Judgment:
ORDER
R.C. Lahoti, J.
1. The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1984 having come into force and the State Administrative Tribunal too having been established, should this Court entertain and proceed to dispose of the controversy raised in the petition or should the petitioner be directed to knock the doors of Tribunal, is the question mooted for decision at this stage.
2. The petitioner, a member of scheduled caste, complains of gross violation of statutoy rules and foul play at the process of selection conducted by a Selection Committee constituted for selecting suitable candidates for filling the posts of Warders in Central Jail, Gwalior. The relief prayed for is that the candidates, including the petitioner, who were actually selected by the Selection Committee be given appointments and those who were not so selected and yet could secure appointments, be excluded. The petitioner is out of employment and is definitely not an in service person.
3. The maintainability of the petition having been objected to on behalf of the respondents in response to the show cause against admission notice issued to them, they have vehemently objected to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition. The learned counsel for the petitioner has defended the jurisdiction of this Court placing implicit reliance on a Division Bench decision of Madras High Court in The Chairman, Railway Recruitment Board, Madras v. S. Ruban Pater and Ors., 1990 L.I.C. 1759. The issue raised in the petition may be a service matter within the meaning of Section 2(q) of the Act, it might be something in relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to any civil service of the State or to any civil post under the State, within the meaning of Section 15 of the Act, nevertheless all those provisions must take colour from the parent provision Article 323A of the Constitution and the petitioner not being an inservice person has no entry in the judicial jurisdictional arena of the Tribunal and hence his constitutional right to make a call to the jurisdiction of this Court cannot be denied, submits the learned counsel for the petitioner.
4. Without wasting any time introting through the web of several legal provisions, we straight way proceed to make a reference to the two land-mark decisions rendered by this Court and other we shall refer to the Madras decision r relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner.
4A. V. S. Jadon-II, 1989 MPLJ 255, was the case of dailyrater, as employed by the State. In that context, this Court has had an opportunity of analysing several relevant provisions of the Act in the light of Article 323A of the Constitution. This Court observed :--
'The jurisdiction exercisable by the Tribunal under Section 15 is expressly circumscribed in terms of Article 323A(2)(b) to deal with matters which concern a person who stakes claim to recuritment to 'any civil service of the State' or is 'appointed to any civil service of the State or to any civil post under the State. 'It is indeed only such a person who is entitled to make an 'application' to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance. We have no doubt that Sections 15 and 19 are to be read together and that view is supported by what is to be read in Section 20.'
* * * * 'According to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, the word 'appoint', at legal parlance, means to declare an appointment under a power; and even ordinarily it means, to determine authoritatively. The term evidently connotes vesting in the person appointed some manner of right providing security to his tenure, under statutory contract or statutory provisions. Much difference lies between an appointment made and an employment provided, as indicated by meaning of the term 'employ' given in the same dictionary. A person is said to be employed when he finds in any manner, for any period, any work or occupation.'
* * * * * * * * * '...the acid test for determination of Tribunal's jurisdiction is to address primarily to the question if in the case before it, this Court is satisfied about what we have called, the crucial and immutable requirement. This Court shall not have jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and to deal with grievances made by the petitioner therein if the petitioner is 'appointed to any civil service of the State or to any civil post under the State' and for that matter, it has to be seen if there are any statutory rules regulating his recruitment and conditions of service. But it has also to be seen if the petitioner could have, even otherwise, made 'application' under Section 19 of the Act to the Tribunal, for he is not to be left remediless. We reiterate in this context that High Court's residuary jurisdiction stands unaffected and refusal to exercise the same to render a citizen remediless would be breach of constitutional trust.'
This Court concluded by holding :--
'The State Administrative Tribunal has not been vested with 'jurisdiction, powers and authority' to entertain and deal with an 'application' by a person in public employment whose conditions of service and recruitment are not governed by statutory Rules because he is not a person' appointment to any civil service of the State or to any civil post under the State.'
5. C. P. Kulshreshtha (Dr.) v. Govt. of M.P., 1991 JLJ 198 is a case wherein Vijay Singh Jadon-II (supra) was referred to and the phrase 'cases relating to selection and/or appointment of judicial officers and all cases instituted by or against judicial officers or ex-judicial officers' came up for consideration of and interpretation by the Division Bench. This Court held:-
'...only cases of perfected right of a candidate offering himself for selection as a Judicial Officer, such as of his being duly selected for appointment as such Officer, come within the purview of the afore-quoted order. It shall be open to any candidate, qua citizen, to challenge any arbitrary action of any authority by which the pre-selection procedure is vitiated and his right to selection is infringed.'
6. Now we refer to Chairman, Rly. Recruitment Board's case (supra). Serious irregularities and foul play at the selection conducted by a Railway Recruitment Board were alleged. The selection was questioned through several writ petitions on very many grounds. The learned Single Judge who initially heard the petitions on the question of maintainability in view of the objection raised by the respondents to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 14(1)(a) of the Act, held that the matters relating to pre-recruitment stage fell outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The decision was challenged before the Division Bench in a writ appeal. The question mooted for consideration was who are the persons who are required to approach only the Tribunal for the adjudication of disputes concerning their services and to whom the writ jurisdiction of the High Court was no longer available.
