ORDER
A.M. Sapre, J.
1. The question involved in this writ is a short one. The question is whether respondent No. 4 was qualified to bid for the dealership of Bharal Petroleum Corporation for commodity popularly known as LPG or in other words, whether respondent No. 4 was eligible for being considered for the dealership of Bharat Petroleum Corporation for LPG The question arises on following facts on which the petitioner has sought this relief in this writ under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
2. The respondent No. 1 is a Government of India undertaking. By advertisement published in News Paper dated 21-8-2000 (Annexure A), the respondent No. 1 invited application from candidates for grant of dealership of distribution of LPG cylinders for several districts in State of M.P. One such district was Shajapur. The respondent No. 1 had prescribed several conditions as an eligibility criteria for applying for the said dealership. In other words, candidates fulfilling the prescribed eligibility criteria contained in the advertisement notice and its enclosing brochure alone were requested to apply. So far as this petition is concerned, the dispute centres round to applicability of clause which reads as under :--
Conviction : Candidates convicted for any criminal offence involving moral turpitude and/or economic offence (other than freedom struggle) and those against whom charges have been framed by the Court (other than freedom struggle) would not be eligible for dealership/distributorship and if such a person is allotted the dealership/distributorship by suppression of information, it will be cancelled.'
3. The petitioner as also the respondent No. 4 claiming themselves to be an eligible candidate for grant of dealership of LPG applied by submitting their respective applications in the prescribed forms. It is the case of petitioner that though he had fulfilled all the terms and conditions prescribed for grant of dealership, the respondent No. 4 was not even eligible to apply. It was alleged that a Criminal Case No. 607 of 2001 was pending and registered against the respondent No. 4 in the Court of J.M.F.C., Shajapur under Sections294, 341 and 323 of IPC and in which the charges under all the aforementioned sections were framed. The petitioner, therefore, complained in writing (An-nexure E) to respondent No. 3 and brought to their notice that since admittedly the respondent No.4 is facing criminal charge in respect of offences involving moral turpitude on the date of submission of application for grant of dealership, his application be not considered, he being disqualified himself for this dealership in view of aforementioned clause. The petitioner also sent copy of charge (Annexure D) framed by the Criminal Court to respondent No. 3 to enable them to reject the application form of the respondent No. 4 at its threshold treating him to be a disqualified candidate. By impugned order dated 20-4-2001 (Annexure R-1/1) (Annexure R-3/4), the respondent No. 3 rejected the objection of the petitioner and held the respondent No. 4 to be an eligible candidate for grant of dealership and eventually proceeded to grant the dealership in favour of respondent No. 4. It is against this rejection of objection dated 20-4-2001 (Annexure R-11/1) and grant of dealership by letter dated 17-3-2001 to respondent No. 4 the petitioner has felt aggrieved and filed this writ.
4. The respondent Nos. 1 to 3 have filed their return. They have in fact supported their decision dated 20-4-2001 on the reasoning contained in the said decision. In substance, the stand of these respondents is that the offences for which the respondent No. 4 is being prosecuted by the Criminal Court can not be regarded as offences involving any moral turpitude so as to debar him from submitting the application. In other words, the stand of the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 is that the case of respondent No. 4 does not fall in the aforementioned clause as it has no application to the case of respondent No. 4. It is on this ground it is contended that the respondent No. 4 was rightly held to be eligible for applying for the dealership.
5. The respondent No. 4 has also filed his separate return. He has supported the sound of respondent Nos. 1 to 3. In addition, while admitting the filing of case against him, he has averred that he has now compromised the dispute with the complainant and has filed the compromise application on 5-3-2001 (pages 19 and 20) in Criminal Court. It is the case of respondent No. 4 that since the matter stands settled between him and his complainant, there, remains nothing which can be used against the respondent No. 4.
6. Heard Shri S.C. Bagadia, learned Senior Counsel with Shri Ajay Bagadia, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Shri Sandeep Kochalta, learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2, Shri Vinay Vijayvargiya, learned Counsel for respondent No. 3 and Shri B.L. Pavecha, learned Senior Counsel with Smt. Sadhna Pathak, learned Counsel for respondent No. 4.
