuna v. State of M.P. and Anr.) as in all these petitions common question of law is involved for consideration of this Court.
2. The facts leading to the bunch of the petitions are not in serious dispute and the same lie in a very narrow compass. Succinctly stated, all the petitioners in all these petitions belongs to one category in the sense that all of them were convicted though by different Courts, in different Sessions trials decided on different dates; but all after 18th December, 1978 and all of them were sentenced to ' imprisonment for life for an offence for which death is one of the penalties provided by the Penal Code but on judicial compassion they were given only prison tenancy for life. All the petitioners are, therefore, suffering their sentences in different Jails. Some of the petitioners being eligible for consideration applied in the prescribed forms for their .premature release under Rule 358 while others applied under Rule 359 of M.P. Prison Rules 1968 (For brevity 'Prison Rules') framed under Section 59 of the Prisons Act, 1894 (No. 9 of 1894). Some of the petitioners applied for their release on licence under the provisions of M.P. Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1954 (Act No. 16 of 1954) (For brevity referred to as 'the Act') and the rules framed thereunder, known as M.P. Prisoners Release on Probation Rules, 1964 (For brevity referred to as 'the 1964 Rules'). The said applications of the petitioners were not disposed of by the Probation Bord and the State Government within the reasonable periods and, therefore, these petitioners moved this Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India seeking issuance of a direction to the respondents to decide their cases within the period fixed by this Court and failing that to release the petitioners on bail.
3. The respondents while Opposing the petitions, have taken the stand that Parliamentary amendment in the Code of Criminal Procedure (herein after referred to as 'the Code') by introducing Section 433-A in the Code on 18th December, 1978 made it obligatory on every person who has been convicted by any Court after 18th December, 1978, for imprisonment for life in respect of an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law, as in the present cases, to serve out the actual detention in prison for full fourteen years as a mandatory minimum before he could claim his premature release under Rules 358 or 359 of the Prison Rules 1968 or release on licence under the M.P. Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1954 and the rules framed there under and the benefit of the said Prison Rules and 1954 Act will not be available to the petitioners unless they suffered actual incarceration for full fourteen years without remissions.
4. Looking to the vital importance of the question effecting a large community of lifers, we made a request to Shri Rajendra Singh a senior Advocate of this Court to assist the Court on the point in controversy as amicus curiae to which he readily accepted.
5. Learned Deputy Advocate-General, Shri Dilip Naik, placing his reliance on the decision rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Maru Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 2147 : (1980 Cri LJ 1440) and a decision by a Division Bench of this Court in Rajendra Sharma v. State of M.P., M.P. No. 140 of 1987, D/-17-10-1988 vigorously contended that any remissions and commutations under the provisions of Sections 432 and 433 of the Code or under Rules 358 and 359 of Prison Rules or 1954 Act, cannot reduce the actual duration of imprisonment below 14 years because of the embargo contained in the newly added Section 433-A in the Code whereby all Remission Rules and the like provisions stand excluded so far as the question of release of 'lifers' punished for capital offences are concerned. He further urged that a sentence of imprisonment for life would be nothing else than the imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of natural life of a convict which would last till his last breath unless it is remitted or commuted to a shorter term but in any case not less than 14 years. He, therefore, submitted that the remissions shall not help such a convict and he will not be entitled to be released in any case unless he has suffered full 14 years without remissions etc.
6. Shri Rajendra Singh, a Senior Advocate, appearing as amucus curiae made an independent contribution by contending that even on the basis of ratio in Maru Ram's case (supra) parole and conditional release under certain restrictions of a 'lifer' punished for capital offences prior to the end of his maximum sentence or before full 14 years is not forbidden by the provisions of Section 433-A of the Code. He urged that Section 433-A of the Code prohibits only release and setting free such a convict from captivity or imprisonment reserving no control over him before he served out the minimum actual sentence for 14 years without remissions. His contention was that the Prison Rules and 1954 Act provide for parole and conditional releases under certain restrictions which do not amount to release or setting aside free a convict without any control over him before the expiry of his term of imprisonment, and as such, according to him, the Prison Rules as well as 1954 Act and the Rules framed thereunder are saved from the application of the provisions of Section 433-A and the same are not hit by the mandate contained therein. According to him, it is for this reason that the Borstal Rules are held by the Supreme Court, as having been saved from the application of Section 433-A of the Code. This line of argument was also adopted by all other learned counsel appearing for various petitioners.
