A.M. Sapre, J.
1. The decision rendered in this second appeal shall also govern disposal of other connected second appeal being S.A. No. 573 of 2002 because both these appeals arise out of the same judgment/decree so too the suit.
2. This second appeal is filed by the defendant No. 1 under Section 100 of CPC against the judgment/decree dated 23-9-2002, passed by learned IVth Additional District Judge, Mandsaur, in C.A. No. 3-A of 2001, which in turn arises out of Civil Suit No. 6-A of 2000, decided by Ist Civil Judge, Class I, Mandsaur, on 17-11-2000. Both the Courts below, i.e., Trial Court as well as First Appellate Court have decreed plaintiff's suit giving rise to filing of this second appeal by defendant No. 1 whereas, the other second appeal (573 of 2002) is filed by defendant Nos. 2 to 6 contending that the appeal involves substantial question of law as is contemplated under Section 100 of CPC. So the question that arises for consideration in these appeals is, whether appeals involve any substantial question of law, or not
3. Heard Shri A.K. Sethi, learned Counsel for the appellant on the question of admission.
4. At the out set it may be taken note of that in an eviction suit, a decree for eviction can be claimed on any of the ground contained in Section 12(1) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. In other words, though the legislature has provided several grounds to seek eviction of a tenant, yet one ground is held sufficient to evict the defendant/tenant, if made out on facts and in confirmity with the requirement of ground contained under Section 12 (1) ibid. It is not necessary for the landlord to establish existence of each and every ground though taken in the plaint.
5. It is an eviction matter. Respondent No. 1 filed a suit against the appellant (defendant No. 1) and respondent Nos. 2 to 6 (defendant Nos. 2 to 6) for their eviction from the suit accommodation inter-alia on the ground covered under Section 12 (1) (c), (e) and (o) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. So far as Trial Court was concerned, it decreed the suit on the grounds covered under Section 12 (1) (c) and (e). However, in first appeal filed by the defendants and also by the plaintiffs, the First Appellate Court not only confirmed the decree passed under Section 12 (1) (c) and (e) ibid by dismissing the appeal filed by defendants but proceeded to decree the suit on the ground failing under Section 12 (1) (o) ibid. In other words, the First Appellate Court has decreed plaintiff's suit in entirety on all the three grounds. As is clear so far as grounds under Section 12 (1) (c) and (e) ibid are concerned, they are of affirmance. It was held so far as ground under Section 12 (1) (e) ibid was concerned that plaintiff being the owner/landlord of the suit accommodation needs the house in suit for his residence as also for the members of his family and that he has no other house of his own in city.
6. It is now a too well settled principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in series of cases and which is being consistently followed by the High Courts as law laid down under Article 141 of Constitution of India that a question of bona fide need set up by the plaintiff (landlord) whether for residential purpose or non-residential, is a question of fact. It is only when the finding so recorded on this issue is found to be dehors the pleading or against the evidence led or is based on no evidence, or is against the statutory requirement of law [12 (1) (f) of the Act], or it is so bad that no judicial man can ever reach to its conclusion, then such finding is amenable to interference in second appeal. When I examine the facts of this case keeping in view these parameters then I am unable to notice any such infirmity in the impugned judgment and hence, it deserves to be upheld.
7. Coming to the facts of the case, I find no case to upturn the finding in so far as it relates to ground of bona fide need under Section 12 (1) (e) ibid is concerned. Firstly, it is a finding of fact, secondly, it is concurrent in nature and hence, binding on the Second Appellate Court. Thirdly, even if one probe into the issues of fact, then also it does not call for any interference. The plaintiff has proved his title by filing a sale-deed by which he has acquired the title. He has proved the tenancy as also attornment. He has also proved that he has no other house of his own where he can live with his family members except the suit house. He has also proved his personal residential need by disclosing his family members. What more material is needed to prove the ground under Section 12 (1) (e) of the Act than the one mentioned supra in a tenancy suit.
8. Submission of learned Counsel for the appellants in both these appeals was that firstly ownership of plaintiff was not properly proved and secondly, no decree under Section 12 (1) (e) could be passed because of the bar contained in Section 12 (4) of the Act in filing suit within one year from the date of acquisition of title in suit property. Both these submissions are entirely misplaced and hence, deserves to be rejected. It is now a well settled principle laid down by Their Lordships of Supreme Court that in a tenancy suit, one is not required to prove the ownership like a title suit. Even then in the present case, the plaintiff has filed a title deed (sale-deed) and proved his title. No flaw thus, can be found in this finding. Coming to the second submission, it has no merit. The suit was filed in the year 1985 whereas the ground for eviction contained in Section 12 (1) (e) of the Act was taken by way of amendment in the year 1993. It was thus, raised much after the expiry of one year from the date of sale. A ground which was not available on the date of suit by virtue of bar can always be taken on the expiry of bar by way of amendment in the plaint.
9. Once, I uphold the ground contained in Section 12 (1) (e) of the Act, i.e., bona fide need of plaintiff for his residence, then it is not necessary to consider the legality and validity of other two grounds on which the decree is also passed in plaintiffs' favour, because even if the appellant (defendant) is able to successfully assail these two grounds, it will be of no consequence.
10. Accordingly and in view of aforesaid discussion, the appeal fails and is dismissed in limine by holding that it does not involve any substantial question of law. However, taking into account all facts and circumstances of the case and the fact that defendant has been in possession, I grant appellant/ defendant three months time to vacate the suit accommodation from the date of this judgment, provided appellant deposit entire arrears of rent together with the cost, if awarded within two weeks from the date of this judgment. The appellant shall also deposit three months rent in advance by way of damages for use and occupation within fifteen days and shall further submit an undertaking before the Executing Court duly supported by an affidavit that he shall vacate the suit accommodation on the expiry of three months from the date of this judgment. In case, if appellant complies with these conditions, the respondent will not execute the decree upto three months. Failure to comply, will entitle the respondent to execute he decree. No costs.
C.C. within a week.