7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner while impugning the action of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in entertaining the dealership application submitted by respondent No. 4 and its eventual acceptance resulting in grant of dealershipin his favour urged that the whole action is an out come of an arbitrary exercise of power by the respondents it being plainly in breach of their own conditions. Learned Counsel contended that when admittedly the respondent No. 4 was facing the criminal trial in relation to offences punishable under Sections 294, 341 and 323 of IPC for which even charge was also framed, the disqualification of respondent No. 4 was apparent being contrary to clause relating to conviction. Learned Counsel maintained that the offences for which the respondent No. 4 was being prosecuted did involve the element of moral turpitude and hence, it did attract the aforesaid clause for rejection of his application at its out set. Learned Counsel urged that accepting the application of respondent No, 4 and its eventual grant in his favour was a clear case of favour shown by the State authorities while distributing the larges of State to an individual who was not qualified whereas others though available and admittedly having better qualification in all respect were not considered. It is these submissions which were elaborated by the learned Counsel for the petitioner to support his case.
8. In reply, learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and respondent No. 4 respectively in their submissions supported the grant made in favour of respondent No. 4 while defending the grant, learned Counsel urged that none of the sections in which the charges are framed against the respondent No. 4 involve any element of moral turpitude so as to attract the clause relating to conviction and hence, the decision taken by the respondent No. 3 in favour of respondent No. 4 to grant dealership is well justified. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 4 also urged that in any event, once the respondent No. 4 settled the dispute pending in Criminal Court with the complainant then, nothing survives in the complaint made by the petitioner. It is essentially these submissions which were pressed in service to defend the grant.
9. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and having perused the record of the case, I am of the considered opinion, that this petition deserves to be allowed, resulting in quashing of decision taken by the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 to grant the dealership of LPG to respondent No. 4.
10. The question that really falls for consideration in this writ is what is the true scope of the clause extracted above under the heading conviction and secondly, whether offences punishable under Sections 294, 341 and 323 of IPC involves an element of moral turpitude.
11. Mere perusal of aforequoted clause would show that it provides for a disqualification. In other words, it is in the nature of disqualification for a candidate. It says that in case, if it is found that candidate who has applied for dealership is convicted for a criminal offence involving moral turpitude or is convicted for any economic offence, or against the said candidate even a charge of any criminal or economic offence involving moral turpitude have been framed by any Criminal Court, then such candidate would be disqualified and ineligible to apply. The clause further says that if after a grant of dealershipthe company comes to know that any candidate has suppressed such information from the company at the time of grant, then the dealership granted to him will be cancelled. The candidates coming from freedom struggle category is kept as an exception.
12. The word 'moral turpitude' is not defined under any law. However, this word is frequently used in English Phraseology. Law Lexicon has explained the meaning of this word in the following way :--
'Moral turpitude. Anything done contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.
A term not clearly defined-- What constitutes moral turpitude, or what will be held such, is not entirely clear. A contract to promote public wrong, short of crime, may or may not involve it. If parties intend such wrong, as where they conspire against the public interests by agreeing to violate the law or some rule of public policy, the act doubtless involves moral turpitude. When no wrong is contemplated, but is unintentionally committed, through error of judgment, it is otherwise. (Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Central Transp. Co., 65 Fed. 158, 161). Everything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals is done with turpitude, so that embezzlement involves moral turpitude.'
13. Similarly, this word also fell for consideration it being a word, frequently used in several Acts and Rules before their Lordships of Supreme Court in the case of 'In the matter of P', reported in AIR 1963 SC 1313, Their Lordships explaining the true meaning of this word though interpreted in the context of facts involved in that case held that the word should not receive any narrow construction while giving effect to it. Dealing with the case of professional misconduct alleged against a lawyer their Lordships held :--
'In dealing with this aspect of the matter, the expression 'moral turpitude or delinquency is not to receive a narrow construction. Wherever conduct proved against an Advocate is contrary to honesty, or opposed to good morals, or is unethical, it may be safely held that it involves moral turpitude. A wilful and callous disregard for the interests of the client may, in a proper case, be characterised as conduct unbefitting an Advocate. Any conduct which makes a person unworthy to belong to the noble fraternity of lawyers or makes an Advocate unfit to be entrusted with the responsible task of looking after the interest of the litigant, must be regarded as conduct involving moral turpitude. The Advocates-on-Record like the other Members of the Bar are Officers of the Court and thepurity of the administration of justice depends as much on the integrity of the Judges as on the honesty of the Bar. That is why dealing with the question as to whether an Advocate has rendered himself unfit to belong to the brotherhood at the Bar, the expression 'moral turpitude or delinquency', is not to be construed in an unduly narrow and restricted sense.'
14. It is in the light of aforesaid exposition, contained in law lexicon and the approach of Supreme Court in interpreting the word in question by giving to it very wide interpretation. Let us examine as to whether an offence punishable under Section 294 of IPC attracts the element of moral turpitude. Section 294 reads as under :--
'Section 294. Whoever, to the annoyance of others, (a) does any obscene act in any public place, or
(b) sings, recites or utters any obscene songs, ballad or words, in or near any public place,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both.'
