S.P. Srivastava, J.
1. These Letters Patent Appeals are directed against the orders passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing the Writ Petitions, filed by the petitioners/appellants, by a common order. Taking into consideration the fact that the controversy raised in these appeals is identical in nature, these appeals are being disposed of by a common order.
2. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants as well as the learned counsel representing the contesting respondent, and have carefully perused the record.
3. The facts in brief, shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of these appeals lie in a narrow compass. The petitioner/appellant, Ramaswaroop Shakya of Writ Petition No. 872 of 1988, giving rise to the Letters Patent Appeal No. 250 of 1996, is an employee of the Morena Mandal Sahakari Sakkar Karkhana Ltd., Kailaras, district Morena, which is a registered society under the M.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. He felt aggrieved by the order passed in the year 1985 granting promotions to respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4. He had prayed for a writ of mandamus requiring the respondent-society to implement the policy of the State Government as disclosed in its circular dated 21st June, 1973 providing for a reservation in the matter relating to filling up of the vacancies in the posts falling in Class I, Class II and Class III at the State level specifying the reservation for Harijan to be 15% as against the posts falling in Class I and Class II and to Adiwasis to the extent of 18% for the aforesaid categories of posts and reservation to the extent of 16% for Harijan for the posts falling in categories of Class III and Class IV and for Adiwasis to the extent of 20% for the posts falling in those categories. Vide the circular issued by the State Government dated 18th October, 1973 the benefits in regard to reservation contemplated under the circular dated 21st June, 1973 were extended to public sector undertakings and local bodies etc. The petitioner had further prayed for a direction requiring the respondent-society to consider his case for appointment as against a regular post of Lower Division Clerk and for his promotion on the post of upper Division Clerk, seeking quashing of the orders passed in favour of respondents Nos. 2 to 4 granting them promotions. The writ petition was filed on 20-7-1983.
4. The Writ Petition No. 475 of 1988, giving rise to Letters Patent Appeal No. 251 of 1996 had been filed by another employee, Lalaram, of the Morena Mandal Sahakari Shakkar Karkhana, Kailaras, district Morena, seeking the issuance of a mandamus for the implementation of the aforesaid policy decision, seeking quashing of the order of promotion dated 13-6-1985 granted to Kadir Khan, who has been impleaded as respondent No. 2 in the writ petition. This writ petition was filed on 11-4-1988.
5. The Writ Petition No. 416 of 1989, giving rise to Letters Patent Appeal No. 297 of 1996 was filed by another employee, Kundan, of the aforesaid co-operative society on similar allegations praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondent No. 1 for giving the petitioner equal emoluments and wages as were being provided to respondent No. 2, Shiv Mangal Prasad. The petitioner in this petition alleged that he along with respondent No. 2 had been promoted on the post of Boiler Attendants by a common order dated 5-9-1981, but in spite of the fact that the respondent No. 2 was junior to the petitioner in the cadre of Boiler Attendant his pay had been fixed at a higher rate vide the order dated 8-5-1984.
6. The Writ Petition No. 498 of 1989 giving rise to the Letters Patent Appeal No. 298 of 1996, had been filed by another employee, Alladin Khan, of the Morena Mandal Sahkari Shakkar Karkhana, Kailaras, district Morena, praying for a writ of mandamus directing the respondent No. 1 for filling the post of Surveyor by appointing the petitioner on that post or in the alternative the respondent No. 1 be directed to give full year appointment of the post of clerk in place of respondent No. 2.
7. The writ petitions were contested by the respondent-society on various grounds including the ground that the writ petition was not maintainable and in any case since the petitioners had approached this Court with undue delay and laches no case for interference or intervention of equity while exercising the extra ordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India had been made out.
8. The learned single Judge vide the impugned order has dismissed the writ petitions holding that the documents on which the reliance was placed by the petitioners were the Government circulars which had provided for the reservations at the level of initial appointments and not to the promotions thereafter, observing that the aforesaid circulars constituted only the Government instructions and were not applicable to the factual situation of the present cases and could not come to the rescue of the petitioners.
9. The learned Single Judge was of the view that the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 475/83 had sought for the quashing of the promotion order of respondent No. 2 made on 13-6-1985 and for the implementation of the policy/circulars of the year 1973, but had approached this Court belatedly after the expiry of three years which was a long lapse. The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 872 of 1988 was also found to have approached this Court after a long lapse of a period of three years. The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 498 of 1989 was found to have approached this Court after a period of six years challenging the appointment of the respondent No. 2 made in the year 1983. So far as the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 416 of 1989 was concerned, the learned single Judge was of the view that since the respondent No. 2 had resigned from the post of Boiler-Attendant and there was no other extra hand available for taking care of the job of Boiler-Attendant and the respondent No. 1 was likely to suffer much adversely on loosing the worker, the issue was compromised and under the contract of service the respondent No. 2 had been allowed some more pay which was sought to be challenged by the petitioner. The petitioner had come up to challenge the order dated 8-5-1984 after a lapse of about five years. The learned Single Judge was of the view that the petitioners were disentitled to any relief while exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on account of their own laches and negligence.
10. The learned counsel for the appellants has tried to assail the findings of the learned Single Judge holding that the petitioners were not entitled to the protection envisaged under the circulars issued by the State Government dated 21-6-1973 and 18-10-1973. It has been asserted that the circular dated 18th October, 1973 issued by the State Government clearly indicated the decision of the State Government to extend the benefits available under the policy decision contained in the circular dated 21st June, 1973 to the public sector undertakings, local bodies etc., which expression, it was asserted, included a society registered under the M.P. Co-operative Societies Act also.