7. The aforesaid respective submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, may properly be appreciated and closely examined in the light of the punitive prescription made in Section 433-A of the Code as well as statutory relevant provisions contained in the Prison Rules and the M.P. Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1954 and the Rules framed thereunder. We, therefore, propose to reproduce the relevant parts thereof. To begin with, the newly added Section 433-A in the Code with the punitive prescription reads as follows:--
'433-A. Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 432, where a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on conviction of a person for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law, or where a sentence of death imposed on a person has been commuted under Section 433 into one of imprisonment for life, such person shall not be released from prison unless he had served at least fourteen years of imprisonment.'
Rule 358 and part of Rule 359 of the Jail Manual so for as they are relevant for the purposes of this case run as follows :--
'358. (1) When a prisoner has been sentenced to imprisonment for life, whether or not he has also been sentenced to a term of imprisonment, or when he has been sentenced to a term or term of imprisonment exceeding 14 years, he shall be considered for release as soon as the term already undergone (together with any remission earned under the rules) and such other special remission if any as have been granted by the Government in celebration of any public event amounts to fourteen years. His case shall be reported to the State Government through the Inspector General with full information regarding the character of his crime, his conduct in prison and the probability of his reverting after release to criminal habits or instigating others to commit crime, in order to enable the State Government to decide whether he should be released and if so, whether he should be , subjected to police supervision or other suitable conditions. If the State Government decides that he should not be released, 'then after two years from the State Government's order his case shall be reported again for further consideration--
(2) The Superintendent of the Jail in which the prisoner is undergoing his sentence shall be primarily responsible for submitting the report under Sub-rule (1)''.
'359. There shall be four Advisory Boards for the jails in Madhya Pradesh located at Jabalpur, Raipur, Gwalior and Indore.
(1) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxxxxx xxx xxx xxx xxxxxx xxx xxx xxx xxx(4) The function of the Advisory Bord shall be to make recommendations regarding the revision of sentences of imprisonment passed by the Criminal Courts.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx(8) The sentence of every casual long term prisoner who has served half his sentence, and. of every habitual long term prisoner with not more than three previous convictions who has served two-thirds of his sentence shall be reviewed. The remission earned by the prisoner's conduct and diligence, excluding that granted in celebration of public events, shall be included in the period of sentence undergone.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx12(a) The Board after a full consideration of the case shall make a recommendation to the State Government either to postpone the question of the grant of remission for a period not exceeding two years or to release the prisoner prematurely with or without conditions. Good conduct in jail shall be in dispensable condition for recommendation by the Advisory Board for premature release in all cases except when the recommendation is made on urgent medical grounds. Where the members of a Board are not unanimous, its recommendations shall be in accordance with the opinions of the majority of its members. Where a Board makes a recommendations which is in opposition to the opinion of the District Magistrate of the District in which the prisoner was residing before his conviction it shall state the reasons in details for such recommendations.
(b) If the State Government decides that the prisoner should not be released, then after an interval of two years from the State Government's orders, the prisoner's case shall be reported again for reconsideration.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx(20)(a) xx xx xx xx xx(b) On receipt of the case of a life convict on the recommendation of the Revising Board, the State Government may pass one of the following orders;
(i) That the convict shall be released immediately conditionally or un-conditionally;
(ii) That the convict shall be released conditionally or un-conditionally after serving a stated period of sentence inclusive of remission; or
(iii) That the case shall be reconsidered after a stated period or after the convict has served a specified period of sentence inclusive of remissions.xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx'
Here it would be relevant to refer to the provisions contained in Section 2 of the Madhya Pradesh Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1954 which run as under:--
'2. Power of Government to release by . licence on conditions imposed by it --Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, where a person is confined in a prison under a sentence of imprisonment, and it appears to the Government from his antecedent and his conduct in the prison that he is likely to abstain from crime and lead a peaceable life, if he is released from prison, the Government may, by licence, permit him to be released on condition that he be placed under the supervision or authority of a Government Officer or of a person professing the same religion as the prisoner or such institution or society as may be recognised by the Government for the purpose, provided such other person, institution or society is willing to take charge of him.xx xx xx xx xx xx xx'
8. We may also briefly look into the objects and reasons which compelled the Parliament in 1978 to introduce stringent provisions like Section 433-A in the Code. It may be pointed out that apart from the sovereign powers of pardons and reprieves enshrined in Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India, Section 432 of the Code also confers wide powers on the appropriate Governent to suspend or remit conditionally or unconditionally a punishment to which a person has been sentenced. Further, Section 433(a) of the Code confers still wider powers on the appropriate Government to commute even a sentence of death, into any other sentence or punishment provided in the Indian Penal Code and according to clause (b) of Section 433 of the Code, a sentence of imprisonment for life may be converted into a term not exceeding fourteen years or even for payment of fine alone. Besides the aforesaid provisions, almost all the States have framed their own rules of remission of sentences and release of the convicts under the Prisons Act 1894 which enabled the life convicts to find their exist much before their full span of life term sentence, irrespective of the heinous, brutal and barbaric nature of the crimes that were committed by them.
