ORDER
T.N. Singh, J.
1. In this matter, the private operator, respondent No. 2, joined issue at the admission stage and on 20-1-1982, his counsel submitted that return shall be filed during the course of the day. We directed the petition to be listed for disposal in motion hearing on the next day because learned counsel for the Corporation/petitioner submitted that the life of impugned temporary permit was expiring on 6-2-1992. However, pleadings could not be completed until 23-1-1992 and this Bench was not available thereafter on 27-1-1992. We heard counsel on 31-1-1992 and 5-2-1992 and reserved orders taking the view that the contentions pressed were impregnated with momentous issues of law and those deserved due consideration and decision and that the petition could not be disposed of as infructuous.
2. Under the permit impugned, the route on which respondent No. 2 is required to operate his vehicle is for a short distance of 5 KMs. an inter-State route, between Kumhdaura and Mohaba, falling in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The two terminii of the route are Panchamnagar in Madhya Pradesh and Mahoba in Uttar Pradesh; along the route lie Bachhon, Devri, Loundi, Atkoha, Tahanga, Rageli, Tigeia and Patha, all in the State of Madhya Pradesh. Among the conditions attached to the permit, one is that the operator would obtain counter signature from competent authority of Uttar Pradesh and the other notable condition is that on the nationalised portion of the route, no passenger shall be picked up or dropped. True, it is also made a condition of the permit that the final decision rendered by the Supreme Court in S. L. P. No. 15107/89 and 15090/89 will be binding on the operator and that is perhaps relatable to the statement in his affidavit (accompanying his application ?) that the route in question was declared under orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court free for operation by all operators. The permit issued was valid from 8-11-1991 to 6-2-1992.
3. Mainly on three grounds, . Shri Nigudkar, learned counsel, appearing for the Corporation/petitioner has assailed the permit and the order dated 20-1-1992 passed by the Chairman, State Transport Authority, Madhya Pradesh, disposing of finally objections preferred against respondent's application for the permit. Before issuing permit, an order was passed on 31-10-1990 (Annexure P/6) by the Secretary, State Transport Authority, Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior, disposing of by an interim order one of the objections which indeed the Corporation/petitioner had preferred. The Chairman has, in his order, recorded finding on the basis, among others, of the Survey Report of Additional Regional Transport Officer, Chhatarpur, that out of the total length of the route, 77 KMs., on a distance of 6 KMs. (between Kundhera and Banspahadi), the vehicle was not operated by the permit-holder. The total effective length of the route was 71 KMs.; and out of total 34 KMs. of nationalised portion the vehicle was run on 28 KMs. only. He relied on the report/certificate of S.D.O., P.W.D., Loundi, in holding further that between Tahanga and Girdhouri, the distance of 3 KMs. was an 'inter-section' and that on the same highway, another portion of the route which passed through Loundi Municipality deserved also to be treated as 'inter-section'. On that basis, he reached the conclusion that by excluding the said 6 KMs., the net overlapping by the operator of the nationalised route was 22 KMs. Accordingly, the objections preferred were rejected holding that in terms of the Gazette Notification dated 11-9-1991, the limit of exemption of 25 KMs. allowed had not been exceeded.
4. Firstly, and indeed, vigorously, Shri Nigudkar contended before us that the Gazette Notification dated 11-2-1991 was void and inoperative in law because the State Government had not obtained 'previous approval' of the Central Government as contemplated under the proviso to Section 100(3), Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for short, the Act. He submitted that by the said Notification, a large number of 'approved' schemes, including the relevant Scheme No. 67, were modified and that the modification authorised under Section 102 of the Act contemplated also previous approval thereof by the Central Government. Otherwise, all State Governments would have a free hand in tinkering with inter-State routes, resulting in chaos. With equal confidence, Shri J. P. Gupta, appearing for respondent No. 2, submitted that judicial legislation is impermissible and that the proviso to Section 100(3) cannot be interpolated in Section 102 when legislature found that requirement unnecessary. He submitted further that the contention pressed was hit also by 'mischief rule' because the new Act of 1988 embodied a different scheme of things based on a different philosophy concerning grant of permit under Chapter V and that is reflected also in Chapter VI containing special provisions relating to State Undertakings.
