S.K. Dubey, J.
1. The appellant Sushil Kumar has preferred this appeal Under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') against the award dated 14-2-79 passed in Claim Case No. 41 of 1977 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Ujjain, whereby an amount of Rs. 12,500/- was awarded to respondent No. 1 as compensation with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the petition, i.e. 31-7-76 till the date of payment.
2. The claimant-respondent No. 1 is an employee of Vinld Mills, when he was going to his residence from the Vinld Mills on 3-2-76 at about 3.45 P.M., the appellant, who was driving the scooter MP1 753, rashly, negligently and with excessive speed, dashed the claimant-respondent No. 1 from behind, as a result of which the claimant fell down and sustained fracture of the femur bone. The claimant filed an application Under Section 110-A of the Act impleading the appellant and one Ashok Kumar, who is paid to have been the owner of the offending vehicle. The scooter was not insured. Before the Tribunal, it was not found proved that respondent No. 2 Ashok Kumar, was the owner of the said vehicle. The appellant, who was in control and possession of the vehicle and was driving the vehicle at the relevant time, did not, in the written statement, disclose about the owner of the said scooter and the insurer thereof. No plea was raised in the written statement about the application not being made in form 'C.A.A.' prescribed Under Rule 277 of the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicle Rules, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'). There was neither any plea nor any issue in relation to non joinder of the owner and the insurer as parties to the application. The only issue raised was whether the non-applicant No. 1, i.e, respondent No. 2 was the owner of the scooter at the relevant time or not.
3. After recording of evidence, the Tribunal held that non-applicant No. 1/respondent No. 2 is not the owner of the vehicle and is not liable to pay any compensation. On merits, the Tribunal found that the scooter was driven by appellant/non-applicant No. 2 rashly and negligently which dashed the claimant from behind. As a result of that, the claimant-respondent No. 1 received fracture in femur bone and after treatment, the permanent disability to the extent of 10% was assessed. The Tribunal, considering all the facts, material and evidence on record, passed an award of Rs. 12,500/- against the appellant.
4. Learned Counsel, Shri Sujan Jain, appearing for the appellant, urged only two grounds before this Court. His first submission was that the provisions in relation to the claiming of compensation in Section 110-A and 110-F of the Act have created a new jurisdiction and a new procedure, new forms and new remedies. The remedy under Torts in relation to motor accident instead of ordinary civil Courts has been given to the Claims Tribunal. Hence, the procedure, form or remedies provided in the statute must be strictly followed. He submitted that as the Insurance Company and the owner of the vehicle were not impleaded as parties to the application, no award could have been passed against the appellant, who was driving the scooter at the relevant time. In support of this the learned Counsel relied on the decision of this Court in the case of M.P.S.R.T C. Jabalpur v. Jahiram and Anr. 1969 ACJ 3 and another case of the Orissa High Court in New India Assurance Company Limited v. Pramila Sahoo and Ors. 1984 ACJ 371. It would be proper to mention here that the appeal is pending for its disposal since 30-4-79. The learned Counsel for the appellant could not place the material to show, even now, that a particular person and particular company was the owner and the insurer of the vehicle, at the relevant time. On merits, the learned Counsel could not challenge the finding on rash and negligent act, but submitted that the amount of compensation awarded in the case was on the higher side. He submitted that the amount of compensation could not have been more than Rs. 5,000/-. The learned Counsel relied upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Subhash Chander and Ors. v. State of Haryana 1975 ACJ 164 and Anr. case of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Hemlata Devi v. Sk. Lokman and Ors. 1971 ACJ 63. Of these two cases, the latter case related to the compensation awarded for the death and the former case of Subhash Chandra relates to the fracture in nasal bone wherein the award was of Rs. 8,300/-, which was reduced in appeal to Rs. 2,000/-. He submits that the award of Rs. 12,500/- is on higher side, if this Court does not dismiss the application or remand the same with a direction to join the owner and the driver as parties to the claim application and to decide the matter afresh, the compensation atleast be reduced.