11. The learned counsels for the respondent, however, has urged that a society registered under the M.P. Co-operative Societies Act cannot be put at par with the public sector undertakings or a legal body and the expression 'etc.' as used in the circular dated 18th October, 1973 cannot be interpreted in such a manner so as to put at par such a society with the public sector undertakings and a local body. It has also been urged that the co-operative society, the respondent No. 1, cannot be taken to be either falling within the ambit of 'State' as envisaged under Article 12 of the Constitution or equated with an 'authority' as contemplated thereunder.
12. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties.
13. The question whether an entity can be regarded as an instrumentality of the State would be dependent on various factors which may be peculiar to the facts of a particular case. No specific fact can be held to be conclusive and an overall cumulative view has to be taken. Further every autonomous body which seems to have nexus with the Government is not to be encompassed within the sweep of the expression 'State' as appearing in Article 12 of the Constitution. In the modern concept of welfare State the independent institutions, corporations and agents are generally subject to State control. That would, however, not make them State under Article 12 of the Constitution. Even if the share-holding of a corporate body lying within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution in an institution or corporation is' of a sizeable amount that per se would not be of great importance. Contribution by a State to a body corporate may be substantial so much so that the same may constitute the main source of functioning but that would not be of a great importance since money may be coming from other sources. The share-holding of any instrumentality of the State would not make it the holding by the State itself. The real test, therefore, is to find out as to whether the State has any deep and pervasive control over the entity.
14. It may further be noticed that the persons or bodies who have legal authority to determine questions affecting the common law or statutory rights or obligations of other persons or bodies who are entrusted by the Legislature with functions, powers and duties which involve the making of decisions of a public nature, may fall within the ambit of the expression 'State' as envisaged under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. All statutory bodies on which the Legislature has conferred statutory powers and duties which when exercised may lead to the detriment of the people who may have to submit to their jurisdiction, however, clearly fall within the ambit of the expression 'State' or 'Authority' as envisaged under Article 12 of the Constitution. These categories are, however, not exhaustive and the jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution can be extended to any other person or body of public nature exercising public duties which it is desirable to control by the remedy of the judicial review.
15. In the present case, the learned Single Judge has come to the conclusion that even if a co-operative society cannot be characterised as 'State' under Article 12 of the Constitution, a writ may still be issued against it to enforce the statutory duty or a public duty imposed on it.
16. Taking into consideration the aspects noticed by us hereinabove, no justifiable ground can be said to have been made out to interfere in the aforesaid finding returned by the learned Single Judge.
17. However, the learned Single Judge has gone further and has found that the circulars heavily relied upon by the petitioners/appellants cannot be of any assistance to them as they regulate the appointments at the initial stages and do not extend to the filling up of the posts by way of promotion.
18. A perusal of the circulars relied upon by the petitioners/appellants clearly indicates that what had been intended was to regulate the recruitment at the initial stage against the vacancies in the various cadres referred to therein. The finding of the learned Single Judge on this aspect of the matter does not call for any interference.
19. There is yet another aspect of the matter. As has already been noticed hereinabove, the petitioners' whole effort has been to bring a society, registered under the M.P. Co-operative Societies Act, within the ambit of the aforesaid circulars on the strength of the expression 'etc.' occurring therein. It seems to us that the word 'etc' as used in the circular dated 18-10-1973 has to be understood as taking its colour from the preceding words 'public sector undertakings/local bodies'. The rule of construction 'Noscitur A Sociis ' can be safely applied in such a situation. The circulars, therefore, in our opinion, cannot per se be deemed to have the effect of extending the benefits of reservation to the establishment of a co-operative society, registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, especially when there is nothing to indicate that in the exercise of jurisdiction vesting in the provisions contained in the M.P. Co-operative Societies Act, any recognition has been granted under any rule framed thereunder to such a policy relating to reservation.
20. In the aforesaid view of the matter also the petitioners are not entitled to any benefit out of the circulars heavily relied upon by them in support of their claim and the contention urged in this regard is not at all acceptable.
21. The learned Single Judge has declined to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in favour of the petitioners holding that they had approached this Court with inordinate delay. The exercise of discretion by the Court even where the writ petition is delayed is to be governed by the objective of public interest and good administration and on that basis it cannot be said that the discretion would not be exercised in favour of interference where it is necessary to prevent continuance or perpetuation of an illegality. However, like all equitable principles the doctrine of laches applies where it would be unjust to give remedy to the petitioner who is disentitled to the grant of the same by his conduct including creation of third party's right during the intervening period which are attributable to the laches of the petitioner. The test, therefore, is not physical running of the time but the real test is to determine in such cases as to whether the petitioner should come to a writ Court before a parallel right is created. It must be emphasised that a petitioner is expected to approach for redress in the exercise of discretionary extra ordinary remedy envisaged under Article 226 of Constitution of India with utmost despatch.
22. In the present case, the delay and laches on the part of the petitioners was of a considerably long period. No satisfactory explanation had been furnished for not approaching this Court with utmost despatch. The learned Single Judge has given cogent reasons for refusing to exercise the discretion in favour of the petitioners. We are not inclined to interfere in the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge against the petitioners. Considering the facts and circumstances brought on record no ground for the intervention of equity has been made out.
23. In view of our conclusions indicated hereinabove, there is no merit in these appeals.
24. These appeals, therefore, deserve to be and are hereby dismissed.
25. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.