5. To deal with the contention of Shri Nigudkar, we extract in extenso Section 102 : -
'102. Cancellation or modification of scheme. - (1) The State Government may, at any time, if it considers necessary, in the public interest so to do, modify any approved scheme after giving -
(i) the State transport undertaking; and
(ii) any other person who, in the opinion of the State Government, is likely to be affected by the proposed modification, an opportunity of being heard in respect of the proposed modification.
(2) The State Government shall publish any modification proposed under sub-section (1) in the Official Gazette and in one of the newspapers in the regional languages circulating in the area in which it is proposed to be covered by such modification, together with the date, not being less than thirty days from such publication in the Official Gazette, and the time and place at which any representation received in this behalf will be heard by the State Government.'
It is true that in the old Act of 1939, we see a different picture. Sub-section (2) of Section 102 (new) is definitely an innovation while sub-section (1) is verbatim reproduction of sub-section (2) of Section 68-E (old). It is also true that there is no provision in the new Section 102 parallel to Section 68-E(l) (old) which provided that the proposal of modification of an approved scheme should be treated as a 'separate scheme'. It is also a fact that the proviso to new Section 100(3) is a verbatim reproduction of the proviso of Section 68-D (old) but the moot point to be noted, of crucial importance is that under the old Act, any 'State Transport Undertaking' could prepare or 'propose' any scheme under Section 68-C for any route being 'notified' as nationalised and that was 'approved' by the State Government following the procedure prescribed; that position does not continue under the new set-up. It is also to be noted that old Section 68-J is reproduced in the new Act as Section 108. It provides really the rationale for Central Government's 'previous approval' and also the nexus between the power-sharing contemplated in both Acts.
Section 108:
'108. Certain powers of State Government exercisable by the Central Government, - The powers conferred on the State Government under this Chapter shall, in relation to a corporation or company owned or controlled by the Central Government or by the Central Government and one or more State Governments, be exercisable only by the Central Government in relation to an inter-State route or area.'
It is necessary in this context to refer to Section 2(42) (iii) which defines 'State Transport Undertaking' to mean, among others, 'any Municipality or any Corporation or Company owned or controlled by the Central Government or one or more State Governments, or by the Central Government and one or more State Governments'.
6. It is now judicial history that Saghir Ahmed, AIR 1954 SC 728 saw the death of U. P. Road Transport Act, 1951, but it is also legal history that by Act No. 100 of 1956, Chapter IV-A was inserted into Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 for securing firm foundation for nationalisation of road transport sendees. In the course of three decades or so, along with demographic changes came also change in the pattern of passenger and freight movement. Accordingly, when the new Act (Motor Vehicles Act, 1988) was enacted, that was done on the basis of reports of various committees and Working Groups which had studied the new problems and considered the suggestions made by different institutions and the general public. It is noted indeed in the Statement of Objects and Reasons, appended to the Bill, that it was necessary to take care of 'the greater flow of passenger and freight with the least impediments so that islands of isolations are not created leading to regional and local imbalances' and better provisions had to be made 'where the private and public sectors can co-exist and develop, in road transport field'. (See - Gazette of India, Extraordinary, dated 11-5-1987, Part II, Section 2). No doubt, the new legislative venture has kept in view the warning sounded in Saghir Ahmed (supra) that right of public to use motor vehicles on the public road cannot in any sense be regarded as right created by the Motor Vehicles Act and that the regulatory provisions contemplated are required to satisfy the test envisaged under Article 19(6) authorising State monopoly in any particular trade. As in the old Act, the new Act, as noted above, secures to the Central Government right to disapprove any scheme relating to any inter-State route proposed by any State Government. Obviously, such a 'State Transport Undertaking' as is promoted by the Central Government in terms of Section 2(42)(iii) is to be given the right of first refusal because when an undertaking is floated either exclusively by the Central Government or through any of its agencies in collaboration with one or more State Governments or otherwise, that undertaking can take better care of a larger variety of interests.