5. Shri CM. Mehta, learned Counsel for the claimant respondent No. 1, submitted that the vehicles was not insured at the relevant time. As such there was no question of impleading the Insurance Company as a party to the claim petition not the appellant placed any material before the Tribunal about the insurance of the vehicle. The appellant also did not place any material to show who was the owner of the vehicle at the relevant time These were the facts within the , special knowledge of the appellant. No doubt, it has come in the statement of the claimant (PW 3) vide para 4, that in the R.T.O. record, the name of Ramchand Jadia is recorded as the owner of the said vehicle. The said Ramchand Jadia died long back and his son has been made a party. If the appellant was serious in his objection, he ought to have raised the plea in the written statement by raising specific names, addresses and particulars of the owner and the insurance company. Section 98 of the Act casts a duty on a person, against whom a claim is made in respect of any liability in relation to Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 95 of the Act, to give such particulars with respect to the policy and the certificate of insurance, from which the details of owner and the insurance company would have been made available or he could have taken the plea in the written statement that the particular Insurance Company and the particular person are the owner, they be made a party to the application and/or atleast he could have got the notice issued to the owner and the insurance company through the Tribunal. But having not done so, the appellant-non applicant No. 2 after about 12 years, is not entitled to raise such a plea. Today also, the appellant is not able to place the information about the owner and the insurance company. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that against the person, who committed tort and caused the accident and was in control and possession of the vehicle, an award cannot be passed as the owner and the insurance Company are not made parties. Learned Counsel for the claimant, further, submitted that the award of Rs. 12500/- as compensation for the fracture of femur bone causing a permanent disability, which has been established by medical evidence, is too low. A Division Bench of this Court in Suresh Singh and Ors. v. Kamlesh 1987 ACJ 429 has awarded compensation of Rs. 30,000/-. Shri Mahesh Manana, learned Counsel for respondent No. 2, submitted that the Tribunal has found as a fact that the respondent No. 2 was not the owner of the vehicle at the relevant time. As such, this finding does not call for any interference.
6. After giving due weight to the submissions made by the learned Counsel and the record of the Tribunal, in my opinion, the appeal has no merit. There is no quarrel about the rule of interpretation of statutes and the rule of construction that in the case of an Act, which creates a new jurisdiction, a new procedure, new form or new remedies, the procedure and the forms or remedies provided in that statute and not provided elsewhere, must be strictly followed. When the mode is prescribed by law for evercising the statutory powers, no other mode can be adopted (Refer to N.P. Ponuswami v. Returning Officer Namakkal AIR 1952 S.G. 64 and the case of M.P.S.R.T.C. v. Jehiram (supra). On this principle of interpretation, the other cases need not be cited. In the present case, there is no controversy that the application was not made in the prescribed form but the controversy relates to the fact that the owner and the insurer were not made parties to the claim application. It is not disputed before me that the registered owner died long back and he is no more in this world. The name of another person was not substituted in place of the said owner in R.T.O. records. Hence, it was not possible to join any person as owner, unless the person comes at his own accord that he is the owner or the appellant should have brought the particulars about the owner. Similarly in the written statement, the appellant ought to have taken a plea that the vehicle is insured with such and such insurance company, who is, in law, bound to satisfy the judgment or the award. During the course of arguments or during the pendency of the appeal, the appellant did not care to find out whether the owner is alive in this world or the vehicle was insured at the relevant time, to implead them as parties so as to get the case remitted back for trial in the light of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of M.P.S.R.T.C. v. Jahiram (supra). During the course of arguments, when a question was put to the learned Counsel, he was not able to place any material or information about the owner and insurer. In such state of affairs when the fact of death of registered owner having died long back is not denied, it cannot be said that no award can be passed against the appellant, who was driving and using the scooter at the relevant time and was in possession and control of the vehicle. In the circumstances, it cannot be held that the application filed by claimant-rsspondent No. 1 was not in accordance with the rules and forms and was not liable to be dismissed and the amount of compensation cannot be realised from the appellant, who was made liable to pay the same.
7. As regards compensation, suffice it to say that the compensation awarded for the fracture in the right femur bone when the claimant-respondent No. 1 remained under treatment and plaster for more than 6 months, as proved by medical evidence and other evidence, and stiffness has been caused in the hip joint, whereby the claimant cannot walk properly and has become permanently disabled, is on the lower side. The disability assessed by Dr. Vinod Kumar Dubey is 10%. In such a situation the award ought to have been on the higher side but the claimant, having not filed any appeal or cross-objections, the amount of compensation in award cannot be enhanced.
8. No other point was urged by either of the parties before me.
9. The appeal, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs of this appeal.