Judgment:
ORDER
S.K. Dubey, J.
1. This is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order, dated 6-10-1987 (Annexure P-5), passed by First Civil Judge, Class II, Shivpuri, in Civil Suit No. 124-A/1986, and order dated 22-2-1988 (Annexure P-6) passed in Civil Revision No. 33/1987, by District Judge, Shivpuri.
2. Brief facts leading to this petition are: The respondent/plaintiff filed a suit for eviction and for arrears of rent against the petitioner/tenant averring therein that defendant was inducted as a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 100/- by one Dinanath Sharma. The tenancy was oral, which commenced from 16-9-1981. Dinanath Sharma died on 10-11-1983, who executed a will in favour of the plaintiff/respondent. It was alleged in the plaint that petitioner/defendant paid rent to plaintiff/respondent till 31-1-1986; from 1-2-1986 the petitioner did not pay any rent, hence, a notice of demand, demanding the rent due was served on the petitioner. The petitioner did not tender or pay the amount in the period prescribed by law, hence, the respondent instituted the suit for eviction and arrears of rent. The petitioner in his written statement denied the allegations and contended that he is a tenant of one Khachhuram Kuswah on a monthly rent of Rs. 10/-. The relationship of landlord and tenant between plaintiff/respondent and him was denied.
3. After the receipt of summons, the tenant did not deposit the arrears of rent due within one month, hence, an application was filed by the respondent under section 13(6) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short the 'Act') for striking out the defence of petitioner/tenant. The trial Court vide order dated 6-10-1987 (Annexure P-5) ordered that the dispute about the relationship of landlord and tenant can only be decided after recording evidence, hence, the petitioner was directed to deposit all the arrears of rent due within one month from the date of that order. Against this order, a revision was taken to the Court of District Judge, Shivpuri, who, vide order dated 22-2-1988 (Annexure P-6), maintained the order of the trial Court and observed that according to the provisions of section 13(3) of the Act, the petitioner is bound to deposit the rent, and the rent so deposited will not be withdrawn by the plaintiff till the dispute regarding relationship of landlord and tenant is decided. The petitioner did not deposit any rent as ordered by the two Courts, hence, the tiral Court vide order, dated 13-7-1988 (Annexure P-7), ordered to strike out the defence of the petitioner.
4. Shri Arun Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the trial Court has not decided the dispute in accordance with section 13(2) of the Act; as the rate of rent was also in dispute, the trial Court was bound to fix a reasonable provisional rent in relation to the accommodation, to be deposited or paid in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1). That having not been done, the orders of the two Courts below and the order of striking out the defence deserve to be quashed. Reliance was placed on Single Bench decisions of this Court in Ashok v. Shri Vallabh Gupta, 1981 JLJ SN 74; Lokumal v. Swastika Bakeries Pvt. Ltd., 1980 MPRCJ N 105; Ajhar Karim v. Mohammad Ismail, 1980 MPRCJ N 61 and Babulal v. Pratap, 1980 (II) WN192.
5. Shri N. K. Jain, learned counsel for respondent/landlord contended that as the order of striking out the defence has already been passed, a remedy of revision is available to the petitioner; therefore, this petition is not maintainable. Learned counsel further contended that if the petitioner does not consider himself to be the tenant of the respondent, he may not comply with the provisions of section 13(1) and, after suffering the consequences mentioned in section 13(6) of the Act, he may still continue to contest the case on the dispute of relationship of landlord and tenant. Shri Jain submitted that the view of this Court is settled in a Division Bench decision in Inderlal v. Mahugibai, 1967 MPLJ 125 = 1967 JLJ 31, wherein this Court has held that section 13(1) applied not only where the relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted by the defendant, but also where the relationship is denied by him and this view is being consistently followed. Both the Courts have rightly passed the orders in accordance with the provisions of section 13(3) of the Act, which do not call for any interference under Article. 227 of the Constitution. Shri Jain to support his contentions placed reliance on Mahammad Yunus v. Mohammad Mustaqim, AIR 1984 SC 38; Quasim v. Jamaluddin, 1986 (II) MPWN 168; Om Prakash v. Smt. Gendabai, 1986 MPRCJ N 13; Mishrilal Rathore v. Annapurnabai, 1976 JLJ N 12 and Asharam v. Bindrawan, 1985 MPWN 153.
6. After hearing learned counsel, we are of the opinion that the contention of Shri Mishra in the present facts of the case is without any merit. A bare reading of section 13 shows that the dispute as contemplated under sub-section (2) of section 13 is as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, and it cannot be disputed that such a dispute could be (i) a dispute about the amount of arrears payable, or (ii) a dispute about the quantum of monthly rent. It cannot be further disputed that if there is a dispute about the quantum of monthly rent, the dispute about arrears payable would be related to the monthly rent. If such a dispute is raised, then the provisions of section 13(1) will remain suspended till the trial Court passes an order as contemplated under section 13(2) of the Act by fixing a reasonable provisional rent in relation to the accommodation, to be deposited in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 13.
