Shantanu Kemkar, J.
1. This appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code has been filed by the appellant-tenant against the judgment and decree dated 17-2-2004 passed by the VI Additional District Judge, Indore in Civil Suit No. 139-A/2001, by which a decree for eviction against him has been passed on the grounds under Section 12(1)(e) and (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act').
2. Briefly stated, the respondent-landlord filed a suit on 27-9-2001 for eviction and for recovery of rent against the appellant-tenant on the grounds under Section 12(1)(a), (c), (e) and (f) of the Act. In his plaint, he averred that House No. 96 HIG Junior (GH) situated at Scheme No. 54, Indore owned and possessed by him was let out by him to the appellant-defendant in the month of November, 1986, for a monthly rent of Rs. 1,300/- for residential purpose. He alleged that since last few years the appellant-tenant changed the use of the premises let out to him and instead of using it for residential purpose, had started using it as Nursing Home in the name of Gayatri Nursing Home. He alleged that the appellant-tenant is irregular in paying rent. A Civil Suit No. 113-A/1987 was filed against him for recovery of rent and on his assurance that he will pay the rent regularly, the suit was compromised. Thereafter, again as he failed to pay the rent, a Civil Suit No. 593-A/1995 was filed, which again was compromised on the basis of assurance given by him to pay the rent regularly. He also alleged that this repeated failure of payment of rent by the appellant and dishonour of cheque given towards rent caused nuisance to him. He also stated that presently he is residing with his parents in his father's house situated at 101, Indralok Colony, Indore. He and his family, consisting of his wife and two sons, now wants to reside in his own house in place of his father's house for family circumstances and for this purpose, he bonafulely needs the suit house and for such need, he has no other house of his own in the city of Indore. He further stated that in one garage like room of the suit house, he will start business of General and Provision store and for this non-residential need, he has no accommodation of his own in the city of Indore. He averred that presently he is doing business of auto parts in the premises let out to him by Vaishnav Trust. He also averred that few days back the appellant-tenant started raising unauthorised construction on the terrace of the suit house which he did not stop even after repeated requests.
3. The appellant-tenant denied the plaint averments and stated that the suit house was let out to him for residential as well as non-residential purposes. The allegation levelled by the plaintiff that he is irregular in making payment of rent was also denied by the appellant. He also denied the bonafide need of the suit house of the respondent-plaintiff for residential as well as for non-residential purposes. According to him, alleged bonafide need of residential purpose is only a pretext to get the accommodation vacated from him. As regards allegation of nuisance, the same was also denied. He also denied the raising of any construction unauthorizedly on the terrace of the suit house.
4. On the basis of the pleadings, the Trial Court framed seven issues. After recording evidence of both the sides, the Trial Court passed the decree in favour of the respondent-plaintiff on the grounds of bonafide requirement of the suit house by him for residential and non-residential purpose. However, the Trial Court did not pass decree on the grounds of arrears of rent and nuisance, holding that both these grounds have not been proved by the respondent-plaintiff.
5. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, the appellant-tenant has filed this appeal. The respondent-plaintiff filed cross-objection against the impugned judgment and decree for not granting him a decree on the grounds of arrears of rent and nuisance. However, at the time of arguments, Shri S.R. Saraf, learned Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff did not press cross-objection. Accordingly, the cross-objection is dismissed as not passed.
6. The contention of Shri S.S. Garg, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant is that the plaintiffs case was that the suit house was let out to the appellant-tenant by the respondent only for residential purpose. In the circumstances, he argued that the need which was pleaded being for residential and non-residential purpose, the decree could not have been passed by the Court below for both the needs treating tenancy to be a composite tenancy. His contention is that granting of such decree would amount to splitting up of tenancy which could not have been done, instead, the Trial Court ought to have rejected the plaintiffs suit. He also argued that the Trial Court has committed error in holding that the plaintiff has been able to prove his bonafide need for residential purpose. According to him, non-examination of the plaintiffs wife to prove the dispute between her and her mother-in-law, is fatal and as such, the decree could not have been passed on the ground that the plaintiff wants to reside in his own house to avoid dispute between his wife and his mother. He submitted that the plaintiff having pleaded that the suit house was let out for residential purpose, the Trial Court could not have passed the decree on the basis of defendant's plea that the accommodation was let out for both the purposes. According to him, the plaintiff has to prove his case and on the basis of pleadings/defence of the defendant, the decree could not have been passed. He placed reliance on the judgment passed by this Court in case of Krishna Kumar Tiwari v. Ghasi Prasad Agrawal 1991 2 MPWN 18, Pratap Rai Tanwani and Anr. v. Uttam Chand and Anr. : (2004)8SCC490 , and on Sait Nagjee Purushottam and Co. Limited v. Vimalabai Prabhulal and Ors. : AIR2006SC770 .
