Gulab C. Gupta, J.
1. This is an appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter called 'the Act'), against the award dated July 20, 1984 passed by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation (Labour Court), Jabalpur, in W.C.C. Case No. 51/81 (N.F) awarding the sum of Rs. 9,676.80 as compensation in favour of the respondent. The respondent has also challenged this order by filing his separate appeal which is Misc. Appeal No. 281/1984 (Om Jain v. Nissan Springs Pvt. Ltd. and Anr.) and has claimed interest and penalty on the aforesaid amount. Since both these appeals arise on the same set of facts, they are being decided by this judgment.
2. The respondent Om Jain had in his application dated December 8. 1981, submitted that he was employed as an Electrician with the appellants and was on duty on October 9, 1980 at 10.30 a.m., when an electric Motor fell on his right foot causing fracture of his ankle. According to him, he was first sent to Victoria Hospital for treatment and was subsequently shifted to Medical College, Jabalpur. He further claimed that he has developed 100% permanent disablement as a result of this accident and was therefore, entitled to a lump sum compensation of Rs. 26,880 from the appellants. He also claimed interest and penalty to the extent of 50% of the said amount. The appellants denied that the respondent suffered an injury on October 9, 1980, in the course of employment and arising out of employment. They specifically denied that an electric motor fell on the respondent's foot causing fracture. The learned Commissioner, on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties, held that the respondent suffered employment injury on October 9, 1980, as alleged and thereby suffered loss of 40% of his earning capacity. The respondent was, therefore, awarded a sum of Rs. 9,676.80 as compensation. It is this judgment which is impugned in the present appeal.
3. Submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants, in the main, is that though large number of documents were filed by the parties, none of them received any consideration from the learned Commissioner, and hence the impugned order is bad in law and does not decide the lis correctly. According to the learned Counsel, the impugned award is also perverse inasmuch as it ignores documentary evidence on record altogether. The learned Counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned award and submitted that no substantial question of law arises in the appeal for consideration of this Court and, therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. The learned Counsel further submitted that since the Commissioner has, without reason, not awarded interest and penalty even though necessary conditions for the same were existing, the appeal filed by the respondent deserves to be allowed.
4. Section 30 of the Act without doubt discourages ordinary appeals and requires a substantial question of law to be involved therein to enable the Court to entertain the same. In other words, jurisdiction of this Court, is to first ascertain whether a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. It is only when such a question is found to be involved, this Court would be entitled to deal with the appeal and not otherwise. This legal position is not only clear from the language used in Section 30 itself but has also been authoritatively stated in N.S. Thread Co. v. James Chadwick & Bros. AIR 1953 S.C. 357. The question Whether a finding is contrary to evidence on record is without doubt a question of law. It would, in fact, amount to grave procedural irregularity to altogether ignore the documentary evidence while reaching a factual conclusion. In Chunilal Mehta v. C.S. & M. Co. Ltd. AIR: 1962 S.C. 1314: 1962-1 Lab LJ 656 the Supreme Court laid down tests to determine whether appeal involves a substantial question of law. Those tests are (i) whether directly or indirectly it affects substantial rights of the parties, or (ii) the question is of general public importance, or (iii) whether it is not an open question in the sense that the issue is not settled by pronouncement of the Supreme Court or the like; or (iv) the issue is not free from difficulty, or (v) that it calls for discussion for alternative view. Only if one of those tests be satisfied, the Court would be entitled to examine the controversy in appeal. Section 25 of the Act requires the Commissioner to record evidence and for that purpose gives power under Section 23 to administer oath. Purpose of recording evidence is not only to give opportunity to the parties to place material with them before the Commissioner to enable him to decide the matter in accordance with law and thereby do justice between the parties and perform functions stated in Section 19 satisfactorily. Section 19(2) exclude the jurisdiction of Civil Court in matters required to be decided or dealt with by the Commissioner. In view of these statutory provisions, it is the legal obligation of the Commissioner to consider oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties to reach its conclusion. Findings arrived at by ignoring documentary evidence on record would be contrary to law and since such a finding will illegally affect rights of the parties, the same would necessarily give rise to a substantial question of law on the application tests laid down by the Supreme Court. This is, however, not to say that a mere wrong assessment of evidence could be included within the purview of this provision. It is not open to this Court to disturb the finding of fact only because the Commissioner has taken one of the plausible views of the evidence.
5. The facts of the case may, therefore, be examined to ascertain whether the grievance of the appellants is correct. A perusal of the impugned award, without doubt, indicates that it is based on statement of witnesses examined by two parties. Para 6 contains the summary of the statement of Ghanshyam Das (P.W. 1) and Om Jain (P.W.2) who has also produced documents Ex. P-1 to Ex. P-8. Para 8 of the award contains the summary of statement of Dr. Sahgal which, according to the learned Commissioner, supports the evidence of the respondent. Para 7 contains the criticism of the learned Counsel for the appellants to the statement of the respondent which criticism has been not by the learned Commissioner by the Statement of Shri. Shukla. Para 9 of the impugned order deals with the statement of Prahlad Rai, the defence witness without expressing any opinion about the correctness or otherwise of the statement. It is, therefore' clear that except for passing reference to the documents, the learned Commissioner has not even cared to look at them. Under the circumstances, the grievance that the documentary evidence was not considered by the learned Commissioner is fully justified and introduces an Infirmity in the impugned award entitling this Court to appreciate evidence and reach its own conclusion.
