Judgment:
ORDER
T.S. Doabia, J.
1. Brij Kishore Shukla for short Shukla was once an employee of the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation). He is dead. He is represented by his legal heirs. These legal heirs seek continuance of the present legal proceedings as according to them the services of the deceased petitioner Brij Kishore Shukla were brought to an end by an order which is beyond the scope of statutory provisions. According to them if the order goes, then they would be entitled to the monetary benefits of back wages.
2. In the background of assumption on the part of the legal heirs of the deceased petitioner Shukla, the facts of this case be noticed.
3. Deceased Petitioner Shukla, as noticed above, was an employee of the Corporation. He was found travelling without a ticket. He was convicted under the Madhya Pradesh Rajya Pariwahan Sewa (Bina Ticket Yatra Ki Rok) Adhiniyam, 1974. Against the order passed by the Motor Vehicles Mobile Court, he preferred a revision petition. This was dismissed by the revisional Court on of March 17, 1979. Thereafter a show cause notice was issued and Shri Shukla was dismissed from service. Copy of this order has been placed on record as Annexure P/1. This order makes mention of the fact that some show cause notice was issued. This is not on the record of the case. The learned counsel appearing for theCorporation however read the show cause notice. It does not recite the fact that Shri Shukla was convicted under the aforementioned Act. That conviction was the basis, which resulted in an order of termination is not apparent from the order of the termination.
4. The order of dismissal was challenged before the Labour Court. The Labour Court ordered reinstatement. It also awarded back wages to the extent of 25%. Both the sides feeling dissatisfied with the decision of the Labour Court preferred appeals. The Industrial Court gave its decision on January 25, 1989. The Industrial Court came to the conclusion that as Shri Shukla was guilty of major misconduct, he was not entitled to any back wages. Shri Shukla, as noticed above, challenged in this court in the present petition the findings recorded by the Labour Court as also by the Industrial Court. It was pleaded that the order is beyond the scope of Madhya Pradesh Industrial Employment Standing Orders of 1963. It is specifically pleaded that mere conviction in a Court of law is not major misconduct. It is also argued that conviction should be (sic.) for an offence involving moral turpitude. Before noticing these arguments it would be apt to notice the provisions of Standing Order 12(1)(a). This reads as under :--
'12. Disciplinary action for misconduct.--(1) The following acts or omissions on the part of an employee shall amount to a major misconduct:
(a) conviction by Court of law for an offence involving moral turpitude;'
5. Before going further into this argument, some other facts be also noticed :--
Annexure P/1 only takes notice of the fact that Shri Shukla was convicted. It nowhere mentions that the offence was such which involved moral turpitude. Again the Industrial Court has taken note of the factum of conviction and has come to the conclusion that on account of this convictionShri Shukla could be removed because mere conviction according to the Industrial Court would amount to major misconduct.
6. I am of the view that the approach of the Corporation and the Labour Court and that of the Industrial Court is not correct. Shri Shukla could not be dismissed from service unless a finding had been recorded that the offence was such which involved moral turpitude.
7. What is meant by offence involving moral turpitude. This aspect was required to be taken note of by the Corporation as also by the Industrial Court. There is no finding that the petitioner was guilty of an offence involving moral turpitude.
8. When can it be said that an offence involves moral turpitude. The term 'moral turpitude' has not been defined either in the Act or in the Indian Penal Code. According to the New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language, 'turpitude' means 'inherent wickedness'. The concept of moral turpitude as stated in Black's Law Dictionary is that it involves baseness, vileness or the depravity in private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowman or to society in general, contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. Thus it is an act or behaviour that gravely violates moral sentiments or accepted moral sentiment or accepted moral standards of the community and is a morally culpable quality held to be present in some criminal offences as distinguished from others. In other words, it is the quality of a crime involving grave infringement of the moral sentiment of the community as distinguished from statutory prohibitions. If one were to look at the matter in a very narrow sense or in general term, of righteousness, society does not permit or approve of any offence being committed. It has to be borne in mind that every act punishable in law is not offence involving 'moral turpitude'. It appears to me that a circumstance in which a crimeis committed and how the society views the commission of that offence in those circumstances is relevant. The question whether offence involves moral turpitude or not is a question of fact to be decided with reference to facts of each case. The same offence may or may not involve moral turpitude. It would depend upon a number of circumstances. Drinking or Gambling in a school may not involve moral turpitude if some outsiders are involved, if, however, a school teacher does these acts the position would be different. An offence committed under one set of circumstances may involve moral turpitude and the same offence committed under a different set of circumstances may not. For instance, a person who goes to commit theft or rape may not be able to achieve his object and on being caught may kill the person apprehending him. Such an offence of murder committed under these circumstances would certainly involve moral turpitude as it involves depravity or wickedness of character and crime involves grave infringement of the moral sentiments of the community as distinguished from statutory prohibitions. Offence of murder committed due to enmity may not per se involve baseness of character. It is a matter of common knowledge that in many societies people do sometimes commit murder with a view to avenge their enmity and such murders are not looked down upon as involving that baseness or deprivity of character as to amount to moral turpitude. In other words this conduct by itself cannot be said to possess morally culpable quality which is present in those criminal offences which involve moral turpitude. The offence of murder was held to be an offence involving no moral turpitude by Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Kuldeep Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1994 Punjab and Haryana 242 and it was observed that an 'Act of killing a person is normally attributed to a feeling of hurt or revenge; an act of personal vendetta. Per se an act of murder will not come within the broad concept of 'moral turpitude' as interpreted by Courts'. Again,conviction for an offence for possession of illicit liquor was held to he involving no moral turpitude in the case of Narain Singh v. N.S. Cheema, 1977 SLWR 448. The reasoning given was that in villages, such illicit possession is not taken that seriously, but possession of illicit liquor concealed in a bladder by a gunman of State Bank of India was held to be an offence involving moral turpitude in the case of Sowarn Singh v. State Bank of India, 1986 Vol. 1, Punjab Legal Reports and Statutes 573. Shri J.V. Gupta, J. (later Chief Justice, Punjab and Haryana High Court) observed :
'Since he was employed as a gunman in the Bank and was found in possession of illicit liquor and that too concealed in a bladder, it does reflect on his character as such and is also derogatory to the duties he is required to perform as a gunman.'
