ORDER
S.K. Seth, J.
1. In this writ petition, under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, petitioner is assailing the order of compulsory retirement passed by the respondents.
2. Petitioner initially entered the Government service in the year 1964 as Agriculture Extension Officer but later on he was absorbed as Lecturer in the Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwavidhyalaya (hereinafter referred to as 'University') w.e.f. 1-12-1966 vide order dated 16-10-1970. Petitioner served in that capacity until the order impugned was passed. Statutes framed by the University govern service conditions of the University employees. In the present case, we are concerned with Statute No. 11, which empowers the University to retire any employee before the normal age of superannuation. Exercising that power, order impugned has been issued retiring petitioner from service after he had completed age of 55 years.
3. I have heard Shri G.S. Patwardhan, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri B.L. Pavecha, learned Senior Counsel for respondents at length. Also perused the service record of the petitioner, which was produced at the time of hearing by the learned Counsel for the respondents.
4. Shri Patwardhan assailed the impugned order contending that petitioner had unblemished record and without considering the entire service record order impugned has been passed. This according to him is impermissible in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in various decisions. He particularly placed reliance on the following decisions :--
(1) R. Ramchandra Raju v. State of Orissa, (1994) Suppl. III SCC 424.
(2) State of U.P. v. Biharilal, (1994) Suppl. III SC 593.
(3) State of Gujarat v. Suryakant, (1999) 1 SCC 529.
(4) S. Maheshwar Rao v. State of Orissa, 1989 JT (3) SC 273.
(5) Union of India v. R.C. Mishra, (2003) 9 SCC 217.
He also placed reliance on two decisions of this Court; viz., Dr. P.G. Najpandey v. JNKVV, reported in 2000 (I) MPJR 400, and another unreported decision rendered in M.P. No. 337/1981, decided on 26-4-1985. Thus according to him, the impugned order is unsustainable in law and as such deserves to be quashed and petitioner is entitled to all monetary benefits from the date of impugned order till he actually completed the normal age of superannuation.
5. On behalf of respondents, Shri Pavecha, learned Senior Counsel supported the impugned order by contending that no interference is warranted with the compulsory retirement. He submitted that in terms of Statute No. 11 as amended in the year 1992, University is empowered to retire compulsorily any employee after he has attained 55 years of age or completed 25 years of service. Petitioner completed 55 years of age in the year 1994. The Screening Committee, considered petitioner's case along with other employees. The Screening Committee formulated certain norms to consider the cases. One of them to judge the utility was to consider last 5 years ACRs. The Screening Committee after considering the case of petitioner recommended for the compulsory retirement. The recommendation of the Screening Committee was placed before the Board of Management, and the Board in its 146th meeting held on 17-5-1996 approved the recommendation of the Screening Committee. After the approval of Board, Vice Chancellor passed the order impugned on 9-9-1996 ordering compulsory retirement of petitioner w.e.f. 13-9-1996. According to Shri Pavecha, scope of interference in such matters is very limited and this Court can not sit as an Appellate Court to examine the validity of the order of compulsory retirement issued in exercise of powers conferred by Statute No. 11. He thus, supported the order impugned and submitted that the reliance placed by Shri Patwardhan on the decisions is of no avail as those decisions are distinguishable on facts and as such petition deserves to be dismissed.
6. After having heard learned Counsel for the parties, and considering the material produced by respondents for the perusal of Court, in the considered opinion of this Court there is no merit and substance in the writ petition.