9. The experience shows and several examples came to light that in exercise of powers conferred by Sections 432, 433 of the Code and other Remission Rules, the lifers were let of within eight to twelve years of incarceration and in some cases, even much earlier, within five to six years. A liberal use of this power may even enable a murderer who could have been awarded death penalty by the Court but on compasssionate grounds has been awarded only life imprisonment, may virtually be released the very next year or at any other time according to the wishes of the appropriate Government. These facts and circumstances appear to have attracted the attention of Parliament which on recommendations' of the Joint Committee found it necessary to make it obligatory not to allow premature release before the lifer suffered actual incarceration for 14 years without remissions. This is how Section 433-A of the Code was enacted and introduced in the Code with prospective effect from 18th December, 1978 having supremacy over the Remission Rules and all other short sentencing Statutes made by various States except the remissions and short sentencing passed under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution.
10. Now adverting directly to the controversy it has to be examined as to what is forbidden and prohibited by the newly enacted Section 433-A of the Code, which for the sake of convenience, has been reproduced in paragraph No. 7 of this order. A plain reading of Section 433-A will show that the actual detention in prison for full fourteen years as a mandatory minimum sentence has been made obligatory before a person may be released, in two classes of cases, that is to say, (1) where the Court could have sentenced the offender with death but did not, or (2) where the offender is visited with death sentence but it has been commuted to life imprisonment in exercise of executive power under Section 433(a) of the Code. It may be pointed out that the use of the words and expression 'such person shall not be released from the prison unless he had served at least fourteen years of imprisonment,' employed at the end of Section 433-A of the Code are very much crucial and significant, particularly the use of the word 'released' for the purposes of the case before us. Thus the embargo is on the 'release' of an offender who could have been punished with death sentence but has not been awarded death sentence or when he has been punished with death sentence but the same has been commuted to life imprisonment.
11. Section 433-A in terms does not speak about release on parole, licence or conditional release in which event the convict in a sense remains in the legal custody and under the control of the Government and the Probation Board etc. The Section 433-A speaks about 'release' simpliciter and places an embargo on 'release' of offenders and culprits whose sentences fall within the purview of the provisions contained in Section 433-A of the Code. The word 'release' has not been defined any where in the Code or the Act and, therefore, it has to be assigned the meaning as given in dictionaries and used in common parlance. According to the Law Lexicon 1987th Edition page 1101 Col. I 'release' means, a discharge of an existing obligation'. It implies that the person so released is not in prison after such release and he is set at liberty with absolute freedom without conditions and once a person is released absolutely he cannot be taken back in prison again. Thus release as contemplated by Section 433-A is an act of setting a prisoner free and liberty without any conditions whatsoever.
12. Having discussed the ambit and scope of Section 433-A, we now address ourselves to have a glance over the provisions contained in Prison Rules 358 and 359 as well as on Section 2 of 1954 Act reproduced in paragraph No. 7 above and 1964 Rules to find out whether the said provisions or any of them fall within the mischief of mandatory rule of 14 years as an essential condition for the release from prison. A critical look and close examination of Prison Rule 358(1) would reveal that a prisoner becomes eligible for consideration by the State Government for his release subject to police supervision or other suitable conditions after he has completed 14 years of imprisonment, inclusive of all remissions earned by him, having regards to the character of his Crime, his conduct in prison and the probability of his reverting to criminal habits or instigating others to commit the crime, after he is so released. The release contemplated by Prison Rule 358(1) is thus a release subject to Police surveillance or subject to other suitable conditions. Similarly, under Sub-rule 12(a) of Prison Rule 359, the State Government after full recommendation of the case of a prisoner, may release him prematurely with or without conditions on being satisfied that his conduct in the Jail has been good. Thus here again the release under Prison Rule 359, may be made either with or without any conditions.