Reference be made to Corpus Juris Secundum also. The relevant extract is as under:--
'While frequently general statements have been made to the effect that mere assault does not or may not, involve moral turpitude, or that assault and battery rarely involve moral turpitude, the rule would seem to be that assault and battery may involve moral turpitude and it may not, the difference depending on the circumstances, and whether an assault does or does not involve moral turpitude generally will be determined by the particular facts of each individual case. The statutes of various jurisdictions divide assaults into different degrees, and many of the crimes which are included within such definitions are crimes that involved moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime.'
9. A Division Bench of this Court in Raldeo Pooranlal v. State Industrial Court, Indore and Ors., 1979 MPLJ 398, while dealing with a case arising under the same statute under which Shukla was dealt with observed :--
'It would be seen from Section 7 that a person can be guilty of offence under that Section, even if he negligently omits to supply ticket or supplies invalid ticket. Moral turpitude signifies baseness, depravity or wickedness of character or disposition. Mere negligent omission to supply ticket does not involve moral turpitude. It would, therefore, be possible for an employee convicted of an offence under Section 7, to urge that his conviction did not involve any moral turpitude and that he was not guilty of any major misconduct under Standing Order 12(1)(a). Admission of conviction in such cases is not enough to prove the charge. As earlier stated, it is for the Corporation to prove the charge by producing the judgment of conviction and other relevant material, if necessary. In the instant case, there was no departmental enquiry. In the proceedings before the Labour Court, although the parties led evidence, the Corporation did not choose to file a copy of the judgment showing the nature of the charge and the facts found against the petitioner by the Criminal Court. There was also no other material from which it could be inferred that the omission to supply tickets was wilful or that it involved any moral turpitude. There was, therefore, absolutely no material to hold that the petitioner was guilty of any major misconduct under Standing Order 12(1)(a). The Labour Court was, therefore, right in setting aside the petitioner's dismissal. The Industrial Court was wrong in interfering with the order of the Labour Court Learned counsel for the petitioner has not pressed his claim before us for back wages due till today.'
10. In Om Prakash v. Post and Telegraph Department, AIR 1973 P& H 2 a full Bench concluded as under:
(a) the departmental punishment of removal or dismissal is not an essential and automatic consequence of conviction on a criminal charge;
(b) the authority competent to take disciplinary action against a servant convicted on a criminal charge has to consider all the circumstances of the case and then to decide;
(i) whether the conduct of the delinquent official which led to his conviction is such as to render his further retention in public service undesirable;
(ii) if so, whether to dismiss him or to remove him from service, or to compulsorily retire him; and
(iii) if the said conduct of the official is not such which renders his further retention in service undesirable, whether the minor punishment if any, should be inflicted on him;
(c) to be retained in service is not a qualification, but a right in certain circumstances subject to service rules;
(d) the liability to be departmentally punished for conduct which has led to the conviction of the employee does not attach to the conviction, but attaches to the original conduct (misconduct) which constituted the offence of which the official has bean convicted;
(e) the original misconduct of a servant does not merge with his conviction so as to become non-existent after conviction;
(f) an order imposing a punishment simply because of his conviction on a criminal charge without reference to the conduct which led to the conviction cannot be sustained.
11. The Supreme Court in Divisional Personnel Officer v. T.K. Challappan, (1979-I-LLJ-68) observed at page79:
'In other words, the position is that the conviction' of the delinquent employee would be taken as sufficient proof of misconduct and then the authority will have to embark upon a summary inquiry as to the nature and extentof the penalty to be imposed on the delinquent employee and in the course of the inquiry if the authority is of the opinion that the offence is too trivial or of a technical nature it may refuse to impose any penalty in spite of the conviction. This is a very salutary provision which has been enshrined in these Rules and one of the purposes for conferring this power is that in cases where the disciplinary authority is satisfied that the delinquent employee is a youthful offender who is not convicted of any serious offence and shows poignant penitence or real repentance he may be dealt with as lightly as possible. This appears to usto be the scope and ambit of this provision.'
12. As neither the employer nor the Labour Court nor the Industrial Court has addressed itself to the impact of the Standing Order and as finding has not been recorded that Shri Shukla was guilty of an offence involving moral turpitude, it is difficult to sustain the order passed by the Industrial Court and also the order of dismissal from service, copy of which is Annexure P/1. As such the petitioner would be deemed to have been dismissed contrary to law. Order Annexure P-1 is quashed. His legal heirs would be entitled to all consequential benefits.