6-A. This position obviously inheres perennial validity and is recognised in the new Act. No wonder, therefore, that the right of first refusal is secured to the 'Central Government' in terms of the common proviso of old Section 68-D(3) and new Section 100(3). Legislature has advisedly kept limited to the first stage this requirement. For, decision is to be taken by the Central Government at the initial stage itself as to whether any scheme sponsored by the State Government is to be allowed to be 'approved' and the State Transport Undertaking concerned is to be allowed to operate on the, inter-State route or routes in question, either exclusively or partially. It is a one-time requirement. Accordingly, Central Government's right contemplated under the proviso is made indefeasible by making the provision mandatory. After the Central Government has accorded its 'previous approval', to any scheme relating to any inter-State route, it obviously loses any interest in the said scheme which may be, therefore, cancelled or modified by the State Government in accordance with the procedure prescribed. It is true, under the old Section 68-E, the proposal for cancellation or modification had to be considered as a 'separate scheme' itself because it. was then possible also for the State transport undertaking concerned to do so in accordance with the procedure prescribed, but that position, as noted earlier, no longer obtains now. To propose and also to approve a scheme is now made possible only on the authority of the State Government or, for that matter, the Central Government.
6-B. However, care is, therefore, taken that the principles of natural justice are duly observed in taking action under Section 102 (new) by contemplating prior publication of the proposal under Section 100(2) 'in one of the newspapers in the regional languages circulating in the area in which it is proposed to be covered by such modification'. As in the yore, currently also it is' contemplated that the modification or cancellation is not to be unilateral or an arbitrary decision, but the decision is taken after 'any other person besides the State transport undertaking is heard'. We do not see, therefore, any scope for any apprehension of any chaotic situation arising from absence of the requirement of previous approval of the Central Government in regard to any cancellation or modification of any scheme relating to any inter-State route. Obviously, though any State Government or any representative of any State Government may be a 'person' who may like to be heard when decision is taken under Section 102, it will obviously the travelling public of the area who would be more interested and, therefore, care is taken that nobody is taken for a ride and any person who is anybody concerned with the proposed modification is heard on his suggestion or grievance.
7. In terms of legal semantics and interpretative technology, the treatment of the issue takes us to the same conclusion. Section 14, General Clauses Act, contemplates that 'unless a different intention appears' any power conferred under any enactment is exercisable as and when occasion requires. Legislature has obviously expressed clearly its intention that the Central Government shall not exercise its power of disapproval contemplated under the common proviso in question except on such occasions when the decision is to be taken, whether to accord 'previous approval' to any scheme sponsored by any State Government relating to any inter-State route. In the same vein, it has also to be said that the language of Section 102 postulates clearly for the power to be exercised 'at any time' by the State Government in which the power is vested and that accords fully with the provisions contemplated under Section 14, G.C. Act. From another angle also, the matter can be viewed. The firmly established principle of law recognised as such in I.T.O. v. Mohd. Kunhi, AIR 1969 SC 430 is that 'an express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective'. Having granted to the State Government the power to approve any scheme of inter-State route subject to the limitations envisaged under the common proviso, in question, there could be no justification to restrict operation of that power and make the grant ineffective. Two other principles of law, of equal importance and relevance can be pressed in service further to buttress the conclusion reached.
7-A. A deeming provision incorporating a legal fiction is to operate strictly within the area for which it is meant. See, in this connection, C.I.T. v. Bombay Trust Corporation, AIR 1930 PC 54; Radhakissen v. Durga Prosad, AIR 1940 PC 167; Bengal 'Immunity Co.'s case, AIR 1955 SC 661; and Kamaraja Nadar's case,, AIR 1958 SC 687. The word used 'deemed' in the common proviso in question is in respect of the scheme sponsored by State Government to be regarded as an 'approved scheme'; its use is to be limited to the occasion of first refusal as is indicated with singular clarity by the words 'previous approval'. The other principle relevant to the issue is manifested in the maxim, expressio unius est exclusio atterius. Legislature having laid out the procedure for performing the function contemplated under Section 102 by the State Government in respect of cancellation or modification of an approved scheme, it is required to act strictly in accordance therewith and in no other manner. The language of Section 102 itself is clear and is no impediment for the maxim to be invoked to add weight to the construction suggested.