13. Now turning to the provisions of M.P. Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1954, it may be seen that Section 2 of the said Act contemplates only release of a prisoner by licence, if it appears to the Government from his antecedent and his conduct in the prison that he is likely to abstain from crime and lead a peaceable life, if he is released from prison, then the Government may, permit his release by licence, on condition that he would be placed under the supervision or authority of a Government Officer or a person, institution or a Society mentioned therein. Section 9(1) of the Act provides that the Government may make rules consistent with the Act for the terms and conditions of licence on which prisoners may be released. Consequently, statutory rules knows as M.P. Prisoners Release on Probation Rules 1964, were framed. Rule 6 of these Rules contains the procedure for routing the application of the prisoner for his release on licence in a prescribed form which has to be filled by the prisoner concerned and his proposed guardian. Rule 7 prescribes the form in which release on licence is granted. The form so prescribed contains various conditions on breach of which the licence so granted may be revoked by the Government under Rule 10 with a direction for his recommitment to the prison to serve rest of the sentence. Rule 9 prescribes the duty of the guardian of the prisoner released on licence to see that the conditions of the licence are fulfilled. It is also the duty of the guardian to look-after the conduct and welfare of the licencee and generally to act in Loco Parentis and if he finds the conduct of the licencee to be bad, it shall be his duty to report the fact to the District Magistrate concerned. From the above discussion and examination of relevant provisions of 1954 Act and the Rules framed thereunder, it is now abundantly clear that a prisoner released on licence under 1954 Act and the Rules, framed thereunder is not set at liberty with absolute freedom but he is released on licence subject to various conditions and on breach of any of those conditions his release on licence may be revoked, he may be again taken into custody and recommitted to prison to serve out his remaining sentence. In other words, the prisoner so released on licence, in a sense, remains under the deemed custody. There is thus a clear distinction in the two releases, that is to say, an absolute release with full freedom, and a release on licence and with certain conditions.
14. Thus a package reading of all the relevant provisions would show that release under the Prison Rules 358 and 359 as well as under 1954 Act and the Rules framed thereunder is not an absolute release but conditional except in the case of a release under Prison Rule 359 where it could be a release with or even without condition. But a critical and close examination of 1954 Act and the Rules framed thereunder make it crystal clear that the release of a prisoner under the said Act and the Rules is not an absolute release at all but subject to various conditions as discussed above, on breach of which his licencee is liable to be revoked and he would be recommitted to prison again to serve out his remaining sentence in accordance with law. The net result of this discussion is that if the release is subject to certain conditions on the breach of which the prisoner can again be committed to prison it would be accepted by the application of the provisions contained in Section 433-A of the Code; but if the release is absolute and without any conditions it would fall within the mischief of mandatory rule of 14 years and hit by the provisions of Section 433-A of the Code, in view of the aforesaid discussion the release of a prisoner on licence under the provisions of 1954 Act or the Rules framed thereunder or premature release on certain conditions under Prison Rules 358 and 359 will not be covered or hit by the provisions of Section 433-A of the Code because they are not absolute release with full freedom, but the prisoner so released, though he does not remain within the stone walls and iron bars of a prison, he still remains within the legal custody and under the control of the State. Such an interpretation would be in consonance with the language of Section 433-A of the Code itself for the reason that if it was intended by the Parliament to bring such laws and Prison Rules also within the fold of Section 433-A of the Code, then the non obstante clause in Section 433-A would have been more comprehensive including all local statutes, in this behalf. In this' view of the matter, we are supported by the decision in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Vallabhapuram Ravi (AIR 1985 SC 870 : 1984 Cri LJ 1511).
15. It may not be out of place to briefly mention the distinction in the phraseology, like remission, commutation and parole employed in the provisions of law discussed above. We have already discussed the release with full freedom and the release of licence and with certain conditions. Remission means, reducing the amount of sentence awarded to a convict without changing the character of sentence, which has the effect of wiping out the remitted portion of the sentence altogether through the order of conviction and sentence stands. According to Section 3(5) of 1954 Act, Remission System, means the rules for the time being in force regulating the award of marks and the consequent shortening of the sentence of prisoner in jail. While suspension of sentence, means, only abeyance of sentence. Commutation of sentence means alteration, change or substitution of lesser or greater punishment, by the authority of law, conditionally or unconditionally, but the conviction remains unaffected. A 'parole' is a conditional release before the expiration of his term of sentence, to remain subject to the conditions during the remainder of his term and to return to imprisonment on violation of the condition of the parole.
16. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court also in Maru Ram's Case (1980 Cri LJ 1440) (supra) saved the provisions of U.P. Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938 from the application of Section 433-A of the Code on the reasonings contained in paragraph 71 of the said report. In paragraph 71 of the report, the Supreme Court clearly observed, that the expression 'prison' and 'imprisonment' must receive a wider connotation and include any place notified as such for detention purposes. Stone walls and iron bars do not make a prison, nor are they a sine qua non to make a jail, open jails are capital instances. It has been further observed that any life under the control of the State, whether within the high walled world or not, may be a prison if the law regards it as such. House detentions, for example, Palaces, were Gandhiji was detained were prisons. Restraint on the freedom under the prison law is the test. Licensed release where instant recapture is sanctioned by the law, and, likewise, parole, where the parole is no free agent and other categories under the inevitable fetters of the prison law may legitimately be regarded as imprisonment even for computation of 14 years under Section 433-A of the Code. On parity of the aforesaid reasoning, it has to be held, that even Maru Ram's case (1980 Cri LJ 1440) (SC) (supra) saved the provisions of the M.P. Prisoners Release on Probation Act 1954 from the application of Section 433-A of the Code and on the same reasoning if the premature release under Prison Rules 358 and 359 is made on conditions a breach of which would make the prisoner liable for re arrest and commitment to prison again to serve out his remaining sentence, then also such release would not be hit by the provisions of Section 433-A of the Code because in that case also the person so released is deemed to be in custody of the State and is not released with full freedom. It appears that this aspect of the matter and the distinction discussed above was not placed before the Division Bench of this Court which decided the case of Rajendra Sharma (M.P. No. 140 of 1987, D/-17-10-1988 (supra).
17. Here it will also be useful to refer to and reproduce the conclusions recorded by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Pragraph 72 of Maru Ram's case, (1980 Cri LJ 1440) (supra) only in so far as they are relevant for the purposes of the case before us.
'72. We conclude by formulating our findings:
XX XX XX XX XX(6) We follow Godse's case AIR 1961 SC 600 : (1961 (1) Cri LJ 736) to hold that imprisonment for life lasts until the last breath, and whatever the length of remissions earned, the prisoner can claim release only if the remaining sentence is remitted by Government.
xx xx xx xx xx xx(11) The U.P. Prisoners' Release on Probation Act, 1938, enabling limited enlargement under licence will be effective as legislatively sanctioned imprisonment of a loose and liberal type and such licensed enlargement will be reckoned for the purpose of the 14 years duration. Similar other statutes and rules will enjoy similar efficacy.
(12) In our view, penal humanitarianism and rehabilitative desideratum warrant liberal paroles, subject to security safeguards and other humanizing strategies for inmates so that the dignity and worth of the human person are not desecrated by making mass jails anthropoid zoos. Human rights awareness must infuse institutional reform and search for alternatives.
xx xx xx xx xx xx(14) Section 433-A does not forbid parole or other release within 14 years span. So to 'interpret the Section as to intensify inner tension and intermissions of freedom is to do violence to language and liberty.'
18. From the aforesaid conclusions recorded by the Supreme Court in the case of Maru Ram (1980 Cri LJ 1440) (supra) it can well be seen that it has been clearly held that though imprisonment for life lasts until the last breath irrespective of any length of remissions earned by a prisoner but while saving the U.P. Prisoner's Release on Probation Act, 1938, the Supreme Court further held that limited enlargement under licence will be effective as legislatively sanctioned imprisonment of a loose and liberal type and such licensed enlargement will be reckoned for the purpose of the 14 years duration and similar other statutes and rules will enjoy similar efficacy. It is so held because in the opinion of their Lordships, penal humanitarianism and rehabilitative considerations warranted liberal paroles, subject to security safeguards and other humanizing strategies for inmates. Finally, it has been stated in no uncertain terms that Section 433-A of the Code does not forbid parole or other release within the 14 years span and to interpret the section otherwise would be to do violence to the language and liberty. Thus on ultimate analysis the net result is that limited and loose type of licensed enlargement of a prisoner subject to certain conditions and safeguards is not forbidden by Section 433-A of the Code and the period of such licensed release on conditions will be reckoned for the purpose of computation of 14 years duration within the meaning of Section 433-A of the Code. That being so, it will not be permissible to the Government to grant premature release without condition under Prison Rules 358 and 359 because such a release would be without any security, safeguards and would amount to absolute liberty and full freedom without any control of the Government to recommit him to prison, and as such unconditional release would not satisfy the tests laid down in Maru Ram's case and, therefore, it would be hit by section 433-A of the Code. However, subject to conditions, the State Government may grant premature release to any prisoner in exercise of its powers under Prison Rule 358 and 359.