7. It can not be disputed and rightly not disputed that Statute No. 11 (4) empowers compulsory retirement after completion of 55 years of age or 25 years of service. It is well established in law that after certain period employer has a right to evaluate the utility of employee based on work and performance and if necessary may compulsorily retire before the employee reaches the prescribed normal age of superannuation. Such order of compulsory retirement is neither dismissal nor a punitive action of any kind. As has been held in string of decisions of the Supreme Court that it is a process undertaken by the employer to weed out corrupt, indolent and inefficient employees who have become dead wood under it. The overall record of the employee goes into consideration on the anvil of laid down norms with due emphasis on the performance of recent five years. The Screening Committee considered case of the petitioner along with other employees/officers who had completed 55 years of age. Screening Committee considered the record of the petitioner, particularly last preceding five years ACRs and recommended compulsory retirement of the petitioner from service upon completion of 55 years of age. The recommendations of the Screening Committee were considered and approved by the Board of Management of the University only thereafter the impugned order was issued. It is now well established that passing of an order of compulsory retirement depends upon the subjective satisfaction of the competent authority, of course on objective considerations. Unless it is shown that the order of compulsory retirement was passed arbitrarily and without application of mind or that such formation of opinion was based on no evidence or that the order was totally perverse, the Court can not interfere. See Jugal Chandra Saikia v. State of Assam, (2003) 4 SCC 59. Considered from that perspective and the material available on record, the decision taken to compulsorily retire the petitioner can not be held to be arbitrary, unjustified or based on no material. Order impugned is passed in public interest. From the ACRs folder it is clear that petitioner did not enjoy unblemished service record. After a steady start of career, majority of ACRs from 1977-78 onwards are of 'C' category - 'Ordinary/satisfactory'. Petitioner continuously got adverse CR form 1990-91, 1992-93, 1994-95. That apart a D.E. was also initiated against the petitioner to inquire into certain allegations of misconduct and that D.E. culminated in a punishment order withholding one increment with cumulative effect (Annexure P-10). From this discussion, it is clear that subjective satisfaction is based on the objective consideration, which does not call for any interference.
8. Now coming to decisions cited, a careful reading would at once disclose that they are distinguishable from the facts of the case in hand. In S. Ramchandra case (supra), the order of compulsory retirement was based on a single adverse entry in the confidential report, therefore, Supreme Court held it to be arbitrary exercise of power. In Biharilal case (supra), High Court set aside the order of compulsory retirement on the ground that representation was pending consideration against adverse ACR. State had gone up in appeal to the Supreme Court after reinstating the respondent therein. At the time of decision of the Supreme Court hardly nine-month's service was left, therefore Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court although it was held that compulsory retirement can be ordered on the basis of even un-communicated adverse entry in confidential report. This case is of no help to present petitioner. In Suryakant case (supra), the Screening Committee without any material assumed only on the basis of FIR that the integrity of the employee was doubtful and recommended compulsory retirement. Order was struck down by the High Court. While maintaining the order of the High Court Supreme Court found and held that no material was there to support the order of compulsory retirement. This case is not applicable to the facts of the present. Similarly, reliance placed on Maheshwar Rao case (supra), is also of avail in as much decision in that was based upon the earlier decision in Brij Mohan Chopra's case and the Supreme Court in Baikunthnath case, reported in AIR 1992 SC 1020 overruled the later decision. Thus, decision in S. Maheshwar Rao does not come to the rescue of the petitioner. In R.C. Mishra's case (supra), specific allegations of malafides were not denied therefore Supreme Court upheld the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal. In the present case as mentioned hereinabove, there are no allegations of malafides hence the R.C. Mishra case is also of no help to petitioner. Now coming to the decision of this Court in Dr. Najpandey's case, in that case the Vice Chancellor without seeking the approval of the Board of Management acted on the recommendations of Screening Committee and passed the order of the compulsory retirement. This Court held that Board of Management is the supreme body and without its approval, Vice Chancellor had no independent authority to pass the order of compulsory retirement. In the case in hand, the recommendations of the Screening Committee were duly approved by the Board of Management and only thereafter the Vice Chancellor issued the order of compulsory retirement, hence no infirmity can be attributed to the order impugned on that score. In Jagdish Prasad case (supra), the Court was concerned with the interpretation of rule regarding age of superannuation and it was not a case of compulsory retirement. Reliance is misconceived. The Supreme Court recently deprecated the practice of indiscriminate citing and use of precedents in Union of India v. Amritlal, reported in (2004) 3 SCC 75, wherein following passage of Lord Denning was quoted with approval:
'Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of line a , case falls, the broad resemblance to another is not at all decisive.'
9. In view of the foregoing discussion, in the considered opinion of this Court, petitioner has failed to make out any case for grant of any relief. The petition is devoid of any substance and as deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, it is dismissed, however no order as to costs.