8. On the other hand, we do not see any scope to invoke the aid of the principle that language of a statute which leads to manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, can be modified. Shri Nigudkar has relied on that principle and has cited Tirath Singh, AIR 1955 SC 830; but in the instant case, we have seen neither any ambiguity in the language of Section 102 nor any need to apply that principle for obvious reasons. He has also cited two other decisions, to wit - Amalgamated Coalfields, AIR 1964 SC 1013; District Collector, Chittor, AIR 1989 SC 989 and Delhi Transport Corporation's case, AIR 1991 SC 101. In all those cases, the legislative policy underlying the relevant enactment was considered and indeed in this case also, we have done so and have not deviated from the chosen or designated path. It was a question of an impost that was considered in Amalgamated Coalfield's case and imposition of increased rate by the local authority (Janpada Sabha) was held invalid as it did not receive the sanction of the local Government. It was held that every increase being a fresh impost, the legislative policy would be deemed subserved only if sanction is obtained in respect of each impost by way of increase in the rate. In District Collector's case, the question was of exercise of power of subordinates legislation under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. State Government's directive Was under an 'order' framed, under the Act imposing restriction on export of groundnut seed and oil and of compulsory levy; that was held illegal, holding that the requirement of obtaining prior concurrence of the Central Government was indispensable. Because, the underlying policy of the Essential Commodities Act is best subserved if the Central Government is held responsible fully of ensuring availability of essential commodity for distribution at fair prices throughout the country by maintaining balance of interest of various States. In the Delhi Transport Corporation's case, the requirement of the statutorty public policy matching the constitutional policy is stressed and reading down the statutory provision to validate it is held impermissible. The principles stated in these decisions do not affect the conclusion we have reached for one short reason.
8-A. In its wisdom, Legislature has found it necessary to liberalise the old policy to give long rope to each State to propose for its 'previous approval' any scheme for any inter-State route and it has kept to itself the power to refuse approval of' any scheme. Initially, therefore, any State Government affected by a scheme proposed by the other State Government will have an opportunity to represent to the Central Government against the scheme proposed and at that stage itself, the question of regional balance or of special interest would be decided. However, even when any scheme is proposed to be modified under Section 102, and the modification affects any other State Government, it may lodge protest or make suggestion in regard to proposed amendment because that door is kept open to it in terms of Section 102(1) itself and indeed, it shall also be open to such a State Government to propose its own scheme to countervail the effect of the modification and when that is done in terms of the common proviso, in according its 'previous approval' to the said scheme relating to an inter-State route, care may be taken of the stalemate, by the Central Government appropriately. The underlying public policy of the new Act obviously is to ensure free flow of passenger traffic and to achieve that purpose, the procedure for grant of permit is simplified on the one hand and on the other hand, power is taken away from a State Transport Undertaking of proposing.
8-B. That position is clearly manifested in, the clear departure made in Section 80, Chapter V and Section 99 of Chapter VI. At any time now, under the new Act, an application for grant of a permit can be made and it is contemplated that the 'R.T.A. shall not ordinarily refuse' such an application; the old procedure of gazette notifications and of objections to be invited for such applications is given a go-by under the new Act. Similarly, undue hassels likely to be occasioned to any scheme proposed by State Transport Undertaking being hastily or inadvertently approved by the State Government impeding free flow of traffic as a result of some routes becoming non-operational for private operators, resulting in inconvenience to travelling public, are avoided. Noticeably and importantly, Section 100(4) contemplates that when a scheme is not published as an approved scheme within one year, the proposal is deemed 'lapsed'; while such a provision did not exist earlier. We do not see, therefore, any justification for the apprehension expressed by Shri Nigudkar of any chaotic conditions arising if the common proviso contemplating previous approval of Central Government is not interpolated in Section 102 in order to curb the power of the State Government. Accepting this contention would result, in our view, the legislative intent being defeated and the new legislative policy being frustrated.