6. A perusal of the application filed by the respondent before the Commissioner indicates that the accident took place on October 9, 1980 at 10.30 a.m., when the electric motor fell on his foot causing 'crack and fracture, etc.,' as would be clear from para 1 of the application. The respondent Om Jain as P.W.I, has deposed on oath that he was required by Naseeb Chand, Head Foreman, to change the motor of oil filter. According to him, Ghanshyam Das, Ramesh, Lalloo Gupta and himself were trying to remove the machine from grinding machine. When the aforesaid three persons were lifting the machine, it fell on his right foot causing injury. From his evidence or evidence of any of the witnesses it does not appear as tp how big or heavy the machine was but hb claims to have fainted and started bleeding. According to him, he was taken to Doctor Sahgal who gave him an injection and sent to Victoria Hospital where he was admitted for about one and half months (Para 5). In cross-examination, he stated that Ex. P-2 was the slip of Victoria Hospital which was prepared on instruction of Naseeb Chand. Naseeb Chand has not been examined. He further deposed that an X-ray was taken on October 9, 1980 and his right leg was plastered. He denied that his Teg was plastered on October 28, 1980. He, however, explained that plaster on October 9, 1980, was removed after 15 days. He further deposed that he had gone to Dr. Vasudeo for consultation and told that the injury was suffered because of fall of electric motor on his foot. Evidence of this witness is contradicted by the document produced by him. Ex. P-2 which he claims to have received from Victoria Hospital on October 9, 1980 mentions that the injury of his right ankle was suffered two days before. It does not contain any statement that he was advised X-ray or put on plaster it. On the contrary it indicates that the G.I. Paint was applied and bandage put. From this document, it is clear that plaster was put on his foot on October 28, 1980. There is thus apparent discrepancy between the oral testimony of the appellant in the Court and this document. It was, therefore, necessary to explain the discrepancy. In any case, it introduces suspicion in the statement of the respondent. It is easy to change the oral statement to suit convenience but it is not so easy to change the official record of a public hospital like Victoria Hospital. X-ray report Ex. P-5 and the plate annexed thereto, would indicate that only, a crack fracture was discovered on his ankle on October 13, 1980. If an electric motor which requires three persons to be removed, had really fallen on the ankle, it would have caused serious injury and several bones would have fractured. Discovery of a crack fracture would make the story of the fall of an electric motor handled by three persons, doubtful. It is also not without any significance that he has not indicated anything about the accident in his applications Ex. P-9 and Ex. P-10, though he has written therein that he was being treated. It is only on February 4, 1981 (Ex. P-12), that he mentioned that he suffered injury because of fall of electric motor. But there also he does not state that he suffered this on duty. Then the respondent claims to be examined by Dr. Vasudeo who has produced certificate Ex. P-22. Surprisingly, Dr. Vasudeo has in this certificate noted that the respondent had a fall from height while working on a water tank and suffered the injury. Dr. Vasudeo (P.W.3) has proved correctness of this report and has asserted that he wrote everything on being told by the respondent Om Jain. This adds further suspicion to the correctness of the statement of respondent Om Jain. It is true that the respondent has, in his statement, denied that he made any such statement to Dr. Vasudeo (Para 17). But there appears to be no reason why Dr. Vasudeo who was engaged by the respondent himself, would make a false statement in the certificate. It is, therefore, plain that the document Ex. P-2 and P-23 introduce an infirmity in the state of respondent Om Jain and make it unreliable. Document Ex. P-2 is supported by register Ex. P-23 and P-24 which confirm the fact that the respondent's right foot was put to plaster on October 28, 1980. and not on October 9, 1980. X-ray report Ex.P-5 would indicate that the X-ray was taken on October 13, 1980 and report given on October 27, 1980. It is, therefore, natural for the hospital authority to put his right leg on plaster on October 28, 1980. It is, therefore, not possible to believe the oral testimony of the respondent that he was X-rayed on October 9, 1980, and put on plaster on that day. There is no reason to doubt the correctness of Ex. P-2 which has been admittedly written in the normal cause. Be that as it may, oral statement of respondent Om Jain, when read in the context of documentary evidence, does not inspire confidence and. cannot, therefore, be the basis of awarding compensation.
7. It is true that the Workmen's Compensation Act is a welfare legislation intended to give benefit to the workmen suf-feping employment injuries. It is also true that because of this message of social justice, this Court does not insist on strict proof of facts from the employees. This is, however, not to say that the legislation should be permitted to be used for entertaining false claims and conferring undeserved benefits. The Act, in the opinion of this Court, imposes corresponding obligation on the employees to obtain benefit honestly. Under the circumstances, it is the bounden duty of this Court not only to see that no real claims are defeated on technical considerations or hyper-technical approach but also that false claims are not entertained because of undeserved sympathy. Since this Court is not satisfied about the correctness of the claim of the respondent, it considers its obligation to allow the appeal and set aside the impugned award.
8. In this view of the matter, no question of allowing respondent's appeal should arise.
9. The appeal succeeds and is allowed by setting aside the impugned award. The appeal No. 281/84 preferred by the respondent is, therefore, dismissed. No order as to costs.