19. Before concluding the order, we must record our thanks to Shri Rajendra Singh, learned Senior Advocate, for rendering assistance to this Court on a ticklish question of law involved in these petitions.
20. But before we proceed to write the concluding note, we may refer to a vital recent amendment in 1964 Rules with which we are not directly concerned, in these petitions, but the same is of great importance in view of the Full Bench decision in the case of Lalji v. State, 1988 MPLJ 127 : (AIR 1988 Madh Pra 82) which was further affirmed by a Bench of Five Judges of this Court in Ramjiva v. State of M.P. (MP No. 1035 of 1986, D/-25-4-1989) wherein while interpreting Rule 3(c) and the explanation below it, it has been held that a prisoner whose application for his release on licence has been once considered and rejected by the Government on a previous occasion, he is precluded from making a second application for his release on licence but the rule does preclude the Government itself from exercising its discretion and issuing a suo motu direction to the Inspector General of Prisons to place the case of any such prisoner before the Probation Board for reconsideration whose application has been previously rejected. But now the said clause (c) of Rule 3 and the explanation below the said Rule 3(c) have been deleted altogether by amendment in the M.P. Prisoners Release on Probation Rules 1964, vide Notification No. F.12-1-87-III Jail, dated 12th June, 1989 published in M.P. Rajpatra, Part IV (Ga), dated 23-6-1989 Page 79 (See 1989 MPLT page 172, Part II Rules and Notifications --M.P. Govt.) In view of this amendment the bar for applying a second time for reconsideration now stands removed.
21. In the light of foregoing discussion it is hereby held, that the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Prisoners' Release on Probation Act, 1954 and the Rules framed thereunder are not conflicting with the provisions of Section 433-A of the Code and, therefore, they are not hit by Section 433-A and as such the conditional enlargement of a prisoners/convict under licence would be permissible and effective, and such licensed enlargement will be reckoned for purposes of 14 years duration. Similarly, premature release under Prison Rules 358 and 359 or similar other Statutes and Rules will also enjoy similar efficacy provided such premature release is made subject to condition).
22. As a result of our conclusions aforesaid, all the petitions succeed and are hereby allowed. In M.P. No. 3155 of 1988, the petitioner Babu Pahalwan alias Babulal has completed 14 years of imprisonment without any remissions, and with remissions he has undergone the sentence for a period over 19 years, but still his case has not been considered for his release under Prison Rule 358 and, therefore, we direct that the petitioner Babu Pahalwan alias Babulal be released on furnishing bond in the sum of Rs. 5000/ - with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of Sessions Judge concerned, pending consideration of his case by the State Government, on the condition that in the event his application is ultimately rejected by the State Government he will surrender himself, to custody. The petitioners in M.P. No. 1903 of 1988, Nandusingh v. State of M.P.; M.P. No. 2161 of 1988, Shiv Dayal v. State of M.P. and 2 Ors.; M.P. No. 2195 of 1989 Jaggi & Bhana v. Director General of Prisons; M.P. No. 2328 of 1988, (Shamser-singh and Ors. v. State of M.P.; M.P. No. 2643 of 1988, Rannu and Ors. v. State of M.P.; M.P. No. 2927 of 1988, Ramchander v. State of M.P.; M.P. No. 3383 of 1988, Khunna v. State of M.P.; M.P. No. 3035 of 89, Shiv Sahay v. State of M.P. and M.P. No. 3 of 1989, Semali v. State of M.P., have undergone sentences ranging from ten to 13 years, and they are eligible for being considered for their release on licence or conditional premature release, but their cases have not been decided by the respondents as yet. We, therefore, direct the respondents to decide their application within a period of three months. As regards the petitioners in M.P. No. 2204 of 1988, Balaram v. State of M.P.; M.P. No. 2929 of 1988, Kachroo Singh v. State of M.P. and M.P. No. 3835 of 1989, Umashanker and Anr. v. State of M.P. they have undergone sentences ranging from six to eight years and, therefore, we direct the respondents to decide their cases within period of six months. All the petitions are disposed of accordingly.