15. Perusal of aforequoted section would clearly indicate that if any person is found to have indulged in any obscene act in any public place or if he sings, recite or utter any obscene songs or words in or near any public place, then such an act of that person is made an offence for which he can be punished for a period of three months or with fine or both.
16. It also emerge from the perusal of what law lexicon says on this word that anything done contrary to justice or an act done contrary to modesty or good morals is considered to involve moral turpitude. Similarly, if a man does some act contrary to social duties which he owes to his fellow man or to a Society in general then such act is also considered to involve moral turpitude.
17. In my considered opinion, when one takes into account the aforementioned facts, then it clearly appears that utterance of obscene words by any person against other person in a public place with an intention to mean to be used only against that person docs attract and involve moral turpitude. It is an act which is not only punishable under the Penal Code but is not acceptable in civilized society. It exhibits the uncivilized character of a person who utters it. No person in the Society would tolerate such words to be used against him by any person in a public place. It gives him a right to file suit against such person and claim even compensation for having caused damage to his reputation in public at large. It is an act which no civilized man in society would generally accept it, it being an act against good morals. A person who commits such an offence is never regarded in a civilized society to be man of good character. Such person never command any respect in society because of his indecent behaviour in society. It exhibits lack of good morals in him. Such actcan certainly be regarded as an act involving moral turpitude because the legislative intent and judicial decisions suggest its wide interpretation.
18. Coming to the facts of this case, it is an admitted fact that the Criminal Court has framed charges against the respondent No. 4 which if proved, would have become an offence punishable under Sections 294, 341 and 323 of IPC. These charges read as under :--
^^fd vkius fnukad 17&3&2000 dks 'kke 6lk<+s 6 cts dks&vkijsfVOg; /ka/ks cSad ds lkeus jksM ij csjNk e.Mh esaifj;knh eukst 'kekZ dks yksd LFkku ij v'yhy xkfy;ka nsdj {kksHk dkfjr fd;k
vkidk mDr R; Hkk-na-la- dh /kkjk 294 dsvUrxZr n.Muh; gksdj bl U;k;ky; ds laKku esa gS
fd vkius mDr fnukad] le; o LFkku ij Qfj;knheukst 'kekZ dks ml fn'kk esa ftlesa mls tkus dk vf/kdkj Fkk] tkus ls jksd djmldk lnks/k vojks/k dkfjr fd;k
vkidk mDr R; Hkk-na-la- dh /kkjk 341 dsvUrxZr n.Muh; gksdj bl U;k;ky; ds laKku esa gS
fd vkius mDr fnukad] le; o LFkku ij vU; lgvfHk;qDr ds lkFk feydj migfr dkfjr djus dk lkekU; vk'k; cuk;k vkSj ml lkekU;vk'k; ds vxzlj.k esa vkius yksgs dh jkWM ls Qfj;knh eukst 'kekZ dks flj esaekjdj LosPN;k migfr dkfjr dh
vkidk mDr R; Hkk-na-la- dh /kkjk 323 dsvUrxZr n.Muh; gksdj bl U;k;ky; ds laKku esa gS
vkius mDr fnukad] le; o LFkku ij Qfj;knh dksla=kl dkfjr djus ds vk'k; ls tkus ls ekjus dh /kkSal nsdj la=kl dkfjr fd;k vkidkR; Hkk-na-la- dh /kkjk 506&, vUrxZr n.Muh; gS vkSj eSa ,rn~ }kjk funsZ'knsrk gwa fd rqEgkjk bl U;k;ky; }kjk mDr vkjksi ij fopkj fd;k tkosA**
19. In my opinion, the aforesaid act on the part of respondent No. 4 did attract the clause relating to conviction and hence rendered him disqualified/ineligible for applying for the dealership of LPG. The respondent Nos. 1 to 3 having provided the clause should have given effect to it while considering the application of respondent No. 4 against him. The very purpose of providing such clause in the application form was that only those persons were to be considered eligible who arc not involved in any criminal cases involving moral turpitude except the freedom fighters. Indeed, the intention to give strict implementation to this clause becomes apparent when it further gives a right to respondent Nos. 1 to 3 to even cancel the dealership already granted to a person who is found to have suppressed such information at the time of submission of application. This clearly suggests as to how muchimportance was attached to such condition, if found to be present in the case of any candidate, which is capable of being exercised at any time after the grant of dealership,
20. Submission of learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4 was that once the criminal case filed against the respondent No. 4 ended in compromise with the complainant may be subsequent to framing of charge, it results in wiping out of the charge from its inception. It is on this basis, learned Counsel urged that the respondent No. 4 was eligible to apply, so too the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were justified in grant of dealership, I do not agree. In my opinion, the submission has no merit,
21. In terms of conditions quoted supra, the eligibility of a candidate had to be judged on the date when he submitted the application form, with a view to find out whether he has fulfilled all required qualifications or/and whether he is a disqualified candidate.
