ORDER
S.P. Shrivastava, J.
1. Heard the learned counsel for the defendant/applicant.
2. Perused the record.
3. Feeling aggrieved by an order passed by the trial Court allowing an application under Order VI, Rule 17, Civil Procedure Code, permitting amendments in the plaint, the defendant-applicant has now approached this Court seeking redress praying for the reversal of the impugned order.
4. The suit giving rise to the impugned order had been filed by the plaintiff praying for a decree for the ejectment of the defendant from the accommodation in dispute under his tenancy.
5. Apart from the aforesaid relief, the plaintiff had also prayed for a decree of prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant from using any portion of the building of which the accommodation in dispute formed part which had not been let out to him.
6. It is not in dispute that the building in question falls within the purview of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The suit had been filed in the year 1987, asserting that the defendant was a defaulter in the payment of rent and had not paid the same since 1-5-1987, and had effected material alterations in the building which had been let out to him. It was further asserted that the defendant/tenant had also encroached upon some portion of the building which was not the subject-matter of the tenancy. The plaintiff also claimed that the defendant was creating nuisance and had no right to continue as a tenant.
7. It may be noticed that the provisions contained in Section 12 of the Act, bar the filing of a suit in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the grounds enumerated therein.
8. In the present case, the plaintiff's suit appears to be based on the grounds envisaged Under Section 12 (1) (c), (m) and (o) of the Act.
9. During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff moved an application seeking amendment in the plaint in the year 1997. Under the proposed amendment, the plaintiff intended to set up an additional ground for the eviction of the defendant from the accommodation in suit. This additional ground purported to be a ground envisaged Under Section 20 of the aforesaid Act. It was asserted that on 22-12-1996, the trustees had passed a resolution for taking action for the eviction of the tenant as the accommodation in dispute was required for the activities of the Trust and on that ground also tenant was liable to be evicte.
10. The trial Court vide the impugned order has allowed the aforesaid amendment.
11. The learned counsel for the tenant/applicant has strenuously urged that the plaintiff was not entitled to incorporate an additional ground for the eviction of the defendant which ground was not available before the date of the filing of the suit.
12. The contention is that in view of the bar contained in Section 12 of the Act, unless one or more grounds for eviction enumerated therein had come into existence prior to the filing of the suit, the plaintiff stood barred from filing a suit seeking eviction.
13. It is urged that in view of the bar contained in Section 12 of the Act, only those grounds enumerated in that provision could be taken into account which had come into existence prior to the filing of the suit for eviction and if such a ground came into existence after the filing of the suit, the same could not be permitted to be introduced in the plaint as a ground for eviction by allowing amendment.
14. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the defendant/applicant has strongly relied upon on the 'decision of this Court in the case of Narayanji v. Gordhanlal and Anr., Civil Revision No. 453 of 1978 (I) decided on 4-7-1980, reported in 1981 MPRCJ S.N. 86 at page 163 and Sureshchandra v. Gopichand, Civil Revision No. 451 of 1981 (I) decided on 13-12-1983 reported in 1984 MPWN SN 470 at page No. 566.
15. I have considered the above submission.
16. The scheme underlying the various provisions contained in Section 12 of the Act, indicates that the statutory bar has been imposed prohibiting filing of the suit in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the grounds enumerated therein.
17. It is, therefore, obvious that in case the plaintiff succeeds in establishing any of the grounds out of several grounds enumerated Under Section 12(1) of the Act, the statutory bar gets lifted and on such lifting of the bar, the suit becomes an ordinary civil suit regulated by the procedure applicable to such suits and has to proceed in accordance with the general procedural law in force.
18. The provision contained in Section 20 of the Act, which provision is a beneficial piece of legislation so far as the landlord is concerned, however, provides an exception. For a ready reference, the provisions contained in Section 20 are enumerated hereunder :
'20. Special provision for recovery of possession in certain cases. - Where the landlord in respect of any accommodation, is any company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution and the accommodation is required for the use of employees of such landlord; or, in the case of a public institution, for the furtherance of its activities, then, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 12 or in any other law, the Court may, on a suit being filed before it in this behalf by such landlord, place the landlord in vacant possession of such accommodation by evicting the tenant and every other person who may be in occupation thereof, if the Court is satisfied -
(a) That the tenant to whom such accommodations were let for use as a residence at a time when he was in the service or employment of the landlord, has ceased to be in such service or employment; or
(b) that the tenant has acted in contravention of the terms, express or implied, under which he was authorised to occupy accommodation; or
(c) that any other person is in unauthorised occupation of such accommodation; or
(d) that the accommodation is required bona fide by the public institution for the furtherance of its activities.
Explanation. - For the purposes of this Section, 'public institution' includes any educational institution, library, hospital and charitable dispensary.'
19. It is apparent from the aforesaid provision that the right to file a suit contemplated thereunder has not been made dependant on the existence of the conditions contemplated Under Section 12 of the Act. It is, therefore obvious that the statutory bar contemplated Under Section 12 of the Act has not been made applicable to the suits envisaged Under Section 20 of the Act, although, the provisions contained thereunder provide additional grounds for the eviction of the tenants to the landlords specified thereunder.
20. The learned counsel for the defendant/applicant has laid considerable stress: on the use of the expression 'on a suit being filed before it' as contained in Section 20 of the Act, and has asserted that the aforesaid provision was indicative of the fact that the grounds enumerated Under Section 20 of the Act, which had been made available to a landlord for getting eviction of a tenant must exist prior to the filing of the suit.