9. Turning now to the other question, it is equally complex. We refer first to the statutory definition of the term 'route'. It is the same in the old and new Acts. New clause (38) corresponds to old clause (28-A) of Section 2, in both Acts, and defines the word to mean 'a line of travel which specifies the highway which may be traversed by a motor vehicle between one terminus and another'. One noticeable change, however, is that in the new Section 71(3)(a), there is a mention of 'City routes' while in the corresponding provision of the old Act, Section 47, that is not to be read. However, the term has not been defined expressly in the new Act. Still, that expression throws some light on the controversy mooted in the instant case relating to the distinction between 'overlapping' and 'inter-section'. Statutorily as also judicially, the position which has remained intact is that in respect of any nationalised route (whether inter-State or intra-State), the provisions of the scheme approved in that regard are absolutely and on no portion of the route overlapping, or for that matter, operation of a vehicle of a private operator is allowed except to the extent made permissible in any manner under the provisions of the scheme. What is 'inter-section' and the question whether that amounts to 'overlapping' or not has been considered in many cases. But, there is still a grey area which has attracted our attention.
10. At one time, what was meant by the term 'route' was a subject-matter of controversy, because of certain observations of Privy Council in Kelani Valley Motor Transit Co.'s case, AIR 1946 PC 137, but the term being defined statutorily by Act No. 56 of 1969 introducing the new clause 28-A in Section 2 of the old Act, it is not necessary to refer to the old position even if in Mysore State Road Transport Corporation's case, AIR 1974 SC 1940, those are noted. It is, however, necessary to extract para 12 from that decision as we find that the term 'inter-Section' is used by the Apex Court expressly in contradistinction to the term 'overlapping' therein
'12. This Court has consistently taken the view that if there is a prohibition to operate on a notified route or routes no licences can be granted to any private operator whose route traversed or overlapped any part or whole of the notified route. The inter-section of the notified route may not, in our view, amount to traversing or overlapping the route because the prohibition imposed applies to a whole or a part of the route on the highway on the same line of the route. An intersection cannot be said to be traversing the same line, as it cuts across it.'
In para 10 of the judgment, before reaching the above conclusion, their Lordships interpreted Section 2(28-A) and observed, inter alia, that 'where the part of the highway to be used by the private transport owner traverses on a line on the same highway on the notified route', application for permit by the transport operator has then to be considered only in the light of the scheme notified and that any condition contemplated therein has to be fulfilled; the application, they held, must be rejected if there was a total prohibition under the Scheme. H6wever, in para 11, they analysed also the Court's earlier decision in the case of C.P.C. Motor Service, Mysore, (1962) Supp (1) SCR 717, in which case the provision of the Scheme directing curtailing of area or route covered under the permit in so far as the permit related to the notified area or route was considered. They held that the route or area stood for the road on which the vehicles ply and the scheme having reserved all routes within Mysore District to State Transport Undertaking, even those routes which were inter-District and open to private transporters stood protanto cut down to only that portion lying outside Mysore District. In that context, obviously, in para 12, it was observed that it would not be a case of overlapping when private operators' vehicle plying on the highway did not traverse 'the same line of the route' because that would be a case of 'inter-Section' a one cutting the other. Indeed, it became necessary to examine the question because the Larger Bench was required to consider if the decision of another Bench of the Court, rendered on 17-5-1984 did not lay down the law correctly. In that case, it was held that if the notified route did not coincide at the points of terminii, it would not be enough to exclude private inter-State owners if their intention was to exclude such user of operation that intention must be made clear in order to have that effect. Dissenting from that view, their Lordships held that what was indispensable was that the question of overlapping was to be decided in terms of the provisions of the scheme of the notified route and if there was a total exclusion and no exemption contemplated, that shall not be judicially interjected in defance of the express provisions of the Scheme. Decisions of the High Court and of the Appellate Tribunal were set aside on the ground that the scheme in question envisaged complete ouster and no exemption and there was no scope for the view that the 'integrity of the scheme' was not impaired even if the distance of the overlapping portion was only five miles and there was condition attached to the permit not to pick up or drop any passenger on the notified route.