22. In other words, the qualification or/and disqualification of a candidate had to be seen on the date of submission of application form. It was not in dispute nor any attempt was made by any of the respondents to dispute that on the date of submission of application form by the respondent No. 4, he was having to his discredit a criminal charge pending in respect of an offence involving moral turpitude. It is this event, which renders him disqualified to apply and takes him out from zone of consideration.
23. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4 relied on a decision of Gujarat High Court rendered in Special C.A no. 235 of 1977, decided on 13-1-1977 to contend that an offence under Section 323 of IPC do not have any involvement of moral turpitude. I have already held that an offence under Section 294 involves moral turpitude and since in this case the respondent No. 4 was also facing a criminal charge under Section 294 in addition to Section 323 of IPC, no benefit of the decision relied on can be of help to respondents. So too the decision relied on by the learned Counsel in the case of Brij Kishore v. M.P.S.R. T.C. (1995 MPLJ 870). In this case also the learned Judge was not dealing with any case relating to offence punishable under IPC. The learned Judge while examining the scope of word 'moral turpitude' observed that it depends upon facts of each case to decide as to whether it involves any moral turpitude or not.
24. Yet one more submission urged by the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4 need to be dealt with. According to learned Counsel utterance of such words by the respondent No. 4 may not be taken as seriously as they are usually uttered in society as a part of language. In other words, the submission was that one should not give any importance to such utterance even if they are held to be proved in Court. The argument must be rejected at its out set being untenable at its face. If such submission is accepted then it will virtually amount to putting a judicial seal on an act which is an offence under the Penal Laws. If a particular act is an offence in law, then it remains anoffence. Wherever its reference comes for interpretation and hence, Courts can not view the said incident in any other context except the one taken in law to be an offence. If the human values are deteriorating then the efforts must be to stop the deterioration rather than to approve it by putting judicial seal over it.
25. Learned Counsel for the petitioner lastly submitted that if this Court comes to a conclusion that respondent No. 4 was not eligible to apply and that respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were not justified in granting the distributorship to respondent No. 4, then in such event, the petitioner being the only eligible candidate, this Court should issue a writ of mandamus directing respondent Nos. 1 to 3 to award the dealership/distributorship to petitioner. I do not agree. A writ of mandamus of this nature can not be granted in the facts of this case. This Court has mainly examined the issue regarding eligibility of respondent No. 4 in applying for the dealership. The decision on this issue against the respondent No. 4 rendered the instance of petitioner does not result in grant of dealership to petitioner. It is not for the Court to decide as to who is the best suited candidate for this dealership/distributorship or/and to whom the said dealership is to be granted or whether it should be granted at all to any candidate who remained in fray after excluding respondent No. 4 or whether the entire process for grant of dealership be initiated denovo. These are all matters which lie exclusively within the domain of the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and decide as to what action is now to be resorted to. Needless to emphasis and remind the authorities that they must ensure that their action must always be fair, reasonable and keeping in account the upper most interest of the State they being the custodian of larges of the State for distribution. Their decision must always reflect that they have given full effect to their policy meant for observance and not for ignorance. Their decision should never be shadowed by any extraneous consideration. The selection of persons should always be strictly on merits and in accordance with the clear mandate contained in the policy. Effort must always be made to ensure that merit and best suitable must prevail so that nobody is able to raise any grievance against State authorities.
26. In view of aforesaid discussion, the petition succeeds and is allowed. Impugned decision contained in letter/order dated 20-4-2001 (Annexure R-1/1)taken by Chairman, Dealer Selection Board, Bhopal II, Bhopal-the respondent No. 3 and letter dated 17-3-2001 issued by respondent No. 1 (which is at pages 23 to 25 of return of respondent No. 4) granting a distributorship of LPG for Shajapur is quashed by issuance of writ of certiorari. A writ in the nature of mandamus is issued to respondent Nos. 1 to 3. Not to consider the application of respondent No. 4 which he has submitted for the dealership/ distributorship of LPG pursuant to advertisement (Annexure A).
No costs.