7. The learned Chief Justice Dr. A. S. Anand (as His Lordship then was) spoke for the Court. The parental provision -- Article 323A of the Constitution, Section 14 of the Act speaking of the jurisdiction, power and authority of Central Administrative Tribunal, the definition of 'service matter', a few provisions of the Rules, were all referred to, analysed and examined. A note of historical background under which the Act was passed and the Tribunal established was taken. The argument that the expression 'recruitment and matters concerning recruitment' includes the matters arising at the pre-recruitment stage raised by persons not in-service was repelled and the Division Bench held :--
'The use of the expression 'recruitment and matters concerning recruitment', in our opinion, would imply that the 'in-service' candidates can raise disputes before the Tribunal even in respect of matters relating to recruitment, but no person who is not 'in-service' can approach the tribunal for redressal of any grievance.'
* * * * * * * 'The consideration of the expression recruitment and matters concerning recruitment' occurring in Section 14(1)(a) of the Act, divorced from the context in which it appears and without examining the provisions of other sections of the Act, can lead to absurdities. If the argument of learned counsel for the appellant were to be accepted that the tribunal can be approached even by persons who are not in service provided they have a grievance against 'recruitment and matters concerning recruitment', then it would imply that even person who is not personally aggrieved would also be entitled to maintain an application under the Act in public interest This is not possible. Such a person can only approach the High Court in exercise of the writ jurisdiction, and not the tribunal. Of course, public interest does require administration to be maintained smoothly and efficiently, but we are afraid the jurisdiction of the tribunal cannot be extended to adjudicate upon disputes in public interest, since the jurisdiction, authority and powers conferred on the tribunal are only to be exercised as contemplated by the provisions of the Act. Construed in this light, it is not possible to hold that the jurisdiction of the High Court would not be available to persons who are not in service when they have a grievance relatable to some service. Before the tribunal only, the 'in-service' persons can agitate in respect of matters covered under the Act'
* * * * * * * '...a person who is not in service cannot be said to be an 'aggrieved person' under Section 19. Inviting applications for a post does not by itself create any right to the post in any candidate who in response to the advertisement makes an application. He only offers himself to be considered for the post. It does not create any right in the candidate to the post. Even the pre-recruitment formalities, such as medical examination, direction to deposit some money as security, does not amount to a promise to appoint the applicant. Mere expectancy of being taken in service or the pre-recruitment formalities having been gone through, does not create any promise which the employer would be estopped from ignoring. Of course, in public service, a candidate who is otherwise fit, able and appropriate person for appointment, should not be ignored on any extraneous consideration; but at the same time, he or she cannot claim that he or she has acquired some right to be appointed to the post for which he or she is a candidate just because he or she had applied for the post and had even gone through the pre-recruitment formalities. No such candidate can approach the tribunal for redressal of any grievance and for such a person the invoking of the jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution has not been excluded.'
* * * * * 'The application for raising a matter before the tribunal in Form I as framed under Section 19 of the Act goes to show that dispute can be raised only by 'in-service' candidates and not by persons who are not 'in-service'. The applicant has, in paragraph 1 of the form, to give the designation of the office in which he is employed and in paragraph 2 he has to provide the particulars of the order against which the application is made. He has also to declare in paragraph 9 that he has availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant Service Rules before approaching the tribunal. The application form also, thus, supports and fortifies our view that the jurisdiction of the High Court has not been excluded in respect of persons who are not 'In service' and who are not aggrieved' persons within the meaning of Section 19 of the Act and that the jurisdiction of the tribunal is limited only to resolving the disputes raised by any 'aggrieved person' in respect of matters covered by Section 14 of the Act read with Section 3 of the Act and that such of disputes can be raised only by or against the 'in service' candidates.'
* * * * * 'Section 14 and the other provisions of the Act noticed above derive their strength from the Act enacted by virtue of the powers contained in Article 323A of the Constitution (supra), the expression 'recruitment and matters concerning recruitment' as occurring in Section 14 of the Act cannot travel beyond the provisions of Article 323A of the Constitution, which, as already noticed, authorised the Parliament to, by law, provide tribunals for adjudication of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and service conditions of the employees who are already in service of the Union etc. It is fundamental that no subordinate legislation can either override or widen the provisions contained in the Constitution and considered in that light also it becomes obvious that the use of the expression 'recruitment and matters concerning recruitment' occurring in Section 14 must be confined and related to persons who have been appointed to public services or who hold posts in connection with the affairs of the Union etc.'
* * * * * 'The learned single Judge, under the circumstances, was right in rejecting the preliminary objection and holding that the question raised' in the writ petition, which arose at the pre-recruitment stage by persons not already 'inservice' could be gone into by the High Court in exercise of the writ jurisdiction.'
8. We find ourselves in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench of Madras High Court. The view so taken appeals to our judicial conscience and in our opinion too is the only reasonable, plausible and correct view of the law.
9. All the afore-cited decisions have derived strength from several Apex Court decisions referred to therein, which decisions we do not feel the necessity of referring to independently and once again.
10. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the present petition filed by a petitioner who is not' in-service' and raising matters as to pre-recruitment stage, does not lie within the jurisdiction of the State Administrative Tribunal but lies within the jurisdictional competence of this Court. The preliminary objection raised to the maintainability of the petition before High Court is overruled.