11. In Karnataka S.R.T.C.'s case, AIR 1979 Karnataka 87, the learned Chief Justice, speaking for the Court in construing the decision and the passage herein extracted gave his own interpretation of the term 'inter-section' and on that, Shri Nigudkar has heavily leaned. After holding that a common sense approach and not a pedantic geometric concept is to be adopted, he proceeds further to observe, 'When two different routes pass through such a village and not beyond the limits thereof, even if the road between such limits of that village is common for both the routes, it is more reasonable to regard those two routes as intersecting at that village than to gard them as overlapping within the limits of that village.' (empnasis added). Shri Nigudkar submitted that it would not be a case of 'inter-section' when the two routes passing through a village, proceed beyond the limits of the village and concept of inter-section is to be limited to the village limits only and applied to the case when the routes terminate in the same village. True, for the view held, the Karnataka High Court considered the fact that no one would think of boarding a stage carriage at end of the village and to get down at the another end of the same village and any two points within the limits of the village could not be reasonably regarded as two terminii on a route running through that village. It is equally true that a Division Bench of this Court in unreported judgment Punjab Sikh Regular Motor Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, M. P. No. 1350 of 1985, decided at the Main Seat on 17-9-1987 has relied on the Karnataka judgment and has accepted the interpretation of 'inter-section' and has followed reasoning of that Court; but on facts, the decision is closer to the case in hand and indeed, it is for this reason that respondent's counsel, Shri J.P. Gupta, has relied on it.
12. In neither case, two subsequent decisions of the Apex Court were noticed which are cited before us. However, we do not think if K. Venkamma's case, AIR 1977 SC 1170, cited by Shri Nigudkar, has direct relevance to the controversy mooted herein as the main question considered there was of terminii of the route relating to inter-State and intra-State routes. However, in the other case, Adarsh Travels Bus Service, AIR 1986 SC 319, Mysore State Road Transport Corporation's case (supra) was considered and it was submitted to their Lordships that the decision required reconsideration, but that was not accepted. At para 13, approving the decision, their Lordships extracted therefrom the passage hereinabove reproduced by us in regard to the observation concerning 'inter-section'. Still, they added as a 'note of caution' that in approving or modifying the scheme, 'care must be taken to protect, as far as possible, the interest of the travelling public who could in the past travel from one point to another without having to change from one service to another en route'. It was observed that this could be always done by 'incorporating appropriate conditional clauses in the scheme' and reiterated yet, that 'sufficient care must be taken to see that the travelling public is not to be needlessly inconvenienced'.
13. Having given our anxious consideration to the matter, we reach the conclusion that Constitution Bench's decision in Adarsh Travels' case (supra) has judicially entrenched the concept of inter-section bringing that within the category of permissible overlapping of specifically excludible class. In our view, the concept of inter-section must subserve the purpose of its conception and its scope or ambit is not to be so limited as would defeat the underlying idea of the concept. We have found it difficult, therefore, to agree with Shri Nigudkar that, as held by the Karnataka High Court, exemption by way of inter-section to overcome the handicap of overlapping is permissible only when the private operator route and the notified route terminates in the same village within the village limits. In our view, the geometric concept of intersection suggests that one line may cut across the other line at more than one points; if one of the lines of travel extends beyond the point of inter-section, it cannot be said that inter-section between the two lines did not take place. As has been observed in the Mysore State Road Transport Corporation's case, the taint of overlapping attaches to parallel run of two vehicles on the same line of the route. The concept of inter-section is devised for the benefit of the travelling public and that benefit may accrue in many ways; as and when that accrues, it could be the result of an inter-section.
14. We may also recall that the Legislature kept in view 'city routes' as distinct concept and in doing so, it has adopted a pragmatic approach. Indeed, whether it is a city or a village, in a populated area, particularly where there is a public authority operating and is charged with civil administration, the 'highway' contemplated under Section 2 of both Acts do not remain so. The portion of the route lying within village limits or city limits is severally criss-crossed by multiple routes used by people coming from different places traversing different routes either terminating there their journey or proceeding further. The road, though a part of the 'highway' along which motor traffic operates in the village or city, cannot be treated reasonably as a 'highway' and that portion of the road is to be excluded from all routes using in common the 'highway' to that extent. If that view is not taken, there is likelihood of the travelling public suffering serious inconvenience due to the large variety of the inter/intra-State routes operating in the country between different places in different directions on different timings. Care is to be taken of variations and prolifications taking place in the pattern of passenger traffic throughout the country in the wake of independence during the last four decades, for mobility is a sign of progress. Indeed, this imperative has been kept in view by providing in some States and at some places what are popularly described as a 'bypass' as a sort of an alternative/parallel road for the highway's continuity to be maintained avoiding populated areas; such routes on the highways as use the bypass retain obviously their integrated character as a highway. In such cases only, it may be possible to say that there would be no scope for the concept of inter-section to be invoked.