7. A look to the pleadings about the dispute raised in the written statement, filed by the petitioner, clearly shows that the dispute raised is that the respondent/plaintiff is not his landlord and there is no privity of contract between him and the plaintiff. When there exists such a dispute in a proceeding under section 13(1) of the Act, the Court under section 13(3) may direct the tenant to deposit with the Court the amount payable by him under sub-section (1) and in such a case no person shall be entitled to withdraw the amount in deposit until the Court decides the dispute and makes an order for payment of the same, and that is what has been done in the present case by the two Courts below. Therefore, the petitioner cannot escape from the mandate of section 13(1) of the Act. The Division Bench of this Court in case of Inderlal (supra) after placing reliance on two decisions of the Supreme Court in M/s I. and M. Ltd. v. Pheroze Framroze, AIR 1953 SC 73 and Babulal v. Nandram, AIR 1958 SC 677, held:
'Once a suit for ejectment, on any of the grounds referred to in section 12, is instituted, the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 13 operate against the defendant, and the Court acquires jurisdiction to deal with any claim or question arising under any of the provisions of section 13, no matter whether the relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted or denied by the defendant. Section 13(1) does not say, or intend to say, that the plea of the defendant will determine whether he is or is not liable to make any deposit under that provision. It proceeds on the basis that a suit by a person claiming to be a landlord has been filed against the person alleged to be his tenant on any of the grounds mentioned in section 12. It is plain from section 12 that in a suit for eviction, founded on any of the grounds mentioned therein, the plaintiff must allege that he is the landlord and that the defendant is his tenant. Therefore, the word 'tenant' used in section 13(1) of the Act is merely connotative of the description which the plaintiff has given of the defendant and means nothing more than 'defendant.' It does not imply a defendant who has been found to be a tenant by the Court.'
8. The next contention of Shri Mishra that, as the dispute was raised under section 13(2) also, therefore, the Court ought to have fixed the reasonable provisional rent under section 1342) and till then section 13(1) remained controlled, has no merit. The law is settled by a Full Bench decision of this Court in Chhogalal v. Bhagwan Shri Satyanarain, 1975 MPLJ 657 = 1975 JLJ 779, that when a dispute is raised as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant or as to the person to whom it is payable, sub-section (1) gets controlled by sub-sections (2) and (3). But we have to see whether in this case any such dispute was raised under section 13(3) of the Act. Looking to the dispute raised in the written statement, it is abundantly clear that the petitioner/defendant came with a case that he is not the plaintiff's tenant and is tenant of Khachhuram Kuswah at the rate of Rs. 10/- per month. The petitioner did not raise the dispute under section 13(2) of the Act, in the alternative; neither this plea was raised before the trial Court nor before the revisional Court, now the plea cannot be entertained for the first time in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, because it is the Court trying the suit, which has the jurisdiction to entertain, after recording reasons in writing, the plea under section 13(2) of the Act at any subsequent stage of the suit. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be allowed to say that unless the dispute with respect to relationship of landlord and tenant is decided, he is not bound to comply with the provisions of section 13(3) of the Act. In our opinion, on such a plea the Courts have rightly passed the orders under section 13(3) of the Act. The petitioner cannot invoke the provisions of section 13(2) of the Act in the facts of the case; as he has only denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and him and has not deposited the rent under section 13(1), his defence was rightly ordered to be struck off by the trial Court under section 13(6). Such a striking out of the defence does not prejudice the case of the petitioner, as he can still establish that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant, and if it is so established, then certainly the suit of the plaintiff/respondent is bound to fail.
9. From the above discussion, we are of opinion that no interference is warranted in our supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, which is limited to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. The order may be right or wrong either on facts or in law, and, unless it is demonstrated that the order is without jurisdiction or is passed in violation of the settled principles of law or against the principles of natural justice, it cannot be interfered.
10. Lastly, Shri Mishra submitted that the petitioner's defence has been struck off because of non-compliance of the orders (Annexures P-5 and P-6), and made a prayer that the petitioner is a poor tenant and he be allowed time to deposit the rent. The prayer is reasonable and is not opposed by the respondent/plaintiff; the circumstances of the case also warrant that the petitioner be granted time to deposit the rent. As rent is said to be due from 1-2-1986 three months' time is granted to petitioner to deposit the rent according to orders (Annexure P-5 and Annexure P-6). If the amount is so deposited, the defence of the petitioner will not be struck off.
11. In the result, the petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.