21. I am of the considered opinion that the expression 'on being filed' as used in Section 20 of the Act, does not deserve a too restricted and narrow interpretation. It contemplates within its ambit a pending suit. Any other construction or interpretation will lead to an absurdity and will result in defeating the very object of the provision, and further unnecessarily result in multiplicity and duplication of the proceedings which is abhorred by law.
22. It seems to me that the provision contained in Section 20 of the Act, which is a beneficent piece of legislation so far as the landlord is concerned has to be interpreted so as to advance its object and must lean in favour of its subject. The provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act, do not intend to create any statutory bar prohibiting the filing of the suit as has been contemplated Under Section 20 of the Act. The non obstante clause contained in Section 20 of the Act, is a clear indicator in this regard.
23. It may be noticed that this Court in its decision in the case of Sunderlal Hazarilal v. Har Prasad and Anr., reported in 1980 MPLJ 182, rendered by a division Bench, had clarified that the preamble of Section 12(1) of the Act, does not in terms require that all the grounds specified in Clauses (a) to (p) should exist prior to the filing of the suit for eviction. Such a requirement cannot be read in all the clauses. It is only the preexistence of facts constituting grounds like (a), (c), (d) or (o) that has been made by their language the postulate of the law. So far as the grounds other than the above it is not the postulate of the law that they should exist before institution of suit. If the landlord wants to introduce in the plaint by amendment any ground other than those falling Under Section 12(1)(a), (c), (d) and (o), that had become available after institution of the suit, the inclusion thereof is not prohibited by the Act either by its scheme or otherwise.
24. The correctness of the decision in the case of Sunderlal Hazarilal (supra) came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Chhotelal v. Akbarali and Anr., reported in 1982 MPLJ 754 = 1983 JLJ 107.
25. As has been noticed hereinabove, in the case of Sunderlal Hazarilal (supra) it was held that any of the grounds envisaged under the Clauses (a), (c), (d) or (o) of Section 12(1) of the Act, must exist prior to the filing of the suit, and they could not be allowed to be incorporated in the plaint by way of amendment. This view of the Division Bench was not approved of by the Full Bench in its aforementioned decision and overruling the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Sunderlal Hazarilal (supra) as well as the earlier decision of a Division Bench in the case of Ratanlal Gulzarilal Vaishya v. Damodardas Giridharilal Vaishya, reported in 1961 MPLJ 7 = 1961 JLJ 5, the Full Bench held that the ground for eviction under Section 12(1) of the Act which was not in existence at the time of filing of the suit, but came into existence during the pendency of the suit can be made a ground by way of amendment of the plaint and a decree for eviction can be passed on such ground if that ground is established by the plaintiff.
26. The decision in the case of Narayanji (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant is based on the decision of a Division Bench in the case of Sunderlal Hazarilal (supra). The other decision in the case of Sureshchandra (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant is based on the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Ratanlal Gulzarilal Vaishya (supra). Since both these decisions rendered by the Division Bench were overruled by a Full Bench in the case of Chhotelal (supra), the applicant cannot derive any advantage out of the observations made in the decisions of the learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Narayanji (supra) and Sureshchandra (supra).
27. In the aforesaid connection, it may further be noticed that the decision in the case of Sureshchandra (supra) rendered by a learned single Judge is dated 13-12-1983. The decision by the Full Bench in the case of Chhotelal (supra) was delivered on 1-10-1982. The aforesaid decision was binding on the learned single Judge but it appears that the decision of the Full Bench was not taken into consideration. In the circumstances, the doctrine of per-in-curiam clearly stands attracted as it applies where a division of the Court has reached a decision in the absence of knowledge of a decision binding on it or a statute provided that in either case it has to be shown that had the Court had the said material, it must have reached a contrary decision. This doctrine, however, does not extend to a case where if different arguments had been placed before it, or a different material had been placed before it, it might have reached a different conclusion. In the present case so far as the decision in the case of Sureshchandra (supra) is concerned, it is clearly per-in-curiam.
28. It seems to me that the ground made available for eviction of a tenant to the landlord of the specified category envisaged Under Section 20 of the Act, has to be taken as an additional ground which is made available to a landlord. The provisions contained in Sections 12(1) and 20 of the Act have to be read in a harmonious manner but the bar contained Under Section 12(1) of the Act cannot be deemed to be extended automatically so as to cover the cases contemplated Under Section 20 of the Act.
29. The learned counsel for the defendant/applicant has urged that the amendment allowed in the year 1997, will relate back to the date of the filing of the suit, and if this is permitted to be done, it may have wholly unwarranted results.
30. Suffice it to say in the aforesaid connection that even according to the plaintiff, the additional ground on which the eviction of tenant was sought had become available only in the month of December, 19%, and that it was based on a resolution passed by the executive body of the trust. In the circumstances, the plaintiff did not intend that the amendment should be allowed to relate back to the date of the filing of the suit. There can be no justification for treating the amendment to relate back to the date of the filing of the suit as on the own showing of the plaintiff, the ground which had become available in the year 1996, could not be treated to have become available on the date of the filing of the suit. The apprehension of the defendant is, therefore, totally misconceived.
31. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances brought on record and the conclusions indicated hereinabove, no justifiable ground has been made out for any interference by this Court in the present proceedings while exercising the revisional jurisdiction envisaged Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
32. This revision is accordingly dismissed in limine.