15. In the instant case, the Notification dated 11-2-1991 in respect to a large number of schemes including the relevant Scheme No. 67, contemplates relaxation of the provisions of the schemes 'in view of additional demand of transport services' and of the necessity 'in the public interest to allow private operators to ply' on the routes covered by the said schemes in manner the contemplated as follows : -
'Notwithstanding anything contained in this Scheme, the private operators may be permitted to ply Stage-Carriages for hire or reward subject to the following conditions namely : -
(1) Limit of exemption on notified route shall not exceed 25 kilometres;
(2) The private operators shall ply the stage carriages over the distance, other than the distance of the notified routes which shall not be less than twice, the distance of the notified route covered by the permit;
(3) Calculations of limit of exemption of 25 Kilometres on notified route shall be made on the basis of total;
(4) This exemption shall be applicable to notified routes under all Schemes, even though the Schemes might have been implemented after 1979;
(5) The private operators shall not pick up or set down passengers on the notified route.'
16. It is Shri Nigudkar's contention that 25 KMs. being fixed as the 'limit of exemption', that should have been strictly adhered to and there was no scope for any further exemption on account of intersection. True, in paras 3 and 4 of the Scheme No. 67, it is contemplated that the 'routes or portions of the routes' specified in the scheme were meant for operation under the reciprocal transport agreement by no person other than the petitioner/Corporation or the nominee of Uttar Pradesh Government covering the specified portions respectively of the routes in question. However, haying taken the view that 'inter-section' is not to be regarded as a portion of the route, reserved for exclusive operation of non-private operator, it is not possible to accept Shri Nigudkar's contention. In our view, the 'exemption' contemplated under the modified scheme, refers to 'overlapping' and not to 'inter-section'. Indeed, in the scheme itself, it is made clear that subject to 'conditions' specified in the permit any private operator can be allowed to ply his vehicle on any one or more portions of the route notified in the scheme. Accordingly in the 'modification' afore-extracted, respondent No. 2 or any other private operator, for that matter is permitted to ply on the notified route his vehicle for a distance only of 25 KMs. in total and this appears clear from conjoint reading of clauses (1) and (3) of the 'modification'. The word 'total' used in clause (3) obviously indicates that the overlapping may be in patches and there may be diverse inter-sections between the two routes along the highway. Had it been the object underlying the modification to exclude the benefit of inter-section, that would have been clearly indicated because for sufficiently long time now, the judicially entrenched concept of inter-section is well-understood and given due recognition. Indeed, not only clauses (1), (2) and (3) are to be read together, they should be read in the context of clause (5) which prohibits a private operator from picking up or setting down passengers on the notified route. If that condition is to be strictly observed, and the inter-section, or for that matter, the road passing through a village or town is regarded as a part of the notified route and not of common route of the private operator and the State Transport Undertaking, it shall cause immense hardship to travelling public as no passenger travelling in a vehicle owned by a private operator would be able to disembark within city or village limits. That apart, when there is no vehicle of the State Transport Undertaking operating on the route on which any person would like to travel from that village, he would be debarred from availing service provided by any private operator's vehicles passing through that village.
17. In our view, the Chairman has rightly taken the decision that the length of the notified route or inter-section at two places, each measuring 3 KMs., can be totalled and the benefit thereof can be given to respondent No. 2. We do not think if any condition of the 'modification' in question is, in any way violated by granting the impugned temporary permit to the said respondent.
18. For all the aforesaid reasons, the petition fails and is dismissed. No costs.