Judgment:
K.K. Adhikari, J.
1. This appeal is by the defendant No. 3 against whom a decree of compensation to the extent of Rs. 16,566.41 has been passed by the trial court in Civil Suit No. 7-B of 1977, wherein a claim for compensation was laid by the respondent No. 1, plaintiff for Rs. 30,723.85 for the damage caused to his passenger transport bus No. CPQ 2165 by the passenger transport bus No. CPQ 2279 belonging to the respondent No. 2/ defendant No. 1 in an accident. This transport bus, i.e., CPQ 2279 belonging to the defendant No. 1 was duly insured with the appellant/ defendant No. 3, Oriental Fire and General Ins. Co. Ltd., Sagar. It may be mentioned here at this stage that the respondent No. 2/ defendant No. 1, being satisfied with the compensation awarded by the trial court, has not preferred any appeal. This appeal is by the insurer.
2. It may be stated that the insurer in its appeal can raise only certain grounds as covered under the provisions of Section 96 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. From perusal of the memorandum of appeal, it is noted that the grounds of appeal raised by the appellant/ defendant No. 3 are not covered by the provisions of Section 96 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The first ground raised in the memorandum of appeal pertains to the fact of passing of a decree by the trial court 'on mere admission by the respondent No. 3/defendant No. 2', who was at the relevant time driving the vehicle of the respondent No. 2/defendant No. 1 and who was convicted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate for rash and negligent driving and was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 20/-. The ground further stated that since the respondent No. 3/defendant No. 2 did not file his written statement and remained ex parte in the proceedings, his testimony was clearly collusive in nature and could not be relied upon. The second ground pertains to the fact that on the date of accident, the respondent No. 1/plaintiff was not holding 'contract carriage permit' and as such the operation of the vehicle with several passengers was in itself an illegality. The third ground raised pertains to the fact that the respondent No. 1/plaintiff did not establish that he was holding a permit on the date of accident even though a specific plea was made in the written statement. The fourth ground states that the trial court grossly erred in not taking into account the burden of proving rash and negligent driving. The fifth ground relates to the fact that the learned trial court ought to have relied upon the testimony of Ramgopal who was an eye-witness to the accident. The failure to do so grossly prejudiced the appellant's case. The sixth ground refers to the award of compensation on account of repair charges by the trial court without the bills and vouchers formally having been proved. The next ground again refers to the relations between respondent No. 1/plaintiff and the other respondents/defendants. The last two grounds raised in the memorandum of appeal pertain to the fact that the learned trial Judge manifestly fell in error and thus erroneously passed a decree in favour of the respondent No. 1/plaintiff.
3. From above, it is clear that none of the grounds raised is covered under Section 96 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The grounds which have been raised are not permitted by the aforesaid section of the said Act. The aforesaid view is supported by a Division Bench decision of this court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Molia Devi, 1969 ACJ 164 (MP).
4. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, argued that the New India Assurance Co. 's case, 1969 ACJ 164 (MP), was for a claim of compensation tried before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal while the present case is tried by the civil court as civil suit. It is, no doubt so, but the principle, in the opinion of this court, would be applicable to the instant case as well.
5. For the reasons stated above, there being no substance in this appeal, the same is hereby dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.