7. Shri S.R. Saraf, learned Counsel for the respondentplaintiff, while supporting the impugned judgment and decree argued that no doubt, it was the case of plaintiff that the suit house was let out for residential purpose and the requirement as pleaded by him in the notice (Exh. P-4) and in the plaint, was for residential as well as non-residential purpose, the Trial Court has rightly passed the decree holding both the needs to be proved by the plaintiff. He submitted that it was the stand of the appellant-defendant that the suit house was let out to him for residential and non-residential purpose and the Trial Court having held that the suit house was let out to him for residential as well as for non-residential purpose, the decree has rightly been passed in favour of the plaintiff. In support, he placed reliance on a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Jagjitkumar v. Jagdeeshchandra 1982 MPRCJ 152 : 1982 JLJ 319 and on Avinash Agrawal alias Vanshi and Ors. v. Smt. Reena Agrawal (2005) 4 MPLJ 386.
8. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. Perused the record of the case.
9. In order to prove his case, the respondent-plaintiff examined himself as P.W. 1, his mother Smt. Pramila (P.W. 2) and Mahesh Kumar (P.W. 3). The appellant-defendant examined himself as D.W. 1, Smt. Leela (D.W. 2), Vidyadhar (D.W. 4), Omprakash (D.W. 5) and Shakti Singh (D.W. 6).
10. Plaintiff Anoop Padalia (P.W. 1) in his deposition stated that House No. 96, HIG Junior (GH) Scheme No. 54, Indore was let out by him to the appellant-defendant on rent at the rate of Rs. 1,300/- per month in November, 1986. The house was given on rent for residential purpose, but since last few years, the appellant-defendant stopped residing in it and without his consent and permission had started a Nursing Home in the name of Gayatri Nursing Home. He further stated that the appellant-tenant was always irregular in paying the rent and for recovery of rent, he had to file suits on earlier occasions. This act on the part of the appellant-tenant caused nuisance to him. In his deposition, he further deposed that presently, he and his family are residing in his father's House No. 101, Indralok Colony, Indore. He stated that apart from him in his family, he is having his wife and two sons. He further stated that for family reasons, now, he does not want to reside with his parents and wants to live separately in his own house with his family members and for this purpose, he has no other house of his own in the city of Indore. He stated that in the suit house in one garage like room he will start business of General and Provision store and for this purpose, he has no accommodation of his own in Indore city. Presently, he is doing business of auto parts in the accommodation taken on rent from Vaishnav Trust. He also deposed about unauthorized construction by the tenant on the terrace of the suit house. In his crossexamination, he stated that he is the only son of his parents and having no grudge with his parents, however, he stated that disputes between his wife and his mother goes on, and to avoid such disputes, he wants to leave the house of his father and wants to live in his own suit house. He also stated that he is doing business since last 18-20 years in the shop rented out to him by Vaishnav Trust. He denied that he has falsely stated about the dispute between his wife and his mother. He deposed that he is in the need of the suit house since 2-3 years prior to the date of his deposition as there is increase in the disputes between his mother and his wife. The plaintiffs mother Smt. Pramila (P.W. 2) in her deposition made a categorical statement that because of her dispute with her daughter-in-law, she and her husband want to live separately. The plaintiff would reside with his family in his own house and she and her husband will continue to stay in her husband's house at 101, Indralok Colony, Indore. She also stated that for this purpose, the plaintiff has no other house of his own except the suit house in the city of Indore. In her crossrexamination, she stated that the plaintiff and his family were residing with them since 1989. She further deposed that in order to avoid disputes, it has been decided by her husband to reside separately. She stated that she is not having any dispute with his son but her dispute is with her daughter-in-law. Mahesh Kumar Mundra (P.W. 3) stated that he is working on the post of Cashier in the Vaishnav Educational and Charitable Trust. He stated that the plaintiff is a tenant of the Trust and is doing his business in the shop of the Trust constructed in the stadium of Vaishnav School premises.
11. Defendant Dr. Babulal Gupta (D. W. 1) did not dispute the tenancy and the rate of rent. He, however, stated that he was never irregular in making the payment. According to him, the suit house was given to him for residential as well as non-residential purpose for running a Nursing Home and for his residence. He stated that no nuisance was caused by him to the plaintiff and he did not raise the alleged unauthorized construction. According to him, the so-called construction was already existing when it was let to him on rent. He denied the plaintiffs bonafide need for residential as well as non-residential purposes. He, however, pleaded his ignorance to the plaintiffs case that he is doing the business in the shop rented out to him by Vaishnav Trust. Smt. Leela Mehta (P.W. 2) stated that the suit house was let out to the appellant-tenant for residential as well as non-residential purpose. Vidyadhar Shukla (D.W. 4) deposed that talks were going on between the plaintiff and the defendant about selling of the suit property to the appellant-tenant. Omprakash Tiwari (D.W. 5) deposed that the suit house was given to the appellant-tenant on rent for both the purposes, i.e., residential as well as non-residential. Similar is the statement of Shakti Singh Pawar (D.W. 6).
12. After analyzing the aforesaid evidence, the Trial Court recorded the finding that the suit house was let out by the respondent-plaintiff to the appellant-defendant not only for the purpose of his residence but also for the purpose of running a Nursing Home. Thus, on the basis of the evidence led by the parties and taking into consideration the stand taken by the defendant himself, a finding has been recorded by the Trial Court that the suit house was let out for residential as well as non-residential purposes. The plaintiffs case from the very beginning was that the suit house was given for the residential purpose and the same is bonafidely required by him for residential as well as for non-residential purpose. The plaintiff through his own evidence and on the basis of the evidence of his mother, Smt. Pramila (P.W. 2), has been able to prove that presently he is residing in his father's house situated at Indralok Colony, Indore and that he has no other suitable house of his own in the city of Indore. He has also been able to prove that he requires the suit house bonafidely for residence of himself and for residence of his family consisting of his wife and two sons. His testimony as well as the testimony of Smt. Pramila (P.W. 2) clearly establishes that the plaintiff bonafidely needs the suit house to live separately from his parents and to avoid disputes between his wife and his mother. The non-residential need has also been clearly established by the plaintiff from his evidence and the evidence of Mahesh Kumar (P.W. 3). It has come in their evidence that presently the plaintiff is doing his business of auto parts in the rented premises belonging Vaishnav Trust. He has also been able to prove that out of the suit premises in one garage like room he will start business of General and Provision store and for this purpose also, he has no accommodation of his own in Indore city.
13. In the light of the aforesaid, even if it is assumed that the suit house was let out by the plaintiff as per his own version only for residential purpose, the decree of eviction has rightly been passed by the Trial Court as the plaintiff successfully proved the bonafide need for residential purpose also apart from non-residential purpose. In the present case, the appellant's-defendant's ' version that the suit house was let out for both the purposes has been found to be proved by the Trial Court on the basis of the evidence led before it. The Trial Court held that it was a case of composite tenancy. It also held that the plaintiff has been able to establish that he requires the suit house for both the purposes. Having held so in my view, a decree for eviction of the appellant-tenant from the entire suit house could have been and has rightly been passed. In the case of Jagjitkumar v. Jagdeeshchandra (supra), it has been held that even though a landlord requires a part of accommodation let out for the purpose for which the accommodation was let out, he becomes entitled to seek eviction from the entire accommodation, if he is able to prove the conditions specified under Section 12(1)(e) and (f) of the Act. In the circumstances, even if the plaintiffs case was that the suit house was rented to the tenant only for residential purpose, the decree could have been passed as the plaintiff has been successful in proving his need for residential purpose also.
14. The contention of the appellant that since the plaintiff did not examine his wife and since he is residing for such a long time with his parents itself shows that the need is not bonafide, cannot be accepted. The plaintiff and his mother categorically stated about the dispute between the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, therefore, in my considered view there was absolutely no necessity for the plaintiff to have examined his wife also. Merely because the appellant continued to reside with his parents during the pendency of the suit, it cannot be held that the bonafide need to reside separately with his family in his own house is extinguished. Pratap Rai Tanwani and Anr. v. Uttam Chand and Anr. (supra), on which reliance has been placed by the defendant does not support his case rather it supports the plaintiffs case because it has been held by the Supreme Court that crucial date is the date of the petition. It is pernicious unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale after passing through all the previous levels of litigation merely on the ground that certain developments occurredpendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period. If the cause of action is to be submerged in such subsequent events on account of malady of the system, it would shatter the confidence of the litigant despite the impairment already caused. True it is that a party has to plead and prove its case as held in the case of Sant Nagjee v. Vimalabal (supra). I find that the plaintiff pleaded that the suit house was given on rent for residential purpose, he pleaded the bonafide needs in regard to residential as well as non-residential purpose. The Trial Court on appreciating the evidence recorded the finding that the suit house was let out for composite purpose, and accordingly passed the decree. I find no lacuna in the pleadings of the plaintiff. I also find that he has proved both the needs. The case of Krishna Kumar Tiwari (supra), is on different footing and has no application to the facts of this case.
15. In this view of the matter, I find that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court is based on sound appreciation of the evidence and it requires no interference what-so-ever. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and decree deserves to be and is hereby affirmed. The appeal is dismissed. The parties to bear their own cost.